TURKEY AND THE WAR ON TERROR
For Forty Years We Fought Alone

Andrew Mango

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Turkey has been the target of terrorism since the 1960s but, until President George W. Bush declared his war on terror, Turkish efforts to fight terrorists enjoyed little sympathy in the West. Comments were mostly focused on the justifications advanced by terrorists and on complaints that human rights were violated in the course of anti-terrorist operations. The attacks on the USA of 9/11 and then the terrorist attacks on British targets and on synagogues in Istanbul in November 2003 have led to a re-evaluation of the costs that terrorism has imposed on Turkey and to a greater readiness to co-operate with Turkish authorities in facing the continuing menace of terror. The time is now ripe to examine the history of terrorism inside Turkey and against Turkish targets outside the country, and to consider the extent to which it has harmed the country’s peaceful development. Andrew Mango, who has spent his professional life following and analysing current affairs in Turkey, tells this story to which the West has until recently closed its ears.

This book will be of interest to undergraduate and postgraduate students of Turkey, terrorism, security studies and international relations.

Born in Istanbul, Andrew Mango spent forty years working for the BBC World Service where he was in charge of Turkish-language broadcasts. He has written extensively on Turkey. His most recent publications include Ataturk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (1999), Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (1994) and The Turks Today (2004). Since his retirement he has been a full-time author, journalist, lecturer and consultant on modern Turkey, which he visits several times a year.
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I could never have written this book without the help and encouragement provided by Mr Asım Kocabıyık, founder and president of Borusan Holding A.Ş., who obtained for me the main studies on the subject of terrorism which have appeared in Turkey. Borusan has made notable contributions to Turkish cultural life by sponsoring one of the country’s finest philharmonic orchestras and by aiding the publication of lavishly illustrated and sumptuously produced books on Turkey’s artistic treasures. Sadly, Turkey shares with the West not only a common cultural heritage, but also common problems. I hope that by relating Turkey’s experience in dealing with one of the world’s most pressing problems, that of terrorism, this study will serve the common interest of Turkey’s foreign partners and of Turkish society, and will promote a better understanding of Turkey as it advances towards its goal of full membership of the European Union, symbol of freedom, reconciliation and peaceful order in a troubled world.

Andrew Mango
London, October 2004
ACRONYMS

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
ARGK (Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan) Kurdistan People’s Liberation Army (Kurdish)
ASALA Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
AYÖD (Ankara Yüksek Öğretim Derneği) Ankara Higher Education (Student) Association (Turkey)
CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) Republican People’s Party (Turkey)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CILDEKT (Comité International pour la libération des députés kurdes emprisonnés en Turquie) International Committee for the Liberation of Kurdish Paliamentarians Imprisoned in Turkey (France)
DDKD (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Derneği) Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Association (Turkey)
DDKO (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları) Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (Turkey)
DEP (Demokrasi Partisi) Democracy Party (Turkey)
DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi) Democratic People’s Party (Turkey)
Dev-Genç (Devrimci Gençlik) Revolutionary Youth (Turkey)
Dev-Sol (Devrimci Sol) Revolutionary Left (Turkey)
DHKP/C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi) Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (Turkey)
DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions (Turkey)
DSP (Demokratik Sol Partisi) Democratic Left Party (Turkey)
ERNK (Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan) National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (Kurdish)
ACRONYMS

ESPГ (Ezilenlerin Sosyalist Platformu/Grubu) Socialist Platform/Group of the Oppressed (Turkey)

ETA (Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna) Basque Homeland and Liberty (Spain)

EU European Union

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FESK (Fakir ve Ezilenlerin Silâhli Kuvvetleri) Armed Forces of the Poor and the Oppressed (Turkey)

GAL (Grupos Antiteroristas de Liberación) Anti-terrorist Liberation Groups (Spain)

HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi) People’s Democracy Party (Turkey)

HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi) People’s Labour Party (Turkey)

HPG (Hêzen Parastîna Gel) People’s Self-Defence Forces (Kurdish)

HRK (Hêzen Rizgariya Kurdistan) Kurdistan Liberation Forces (Kurdish)

İBDA-C (İslamî Büyük Doğu Akîncılar-Cephesi) Islamic Grand Orient Raiders-Front

İCCB-AFİD-HD (İslamî Cemaatler ve Cemiyetler Birliği-Anadolu Federe İslam Devleti-Hilâfet Devleti) Union of Islamic Associations and Congregations-Anatolian Federal Islamic State-Caliphate State (Turkish in Germany)

IGMG (Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüş) National Vision Islamic Association (Turkish in Germany)

IMK Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (Iraq)

IMRO Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation

IRA Irish Republican Army

JCAG Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide

JİTEM (Jandarma İstihbarat Teşkilâtı Müdürlüğü) Directorate of the Gendarmerie Intelligence Organisation (Turkey)

KADEK (Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê) Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kurdish)

KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party (Iraq)

KNK (Kongra Netewiya Kurdistan) Kurdistan National Congress (Kurdish)

KONGRA-GEL (Kongra Gelê Kurdistan) Kurdish People’s Congress

MHA (Mezopotamya Haber Ajansî) Mesopotamian News-agency (Kurdish in Germany)

MÎT (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtî) National Intelligence Organisation (Turkey)

MLKP (Marksist Leninist Komünist Parti) Marxist Leninist Communist Party (Turkey)

MSP (Millî Selâmê Partisi) National Salvation Party (Turkey)
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>MTTB</td>
<td>(Milli Türk Talebe Birliği) National Turkish Union of Students (Turkey)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>PEJAK</td>
<td>(Partiya Jiyan Azadîya Kurdistan) Kurdistan Free Life Party (Kurdish in Iran)</td>
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<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish)</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
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<td>PUK</td>
<td>Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Iraq)</td>
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<td>PWD</td>
<td>(Partiya Welatpareza Demokrat) Patriotic Democratic Party (Kurdish)</td>
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<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Faction (Germany)</td>
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<td>SHP</td>
<td>(Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi) Social Democratic People’s Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>SODAP</td>
<td>(Sosyalist Dayanışma Platformu) Socialist Solidarity Platform (Turkey)</td>
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<td>RC</td>
<td>(Rifondazione Comunista) Communist Refoundation (Italian)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SODEP</td>
<td>(Sosyaldemokrasi Partisi) Social Democracy Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>TADOC</td>
<td>Turkish International Academy Against Drugs and Organised Crime (Turkey)</td>
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<td>TAJK</td>
<td>(Tevgera Azadiya Jinên Kurdistan) Free Women’s Movement of Kurdistan</td>
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<td>TDP</td>
<td>(Türkiye Devrim Partisi) Turkish Revolutionary Party</td>
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<td>THKO</td>
<td>(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu) Turkish People’s Liberation Army (Turkey)</td>
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<td>THKP/C</td>
<td>(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi) Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİKKO</td>
<td>(Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu) Turkish Worker-Peasant Liberation Army (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TİP</td>
<td>(Türkiye İşçi Partisi) Turkish Workers Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>T-KDP</td>
<td>(Türkiye-Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi) Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey</td>
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<td>TKP (ML)</td>
<td>Turkish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist), renamed Maoist Communist Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSİP</td>
<td>(Türkiye Sosyalist İşçi Partisi) Turkish Socialist Workers Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TÜSİAD</td>
<td>(Türkiye Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği) Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>YHO</td>
<td>(Yeni Halk Ordusu) New People’s Army (Turkey)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

On September 10, 2001, the world press reported briefly that the previous evening a suicide bomber had killed two policemen near the German consulate general in Istanbul. Twenty people were injured in the explosion, including an Australian tourist. She died soon afterwards. The suicide bomber belonged to a Marxist-Leninist group known as DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), which had carried out 53 murders in eight years. At the time, DHKP/C had an office, which flew its flag, in Brussels. Its newspaper was published in Holland. The free world took little notice as another statistic was added to the toll of terrorist outrages in Turkey. Terrorism had caused the death of more than 35,000 people in Turkey. But the fact that the country was a member of NATO and of the Council of Europe, and that it was an associate member and a candidate for full membership of the European Union did not ensure it sufficient support from its friends and allies in the fight against terrorism.

The following day the world reeled from the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. Some 3,000 people lost their lives in the outrages. President George W. Bush reacted swiftly and mobilised American power to fight terrorism worldwide. His warning that foreign countries would not be allowed to harbour terrorists was followed by military action in Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Taliban regime. America’s allies supported the action. The death of 3,000 Americans produced the kind of effective united response which the death of 35,000 Turks had signally failed to inspire. But there was now at least some understanding of the suffering terrorism had caused to Turkey. Even so, it was not until May 2, 2002, that the European Union finally entered on its list of banned terrorist organisations the two deadliest networks directed against Turkey: the separatist PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and DHKP/C.

This book looks at the history of terrorism which has targeted Turkey since the 1970s and at the international setting within which Turkey has had to combat it. But first, what is terrorism and when did it first appear in Turkey?
The beginnings

The term ‘terrorism’ was first used in France where it was applied to people who supported and then justified the Reign of Terror, a one-year period of savage repression of opponents or presumed opponents of the French Revolution between 1793 and 1794. The Reign of Terror witnessed the arrest of at least 300,000 suspects and 17,000 executions. From its beginnings, terrorism was thus a political tool. In revolutionary France that tool was used by people who had seized control of the state and sought to refashion it in accordance with their ideals. One of the defining characteristics of a modern state is that it has the monopoly of coercion within its territory. But the right of the state to coerce its citizens is subject to limits which political scientists have sought to define since classical antiquity.

A traditional formulation is that rulers of states should not transgress the principles of natural justice. Today it is generally accepted that states must respect human rights in the exercise of their legislative, executive and judicial powers. Human rights have been codified in a number of international and regional conventions. Sadly, examples abound of states which have violated these conventions. Where the purpose of the violation is to enforce obedience by terrorising people over whom a government exercises power, the term ‘state terror’ is often used. But this can confuse the issue of terrorism by widening its definition to a point where it is difficult or even impossible to apply it practically. The old-fashioned terms of ‘tyranny’, ‘oppression’ or ‘injustice’ provide a better description of the behaviour of governments which violate accepted norms of human rights.

Similarly, states at war with each other have always tried to instil fear in their opponents. Here too limits have been set by the laws of war which also apply to the use of irregulars in warfare. The treatment of prisoners, whether regular or irregular, in inter-state warfare is regulated by the Geneva conventions. When governments use terror to achieve their objectives, whether in war or in peacetime, they transgress their legitimate powers. Because of the power which they wield, governments can and do cause many more victims than do private individuals, whose recourse to violence is by definition illegitimate. But while the misbehaviour of governments, of rogue and of failed states can have a bearing on the problem of terrorism, it is a separate issue, and the response it elicits falls within the realm of inter-state relations and of international law which regulates them. A tighter definition of terrorism is needed if it is to be combated effectively.

The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines terrorism as ‘the systematic use of terror (such as bombings, killings and kidnappings) as a means of forcing some political objective’. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a terrorist is ‘a person who uses or favours violent and intimidating methods of coercing a government or a community’. Both definitions – the first
implicitly by the examples which it gives, and the second explicitly –
confine the use of the term ‘terrorist’ to non-state actors who use violence
to spread fear in pursuit of political aims. We shall come to the latest legal
definitions in a moment.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, terrorism was taken up
by anarchists who developed the theory of ‘propaganda of the deed’.
The term was coined by the Italian anarchist Errico Malatesta (1853–1932),
who travelled the world preaching his violent creed. Anarchist terrorists
attempted to kill leading ruling figures in order to demonstrate the vulner-
ability of the political system they sought to overthrow. Between 1890 and
1901 their victims included King Umberto I of Italy, the empress Elizabeth
of Austria, President Carnot of France and President McKinley of the
United States. Anarchists were not unduly distressed when their bombs also
killed innocent passers-by. In the popular mind, terrorism became closely
associated with anarchism, and even in recent years the terms ‘anarchist’
and ‘terrorist’ have been used interchangeably.

In the Ottoman Empire, there were two notable examples of ‘propaganda
of the deed’, both carried out by Armenian nationalist revolutionaries. In
1896, they stormed the head office of the Ottoman Bank in Istanbul, killing
four employees. The assailants were allowed to go abroad when great power
mediation ended the stand-off. Then in 1905 Sultan Abdülhamit II escaped
an assassination attempt when bombs planted by Armenian terrorists failed
to explode. The Sultan pardoned the assailants.

World War I was triggered by a terrorist outrage, the assassination of
Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg throne, by the Serbian
terrorist Gavrilo Princip in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914. The murder had been
planned in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, and ‘the connection of the
Serbian government with the assassination was unpleasantly close’. At his
trial, Princip admitted that Francis Ferdinand was killed because, ‘as future
Sovereign he would have . . . carried out reforms which would have been
clearly against our interests’. The reforms were intended to meet South Slav
grievances in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The terrorists did not want a
reformed Austria–Hungary; they wanted a Serb-dominated South Slav state.
The Archduke’s murder illustrated two points which remain valid to this
day: that reforms aimed at genuine grievances do not deflect terrorists from
their purpose, and that terrorists need a foreign base, and preferably the
complicity of foreign authorities.

Lenin did not believe that terrorism would lead to the success of a
socialist revolution. His brother, Aleksandr Ulyanov, had been hanged in
1887, while a student at the university of St Petersburg, for conspiracy
with a revolutionary terrorist group that plotted to assassinate Emperor
Alexander III. The plot did not shake the Tsarist regime. Lenin drew the
lesson that ‘propaganda of the deed’ would not help him achieve his aim,
which was to seize control of the state with its immense powers of coercion. It was World War I, the series of defeats suffered by Tsarist armies and the disaffection which these brought in their train in Russia, and German efforts to undermine the Tsarist empire that allowed Lenin to usurp power in 1917. Having eschewed terrorism as a means to gain power, he used terror to consolidate his hold on it. The reign of revolutionary terror he introduced surpassed in horror its French prototype. Stalin used terror on an even grander scale. So, of course, did Hitler. In all these cases, terror was a tool in the hands of tyrannical state actors.

Outside the totalitarian states in the years between the two world wars anarchists in Spain revived the old association of their creed with terrorism. Franco’s nationalists also used terror as a weapon. In the Balkans, nationalist revolutionary organisations, like IMRO (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation) and the Croatian Ustashe, sought to advance their cause through political assassinations.

Terrorism was hardly an issue between 1939 and 1945 when millions perished in World War II, as belligerent states sought to destroy each other. But it resurfaced as a burning issue in the 1950s and 1960s in countries lying outside the Communist bloc. Inside it, unofficial terrorists stood no chance as Stalinist rulers exercised their monopoly of terror.

Three main factors accounted for the rise of terrorism in non-Communist countries. They were: the Cold War, the conflicts (mainly of a nationalist nature) which accompanied and followed the break-up of Western empires, and the wave of radicalism which swept the young in prosperous countries (mainly in Western Europe and the USA), once the privations of the immediate post-war years were left behind. The three factors sometimes coalesced or reinforced each other.

In the context of the Cold War, the Soviet leadership saw a political advantage in terrorism outside the Communist bloc. True, Moscow did not sponsor terrorism directly. But its intelligence services and, particularly, the intelligence services of Soviet satellites gave discreet help to terrorists, above all in NATO countries. Foreign terrorists could obtain weapons in a tightly controlled Communist country, such as Bulgaria, and they were given refuge in Communist-ruled East Germany.

Discreet aid from the Soviet bloc sustained the terrorism which arose as a result of post-imperial conflicts. The three regions mainly affected were the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. In Africa, anti-colonialist terrorism hastened the end of foreign rule, but destabilised local societies which have yet to regain their equilibrium. Independence has been accompanied by instability causing widespread misery. In South Asia, on the other hand, terrorism was limited by the fact that, at first, the successor states were able to control their territories. The collapse of the state in Afghanistan and the use of terrorists as proxies in South Asian inter-state conflicts came later. But in the Middle East, the exodus of Palestinian refugees after the creation
of the state of Israel destabilised its neighbours. Palestinian terrorist organisations challenged the state in Jordan until King Hussein re-established his authority and expelled the Palestinian leadership in a bloody operation in September 1970, which Palestinians remember as Black September. The Palestinian leaders then moved to Lebanon where they established a state within a state. This lasted until 1982 when the Israelis invaded Lebanon and forced the departure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Lebanon then became a protectorate of Syria, which used terrorists for its own ends. The Syrian/Palestinian connection has been of prime importance in the development of terrorist organisations in the region and beyond. This has been particularly true of terrorists who have assailed the Turkish Republic.

‘Euro-terrorism’ is the third strand in the post-war history of terrorism. This, in turn, can be divided into two categories – ethnic terrorism (represented by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom, and the Basque separatist organisation (ETA) in Spain) and ideological terrorism, exemplified by the Red Brigades in Italy, the Baader–Meinhof gang in Germany, and Action Directe in France. The two categories overlap. Ethnic terrorists often profess radical social and political ideologies which provide common ground between them and ideological terrorists. These ideologies have two main ingredients – Marxism and anti-imperialism. All terrorist organisations call themselves anti-imperialist; most have, to a greater or lesser extent, been inspired by Marxism in its various guises.

The radicalism of the post-war generation of Europeans reached its culminating point in the Paris riots of 1968. The events (événements) of that year did not usher in a socialist revolution. On the contrary, the Gaullist French Republic matured, and the revolutionary tide slowly ebbed away in France and elsewhere in Western Europe. West European society was strong enough to contain the radicalism of its young people. As the appeal of revolutionary socialism faded, the young took up other causes – human rights, women’s rights, animal rights, the preservation of the environment, anti-globalisation, opposition to genetically modified food, etc. Nevertheless, 1968 has left its mark on Europe and the world. In the words of the French president François Mitterand, many middle-aged and middle-class West Europeans have ‘remained faithful to their youth’, at least platonically. Unfortunately – and not surprisingly – the enthusiasm of the young was often matched by their ignorance, particularly of foreign countries. Turkey has suffered much from this ignorance of foreign enthusiasts, well-meaning or otherwise.

The response

It was the hijacking of aircraft by Palestinian terrorists which first prompted action by the international community. United Nations conventions seeking
to eliminate this threat were signed in 1963, 1970, 1971 and 1988.\textsuperscript{6} The threat was not totally suppressed, but by spelling out what member countries should and should not do when an aircraft was hijacked, the UN helped to reduce the number of incidents. Conventions protecting other targets followed. In 1973, the year that the Turkish consul general and his deputy were assassinated by an Armenian terrorist in Los Angeles, the UN signed a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomats. However, this did not prevent the murder of another forty Turkish diplomats in subsequent years.

UN conventions followed in other specific areas: against hostage-taking (1979), for the protection of nuclear material (1980), the protection of shipping and of oil exploration platforms (1988), and against the misuse of plastic explosives (1991). Two conventions were more wide-ranging – the 1997 convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings and the 1999 convention seeking to outlaw the financing of terrorism. The terrorist outrages on September 11, 2001, showed that all these efforts did not go far enough and that they had to be supplemented.

The same was true of the European convention for the suppression of terrorism, concluded at Strasbourg on January 27, 1977. True, it gave what looked like a comprehensive definition of terrorist acts. But even this had loopholes. Thus, the Belgian authorities declined to prosecute a Turkish woman accused of taking part in the murder of a Turkish industrialist, on the grounds that the weapon used in the murder – a handgun – was not covered by article 1(e) of the convention which specified ‘the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb’.\textsuperscript{7}

There were other, more serious, loopholes. The whole purpose of the Convention was to prevent the description of terrorist acts as ‘political offences’ (article 1, paragraph 1). Yet when they ratified the Convention, Belgium and many other member states of the Council of Europe reserved the right to refuse extradition in respect of any offence which they considered to be a political offence.\textsuperscript{8} This negated the whole purpose of the treaty. France declared more eloquently that ‘Anyone persecuted on account of his action for the cause of liberty has the right to asylum on the territory of the Republic.’ What happens then if a terrorist commits a murder allegedly ‘for the cause of liberty’ – a not uncommon justification?

There were other possibilities to justify a failure to extradite terrorists. For example, article 3 stated that:

\begin{quote}
nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request for extradition . . . has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or \textit{political opinion}, or that that person’s position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons. [italics added]
\end{quote}
But it is the terrorist’s political opinions which justify, at least in his own mind, his recourse to violence. How then can a court fail to take them into account?

It is not surprising, therefore, that in spite of all the treaties and conventions, terrorists of various kinds and nationalities found it easy to operate out of Western Europe. In effect, the West gave shelter to its own enemies. What is more, the failure to take effective action against terrorism did not derive solely from the inadequacy of treaties and domestic laws, or from a laudable concern for human rights. Political considerations of national interest also came into play.

The first, perhaps the most natural, consideration is to avoid trouble at home. As the Turkish proverb puts it, ‘If a snake doesn’t bite me, may it live a thousand years!’ However, one can never be certain that the snake will not turn against the tolerant householder. The odds are that it will one day. France furnishes a striking example. As the French expert on terrorism, Claude Moniquet, put it, the Armenian terrorist organisation ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), which targeted Turkish diplomats, reached in 1982 ‘a sadly classic agreement’ with the French authorities: so long as ASALA did not mount any attacks in France, the French police was to shut its eyes to its use of French territory as a rear base. Claude Moniquet goes on: ‘The blindness of the [French] government was to be fully rewarded by the attack at Orly [airport] in July [1983, which killed eight and injured 52], proving that it is not only immoral, but also totally vain to negotiate with a terrorist group.’

Similarly, for years the French authorities failed to take decisive action against members of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA, which used French soil to mount attacks inside Spain. But as they tried to avoid trouble among Basques in France, they invited trouble from Spain. Spanish secret services decided to do the job the French had left undone and targeted Basque terrorists inside France. The tolerant attitude of the French authorities did not pay off and the two countries finally reached agreement to crack down on terrorists in their respective territories.

German authorities tried a different approach. When members of the terrorist Kurdish separatist organisation PKK committed crimes and disrupted traffic in Germany, they banned the organisation in 1993. However in 1997, after a period of relative calm, ‘two high level German officials met [the PKK leader Abdullah] Öcalan in Damascus in an effort to talk him into calling off attacks against Turks and Turkish businesses in Germany. Following this meeting, [Heinrich] Lummer [CDU representative from Berlin in the Bundestag] had a similar meeting with Öcalan during which he repeated the German government’s plea.’ As PKK violence decreased, ‘Kai Nehm of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office . . . announced that the PKK was no longer regarded as a terrorist organisation but rather as a criminal organisation.’
various criminal and terrorist activities, received very mild sentences during 1997 and 1998.’ The German authorities may thus have bought themselves some peace at home, while disregarding the difficulties faced by Turkish authorities in fighting PKK terror, partly sustained by funds collected, and encouraged by propaganda freely published in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe.

However, there are other reasons why some governments allow foreign terrorists freedom to operate on their soil. As we shall see, Syria used the PKK and other terrorist organisations in order to win concessions from Turkey. Greece allowed them facilities to gain leverage in its conflicts with Turkey, until the discovery of Öcalan on Greek diplomatic premises in Kenya gave the game away.

Terrorism has been an international phenomenon right from its beginnings. No terrorist organisation can operate for long without foreign bases. Allowing terrorists to establish such bases carries a cost for the host country. Aside from any moral considerations, enlightened self-interest should stop any tendency to allow, let alone actively provide, facilities for foreign terrorists. True, it is not always easy to distinguish between terrorists and dissenters. But a distinction can and must be made between peaceful dissent and the encouragement, let alone the organisation of, murderous operations. This rule is of universal validity. Its disregard is all the more to be deplored in relations between countries which share the same ideals and are members of the same organisations.

After September 11, NATO properly invoked article 5 of its founding treaty which declares that ‘an attack against one or more of them [the members of the Alliance] shall be considered an attack against them all’. But one must not disregard also the preamble to the treaty and the wording of article 2, under which the parties undertake to promote ‘conditions of stability and well-being’ in their area. Terrorism has assailed Turkey’s stability and well-being for nearly forty years. Turkey has signed and ratified all 12 international conventions and protocols concerning terrorism. But it is still the target of terrorists of various persuasions. Turkey’s experience provides a case study from which other countries can draw a lesson. It is, therefore, useful to know how the threat to Turkey developed, how it was fought at home, and how it was perceived abroad, particularly by Turkey’s friends and allies.
The first achievement of the Turkish Republic was to establish law and order in a country where lawlessness and brigandage had been endemic. One can even say that law and order were the precondition for the establishment of the republic. Speaking to journalists on January 16, 1923, some eight months before the republic was proclaimed, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father of the new state, said:

I believe that the overriding aim of domestic policy should be to establish order, security and discipline in the country. My latest enquiries have shown that . . . the level of order and security in the country is very high. Except for a couple of political bands – which have appeared and have been struck down recently – there have been no incidents. Even ordinary crime is decreasing.¹

Public order was disturbed sporadically when Atatürk began implementing his reforms. Secularisation which ended religious interference in public policy was resisted by conservatives. Tribes and provincial strongmen resisted control by a modern state. Atatürk himself escaped an assassination attempt in İzmir in 1926. Atatürk’s reforms amounted to a cultural revolution. Opposition to it had to be overcome if Turkey was to become a modern state. But as far as revolutions go, its cost in lives was small. Some violent incidents occurred on the periphery, but the main metropolitan areas remained peaceful. The most serious incidents took place in tribal areas. In 1925, a local religious leader, Şeyh Sait, raised a revolt in the south-east. His rebellion followed the abolition of the caliphate and was mainly religious in inspiration. But it had three other ingredients: nascent Kurdish nationalism, tribal resistance to central authority and inter-tribal rivalry. Some of the tribes helped the state put down the rebellion.

Much has been written about the Kurdish question in Turkey.² It is more accurate to call it the problem posed by Kurdish nationalism and, in particular, separatist nationalism. People of Kurdish origin are no more of a problem than citizens of other ethnic origins in Turkish society.
The nationalism of Atatürk and of his successors in the government of Turkey has been predominantly civic and territorial, and not ethnic. The Turkish Republic has been inspired by the French model of a unitary state built round a single national culture and with a single official language. The constitution defines a Turk as a citizen of the Turkish Republic, irrespective of religion and ethnic origin. This corresponds to the reality of Turkish society in which people from a variety of backgrounds live together, work together and intermarry. The Turkish Republic has thus extended to all its citizens the Ottoman tradition of an undivided community of Muslims. Separatist nationalism threatens the social harmony which the Republic has always sought to promote.

The suppression of the Şeyh Sait rebellion was followed by less serious outbreaks in the east of the country. By the time Atatürk died in 1938, on the eve of World War II, domestic peace had been restored. The Republic had mastered the rebellions with comparative ease, first, because it enjoyed the overwhelming support of its citizens and, second, because the rebels had failed to mobilise foreign support. True, Kurdish nationalist politicians were to be found in Syria and Iraq, from where they tried to stir up trouble. But the mandatory powers, France and Britain, kept an eye on them, as they did not want to antagonise Turkey. Turkey had friendly relations with its other neighbours too. Thus, a minor frontier rectification agreed with Iran stopped rebel infiltration from that country.

After World War II, the introduction of free party politics and the consequent accession to power of the Democrat Party in 1950 ushered in a period of political turbulence as an accompaniment to rapid social and economic development. But until the end of the 1960s, terrorism did not figure among the many problems the country faced as it fought its way through a crisis of growth. When violence finally broke out, it drew its inspiration from the West, from the radicalism which had affected students in wealthier and, therefore, different societies.

Student troubles were the harbinger of the four waves of terrorism that were to strike Turkey from the late 1960s to our day. As student unrest spawned left-wing and right-wing ideological terrorism, a group of Armenian terrorist organisations launched a murderous campaign against Turkish diplomats worldwide. Then came the ethnic separatist terror of the PKK. Finally, the state had to deal with brutal religious fundamentalist groups, which, like the PKK, had their roots in the south-east of the country. All these terrorist activities had links with Middle Eastern terrorists and their sponsors. They sometimes acted in common. But of the four waves, Armenian terrorism was different in that it operated largely outside Turkey. It is, therefore, simpler to deal with it first, before tracing the history of terrorism, which also had strong foreign links, but struck at targets inside Turkey.
The murder of Turkish diplomats

The Armenian terrorist campaign which targeted Turkish diplomats and other soft targets, mainly outside Turkey, lasted for ten years, between 1975 and 1985. Several groups were involved, which sometimes overlapped and at other times competed with each other. The main ones were founded in Beirut in 1975. They were ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide). The latter was believed to be an offshoot of the old-established nationalist party Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), which was to enjoy a spell in power in independent Armenia after the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Armenian terrorists who murdered Turkish diplomats justified their action by declaring that they wanted to draw the attention of the world to the suffering of their people in 1915. Indeed hundreds of thousands of Armenians and also of Turks had perished that year and in subsequent years, as fears about the loyalty of the Armenian minority, many of whose members sympathised with the Russian armies advancing into Anatolia – fears that were fed by sporadic risings and subversive activities by nationalist Armenians behind Ottoman lines in World War I – prompted the Ottoman authorities to deport the Armenian population from the war area and the lines of communications leading to it. Why, however, did this campaign arise sixty years after the events it purported to avenge? Two answers suggest themselves.

The first relates to the behaviour of diasporas generally. The first generation of migrants is fully occupied establishing itself in its new home and earning a living. Where they are successful, subsequent generations have the leisure to ponder their identity. Some are content to leave the past behind; others want to rediscover their roots and, at the same time, stop their indifferent kinsmen from losing their communal identity. On the other hand, where the migrant community is unhappy or threatened, the past is all it has to cling to. One ASALA leader stated characteristically:

[Our] primary objectives are to introduce the Armenian cause to world public opinion, and make the world feel that there is a desolate people that lacks a homeland or identity, and to arouse the national feeling of the Armenian diaspora.

In other words, the terrorists resorted to ‘propaganda of the deed’, as originally defined by the anarchists, in order to keep their community together, particularly where assimilation threatened to erode it.

The second reason for the rise of Armenian terrorism in 1975 was that civil war had caused a breakdown of authority in Lebanon and provided models for violent action. The Armenian community was caught in the
middle of the Lebanese civil war. Originally the Armenians had taken the side of the dominant Christian Maronite community. But when the Maronites lost their hold on power, those Armenians who were inclined to violence sided with Palestinian militants. From the outset, ASALA was supported by the PLO, and particularly by its most radical faction PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), which had a Marxist ideological basis. Alliances were forged also with other terrorist organisations. Thus at a press conference in the south Lebanese town of Sidon in 1980, ASALA announced that it would co-operate with the Kurdish separatist PKK6 (about which later). Opportunity and predisposition came together to give birth to terrorism.

A third factor deserves mention. When the Israelis expelled the PLO from Beirut in September 1982, ASALA had to look for new logistical bases, and even new patrons. The Armenian community in France provided cover and support, while the French authorities kept their eyes averted, as has already been mentioned. But one also finds Armenian terrorists living in or transiting through Athens and Greek-administered Cyprus. It is hard to believe that authorities there were unaware of their activities.

The first two murders of Turkish diplomats were committed in January 1973 by an elderly Armenian loner, Gourgen Yanikian, who invited to a meal the Turkish consul general in Los Angeles and his assistant and then shot them dead in cold blood. Yanikian set the pattern which ASALA and other terrorist groups then followed.

On October 24, 1975, nine months after the establishment of ASALA, the Turkish ambassador in Paris was murdered together with his bodyguard. In subsequent years Turkish diplomats were assassinated in France again and again, and in many other countries – Austria, Greece, Holland, Spain, Switzerland, even as far as Australia. Serving diplomats were not the only victims. The wife of the Turkish ambassador was assassinated in Madrid in June 1978; the son of the Turkish ambassador in Holland was killed in October 1979. There were attacks also on Turkish Airlines and tourist offices in several countries. Armenian militants practised indiscriminate terror when they bombed Istanbul airport and railway station in May 1977 and Ankara airport in August 1982. Then came the bomb attack at Orly airport in Paris, which killed four Frenchmen, two Turks, an American and a Swede. The terrorists had overreached themselves. As the French authorities finally took action, Armenian terrorism tapered off. There were only another two serious incidents: an unsuccessful attack on the Turkish embassy in Lisbon in June 1983, and an attack on the Turkish embassy in Ottawa in March 1985, where the ambassador escaped, but a Canadian guard was killed. Had the action which followed the Orly outrage been taken more promptly, the tide of violence would have been stemmed earlier. As it was, 42 Turkish diplomats were assassinated in 110 incidents in 21 countries.

After Orly, ASALA split into two factions, one of which faded into insignificance. The other, led by Hagop Hagopian, whom even his associates
called ‘the madman’, became a band of contract killers working closely with Arab terrorists. Hagopian was gunned down, significantly in Athens, in April 1988 in a mafia-like execution. At the time of his death, this Christian Armenian terrorist was carrying a South Yemeni passport in the name of ‘Abdul Muhammad’.

Armenian terrorism directed at Turkish civilian targets carried on for ten years because of the tolerant attitude of French and other foreign authorities. Thus a sentence of only thirty months in prison passed on the terrorist Abraham Tomassian for bombing the office of Turkish Airlines in the heart of Paris was an encouragement of, rather than a deterrent to, terrorism. Western press comments explaining the murder of innocent people in terms of an inter-communal conflict that had taken place 70 years earlier sought excuses for what was inexcusable.

Apart from its cost in human lives, the Armenian terror campaign carried a heavy financial cost, as Turkish premises had to be secured against attack. Millions of travellers were disturbed as security had to be increased in airports and aircraft.

ASALA tried to rewrite history with the bomb and the gun, but succeeded only in adding a new bloody chapter to it. Later, Armenian nationalists used Western parliaments in an absurd attempt to rewrite history by legislative process. These efforts were encouraged, if not inspired, by the government of independent Armenia which emerged from the ruins of the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, the domestic politics of that small country also suffered from the gun: in October 1999, the prime minister Vazgen Sarkisian, his political ally Karen Demirchian, together with five other parliamentary deputies and one minister, were shot dead in parliament by five gunmen. A more militant leadership emerged intent on hanging on to the fifth of the total territory of neighbouring Azerbaijan which Armenians had occupied and from which a million or so Azeris were forced to flee. At the same time there were persistent reports that Armenian authorities extended discreet help to PKK terrorists.

This revival of national hatred as an instrument of policy has not benefited Armenia. While its territory has been enlarged, at least provisionally, at the expense of Azerbaijan, its population is reported to have halved to only two million, as its people emigrate in search of a better life. They could achieve that better life at home, if the Armenian government laid aside its preoccupation with revenge (and irredentism) and mended its fences with its neighbours.

**Ideas that kill**

If an example were needed of the closeness of Turkey to Europe, it could be found in the fact that in June 1968, barely a month after the student troubles in Paris, left-wing students occupied several faculties of Istanbul University, preventing end-of-year examinations. But underneath the
surface, the motives of Turkish students differed from those of their Western counterparts. In the West, young romantics believed that they had taken up arms against the materialism of post-war reconstruction. In Turkey, it was the country’s under-development which angered the young. In fact, material conditions in Turkey had improved rapidly under the Democrat Party administration in the 1950s. However, as state revenues were inadequate to finance rapid development, the economy fell prey to inflation, and the country’s solvency could be sustained only with the help of foreign, mainly American, aid. But young militants found a different explanation for the country’s troubles in Marxist ideology which, for the first time in Turkey, could be propagated more or less freely under the auspices of the liberal constitution of 1961. Left-wing students became convinced, first, that only a socialist regime could ensure the rapid development of the economy, and second, that Turkey was being held back by, mainly American, imperialism, which wanted to keep the country as a dependency of the world capitalist system. Socialism did not commend itself to the Turkish electorate, and the Turkish Workers Party (TİP), which preached Marxist socialism, received less than 3 per cent of valid votes in the 1965 and 1969 elections. In the face of the electoral failure of their ideology, militants despaired of the parliamentary system.

Anti-imperialism had a greater appeal in a developing country like Turkey, which had in fact gained its independence by thwarting the designs of imperial great powers after World War I. After World War II, the Marxist assertion that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism provided a common language for a number of anti-colonial revolutionary movements in Algeria, Vietnam, Cuba and elsewhere. In Vietnam, after 1965, the main target was the United States which had intervened in order to prop up the government of South Vietnam. In Latin America, the United States was hostile to the revolution which brought Fidel Castro to power in Cuba in 1959 and was seen generally as the supporter of regimes which Marxist revolutionaries sought to overthrow. Castro and the Vietnamese Communists had made successful use of guerrilla warfare. Manuals explaining the use of this form of armed struggle and extolling its merits as an instrument of socialist revolution were written by such revolutionaries as the Vietnamese General Giap, Castro’s companion (and rival) Che Guevara and the Brazilian Marxist ideologist Carlos Marighela. These books were quickly translated into Turkish and read eagerly by left-wing militants.

Yet revolutionary anti-imperialism, particularly in its anti-American guise, had little relevance to Turkey. Unlike Latin America where ‘yanqui imperialism’ had long been a convenient scapegoat, Turkey had no tradition of anti-Americanism. Not only had America been considered a benevolent power during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–23), but after World War II its support had been enlisted to resist Soviet encroachment. This, of course, did not endear the United States to the handful of
Moscow-line Marxists in Turkey. Other militants, who took their cue from Mao’s China, from Vietnam or from Cuba, vented their anger on America as the enemy of Marxist socialism. They followed the fashion of the Third World and of its ideologists in the West.

When university authorities in Turkey met the students’ grievances and faculty sit-ins ended, militants upped the ante by attacking sailors of the US Sixth Fleet visiting Turkish ports. In July 1968, one student was killed when riot police broke into the Istanbul Technical University from which attacks on American sailors had been directed. The following month, left-wing violence was answered by a mob which hunted down left-wingers in the conservative city of Konya. The army had to intervene to restore order. The seeds of violence had been sown.

Left-wing militancy had its first advocates in university debating societies formed in the late 1950s under the name of Think Clubs. The clubs came together in a nation-wide federation, which, at first, supported the orthodox Marxist policy of the Turkish Workers Party. But in 1969 the federation came under the control of Maoists known as Proletarian Revolutionaries and Proletarian Socialists. It renamed itself as the Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (Dev-Genç) and embarked on a violent course. Some of the militants, mainly of provincial origin, advocated the utopian project of a revolutionary alliance of students, workers and peasants. The alliance was to emerge from student-led guerrilla warfare. Others, largely from a middle-class metropolitan background, sought to incite the army to stage a coup, which, they fondly thought, would bring to power a military-backed socialist regime on the lines of Baath governments in Syria and Iraq.

The first wave of left-wing terrorism was mild in comparison with what was to come. Banks were robbed, US and other installations were attacked with plastic explosives, kidnappings were staged to extract ransom. In 1971, growing disorder prompted the armed forces to demand the formation of a national government, which was to carry out social and economic reforms and thus deprive the revolutionaries of any excuse for violence. At the same time, martial law was declared and the military authorities used their new powers to crack down on the revolutionaries and their real or alleged mentors. The army had been provoked, but instead of installing a Baath-type regime, as the revolutionaries had hoped, it called in technocrats to reform the administration and tighten up the constitution.

The outside world did not figure solely as a source of inspiration for this first wave of domestic terrorism in post-war Turkey. In 1961 Turkey had begun to send workers to Germany under an agreement with the Federal Republic. By 1971 there were nearly half a million of Turkish workers in West Germany. Their community went through the difficulties of adaptation common to all migrants. These difficulties produced converts to extremist views – Marxist, Islamist fundamentalist, separatist – views
which could be readily expressed under German liberal laws. Militants from Turkey could thus find at least some support within the newly established Turkish community in Germany, which could serve as a rear base for their activity in Turkey. The Turkish White Book on terrorism, issued in 1973, notes that some of the publications of the extremist group of Proletarian Revolutionaries had appeared in the Federal Republic.\(^{14}\) Newspapers, magazines and other forms of printed propaganda material played an important part in the development of terrorism in Turkey, and some militant groups were known by the names of their publications, which attacked each other as often as they criticised ‘the system’. Germany (and later other West European countries) served also as a base for propaganda aimed at Western liberal opinion seeking to gain support for the revolutionary cause in Turkey.

Immediately after the military intervention of March 12, 1971, organisations such as the Democratic Front for a Free Turkey, the People’s Patriotic Front and the United Patriotic Front in Europe for a Democratic Turkey,\(^ {15}\) were established in Germany to disseminate propaganda in both directions – Turkey and Europe – and to provide logistic support for subversive activity in Turkey. While Maoists used West Germany for their sales pitch, Moscow-line anti-American propaganda and calls for a change of regime in Turkey poured out of a radio station (\textit{Bizim Radyo}/Our Radio) broadcasting from East Germany (and, later, Romania).

The West was useful for ‘propaganda of the word’. ‘Propaganda of the deed’ – in other words, terrorism – relied on help provided by the Communist regime in Bulgaria, by the PLO in Lebanon and the Baath party regime which seized power in Syria in 1966. In 1973, the White Book published by the Turkish government used guarded diplomatic language in describing foreign assistance to terrorism. It referred to Bulgaria as ‘a country in southern Europe, small in area and population, but working in the interests of a continental power [read the Soviet Union], with which it had close relations’ and said that this unnamed country ‘went so far as to train Turkish Communists in guerrilla practices’.\(^ {16}\)

The White Book went on:

The most effective help provided to Turkish Marxist-Leninists, including Maoists, comes from certain organisations on the territory of Turkey’s southern neighbours [read Syria and Lebanon]. These organisations were originally set up to advance by force of arms a national and regional cause [read the Palestinian cause]. But since 1969 there has been clear evidence of their activities against Turkey.

The White Book produced the evidence: photographs of a false identity document given by the PLO to a Turkish terrorist, of Turkish terrorists
arrested after they had been infiltrated from the south, and of weapons and ammunition with which they had been supplied. The White Book commented: ‘The weapons provided, were not low-quality, surplus to the requirements of the organisations in the south [read the PLO and its constituent groups], but brand-new, high-power weapons of the latest model.’

The formation of a national government in Turkey at the behest of the military in March 1971 did not put an immediate end to violence. In May 1971, immediately after the proclamation of martial law, terrorists of the Turkish People’s Liberation Front (THKC) kidnapped the Israeli consul general in Istanbul, Ephraim Elrom. They killed him when the authorities refused to meet their demand that all Marxist-Leninist militants should be released from prison and that the THKC proclamation should be broadcast for three days.

In March 1972, terrorists of the Turkish People’s Liberation Party (THKP) and the Turkish People’s Liberation Army (THKO) kidnapped two British and one Canadian radar technicians. They were killed in a fire-fight when the army surrounded the terrorists’ hide-out in a village in northern Turkey. Later that year, terrorists hijacked two Turkish airliners and forced them to fly, significantly, to Sofia, Bulgaria. The Turkish authorities once again refused to meet the terrorists’ terms, but this time bloodshed was avoided.

Gradually, the situation was brought under control. By October 1973, when free elections were held and military commanders withdrew from the political arena, terrorism seemed to have been defeated. The following year, a new government headed by the social-democratic statesman Bülent Ecevit proclaimed a wide-ranging amnesty. The constitutional court extended it in July 1974. As a result, some of the young radicals who had gone to Syria to train as revolutionary fighters, as well as others who had fled to the West to agitate for the revolution, returned to Turkey. A few changed their views with time, and joined the national mainstream as liberals. They supported prime minister (later, president) Turgut Özal’s free-market reforms in the 1980s, and the campaign for membership of the European Union in subsequent years. They had dipped their toes in the muddy water of terrorism and realised that it carried deadly germs. But the amnesty of 1974 also let loose quite a few unrepentant terrorists. They and new converts to their cause could count on continued foreign support for their efforts to destabilise Turkey.

A civil war in the making

The pause in violence following the military crackdown between 1971 and 1973 was short-lived. In 1975, after the resignation of Bülent Ecevit’s first government, trouble started again on university campuses. The following year, more than forty people were killed in clashes between right-wing and
left-wing students and between the latter and the security forces. Higher education was disrupted. For the next five years, not only universities but even some high schools became battlegrounds. Statistics of political violence tell their own story: 231 political murders in 1977, 832 in 1978, 898 during the nine months between December 1978 and September 1979, and 2,812 during the following twelve months which led up to the assumption of power by the armed forces on September 12, 1980. The majority of those killed were students and other young militants. But the victims included also prominent public figures, like Nihat Erim, prime minister of the first national government formed at the behest of the military in 1971, who was killed in July 1980, and Turkey’s best-known liberal editor, Abdi İpekçi assassinated in February 1979.

Domestic politics were largely to blame. Weak coalition governments, which followed each other in quick succession, were unable to establish order either in the streets or in the economy. What they were able to do was to fill the administration with their nominees. All the branches of public service, including teaching and even the police, became politicised and split into rival factions. Radical left-wing and right-wing labour unions fought for control of teachers, the police, of workers in state and privately owned factories. As the two basically moderate rival political leaders, Süleyman Demirel on the centre-right and Bülent Ecevit on the centre-left, who formed alternate governments, were unable to present a common front, they could hold power only with the help of parties (Islamists, extreme rightists), which counted violent militants among their retainers. The state seemed paralysed; so was parliament which was unable to elect a president of the republic. When the military intervened on September 12, 1980, the country heaved a sigh of relief.

The troubled 1970s are remembered as a period of violent ideological confrontation between self-styled revolutionaries and self-styled nationalists, the latter known also as ‘idealist’ or ‘Grey Wolves’. But ideological differences often concealed communal conflicts which the secular unitary republic created by Atatürk had contained. In December 1978, a mob of Sunnis staged a pogrom against Alevis [heterodox Muslims] in the southeastern city of Kahramanmaraş. In four days of rioting, 109 people were killed and over 170 seriously injured. Appalled by the killings, prime minister Ecevit declared martial law, which was later extended to twenty provinces, including Istanbul. A year later, on December 4, 1979, General Selâhattin Demircioğlu, martial law commander in east-central Turkey, warned Süleyman Demirel, who had once more replaced Bülent Ecevit in the premiership: ‘Incidents of anarchy are beginning to involve the masses. After 1974, they turned into a conflict pitting Sunnis against Alevis, and then Kurds against Turks.’

Dev-Genç, which had played a major part in left-wing student agitation before 1971, split into factions competing in acts of terror. On August 30,
1980, an official report listed 24 left-wing terrorist groups. They included two organisations still active in 2002: Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left), founded in 1978, which later became DHKP/C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), and the Maoist Partizan, closely linked with TIKKO (Turkish Worker-Peasant Liberation Army). TIKKO was founded in 1972 by a fanatic, İbrahim Kaypakkaya, who decided that mainstream Marxists were ‘capitulationists’ – in other words less inclined to violence than he was. However, the list did not include PKK, which was to prove the deadliest of all terrorist organisations.

The roots of the terror groups which fought each other and the state in the 1970s lay within Turkey. But these roots produced a poisonous growth in such abundance because they were watered from abroad. Like the earlier report on the violence which led up to the military intervention on March 12, 1971, the official progress report published in 1982 on the causes and the first results of the military take-over of September 12, 1980, used diplomatic language and did not name states complicit in terrorism. All it said was: ‘Certain foreign powers and their treacherous collaborators at home who knew that their deviant ideologies could not ever come to power in Turkey through democratic channels, planned to create a climate of violence in the country.’ The reference to the Soviet bloc is unmistakable, as it was Marxist socialism that the Turkish electorate had rejected time and again. In effect, Moscow had used Bulgaria and Syria as proxies to supply Turkish terrorists with weapons and training. In four years following the assumption of power by the military, security forces seized 26,000 rocket launchers, 7,000 machine-guns, 48,000 rifles, 640,000 handguns and 6 million rounds of ammunition, held illegally in the country. This arsenal and the money needed to procure it came largely from abroad.

A good illustration of the international connections of Turkish terrorists is provided by the case of Mehmet Ali Ağca, a killer who came from a right-wing background. Ağca was to state in court that in 1977 he had received some forty days’ training as a guerrilla in the southern suburbs of Beirut. He assassinated the liberal editor Abdi İpekçi, on February 1, 1979. A year later, having been sprung from military gaol by accomplices, he escaped to Iran. He spent some eighty days there and then made his way to Bulgaria, where he contacted Turkish smugglers involved in gun-running and other illicit pursuits. Leaving Bulgaria, Ağca spent several months travelling in Tunisia, Italy, Switzerland, Germany and Spain. It was in Majorca that a Turkish smuggler gave him a Belgian-made gun with which Ağca shot Pope John Paul II in Rome on May 13, 1981. Bulgarian officials who were later tried in Rome accused of complicity in the assassination attempt were acquitted for lack of evidence. But it is hard to believe that Bulgarian Communist authorities had been unaware of Ağca’s presence in their capital, Sofia, before the killer moved on to Western Europe. The Turkish smugglers whose company Ağca kept in Sofia did business with
Bulgarian state trading companies. The conclusion is inescapable that the Bulgarian Communist authorities, acting in the interests of Moscow, used Turkish criminals, irrespective of their ideology, in their efforts to destabilise Turkey.

Western democracies were involved indirectly. Although the terrorist assault on Turkey was part of the Cold War in which they were engaged with the Soviet bloc, they did not take effective measures to stop terrorists from finding refuge, or from collecting funds and proselytising among Turkish workers and others in the West. Both left-wing and right-wing terrorists could rely on contacts and accomplices among Turkish migrants in West Germany. The West harboured enemies in its own midst. Marxist theory speaks of the contradictions of capitalism. International terrorism depends on the contradictions of liberalism, which makes room for its own enemies. Internal contradictions have not led to the collapse of capitalism, as the Marxists had expected, because capitalism knew how to reform itself. One can only hope that the threat of international terror will similarly lead liberalism to escape from its internal contradictions and stop it from protecting its foes.

The tolerance extended to enemies of democracy was encouraged by propaganda put out by perpetrators and advocates of violence. The propaganda networks worked hard to discredit the efforts of Turkish authorities to re-establish law and order after 1971 and, particularly, after 1980. True, the measures taken in Turkey were harsh. During the four years which followed the military take-over, nearly 180,000 persons were detained, some 65,000 were charged, 42,000 sentenced and 25 executed. There were undoubtedly cases where innocent people suffered before they were exonerated.

Moreover, terrorism can corrupt the state. Many countries – France, Spain, Britain, and, as the abuse of prisoners by American interrogators in Baghdad in 2003–4 demonstrated graphically, the United States too – have allowed their intelligence services to use unorthodox methods in order to uncover terrorist networks. Accused of dirty tricks, such as employing unsavoury elements to trap terrorists or subjecting suspects to torture, they have defended themselves by saying that their primary concern was to prevent further outrages. The same has happened in Turkey, where right-wing criminals have been used discreetly against left-wing terrorists. But unorthodox methods can boomerang. Sooner or later, dirty tricks are revealed, at least in democracies where there is a free press, and their legacy can take years to clear up.

In Turkey the cost of fighting terrorism after 1980 has been heavy. But democratic order was gradually re-established, the incidence of violence fell dramatically, and the economy, which had become insolvent by 1980, achieved high rates of growth in the following decade. In 1987, Turkey felt strong enough to apply for full membership of the European Union (at that
time still the European Economic Community). On January 1, 1996, Turkey entered into a customs union with the EU.

By stopping the slide to civil war, the military had opened the door to progress in the economy and also in democratic governance. But although the violent conflict between left-wing and right-wing terrorists had been arrested, other forms of terror continued. The first was a hangover from the 1970s, the terrorism of a band of Marxist fanatics, who went on killing in a hopeless cause. The second was the terror campaign of separatist Kurdish nationalists, bloodier and costlier than anything Turkey had seen before. The third was unleashed by religious fanatics who took on modern civilisation as a whole. All three campaigns were directed from bases outside Turkey.
KEEPING THE DEATH WISH ALIVE

Revolutionary Marxism has lost its hold on the young since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But it has survived among small groups of irreconcilables whose rant combines the old themes of anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism and anti-capitalism as a justification and a glorification of violence. There are plenty of problems in the world and many sources of discontent. Fanatics insist on giving to these problems old answers, which have been proved wrong over and over again.

In Turkey the recruiting base of Marxist fanatics is the mountainous province of Tunceli, traditionally a hide-out of outlaws, in east-central Anatolia, and the area which lies between it and the Black Sea coast to the north. This area has also a large concentration of Alevis, who tend to be poorer than their Sunni neighbours. Most Alevis are of Turkish ethnic origin, but some speak a Kurdish language, known as Zaza (or Dîmilî). Irrespective of their ethnic origin, many poor inhabitants of east-central Anatolia migrate to the west – often to poor neighbourhoods on the outskirts of Istanbul and other metropolitan centres, and sometimes further afield to Western Europe. Suburbs where rural migrants live divide on ideological lines, largely determined by the geographical origin of their inhabitants. Thus Marxist fanatics find cover in the Istanbul suburb of Gazi, home to many Kurdish-speaking Alevis, while religious fanatics hide among sympathisers in industrial suburbs on the Asian approaches to the city. Marxist terrorists operate both in the original homeland of these migrants and in their new surroundings. They offer simple, violent remedies to simple people.

It is often difficult to distinguish between revolutionary groups, as they merge, split, collaborate or fight each other. Some of these terrorist organisations were originally of Maoist inspiration, but now that Maoism is dead in all but name in its Chinese homeland, the distinction between Maoists and unreconstructed Communists is becoming blurred. There are two other processes at work. Inside Turkey, democratic reforms have allowed the emergence of legal associations, some claiming to defend the civil rights of imprisoned revolutionaries, others describing themselves as defenders of
human or specifically workers’ rights. Such associations typically refute accusations of terrorism. At the same time, many of them extol the class struggle, anti-imperialism and other causes dear to the hearts of Marxists, and hold up for admiration ‘martyrs’ who have died as a result of revolutionary violence. Outside the country, Marxist revolutionaries have responded to the awakening of the civilised world to the terrorist menace by making common cause with a whole array of protest groups and movements, from anarchists to anti-globalisers and eco-warriors. Some members of this front of ‘alternative’ protest movements also extol the ‘martyrs of the revolution’ – terrorists who have killed others or themselves.

The main exponent of Marxist violence in Turkey is DHKP/C – the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front. It is associated – or perhaps confused – with many small terrorist groups with a similar ideology. When DHKP/C was put on the list of banned terrorist organisations in the European Union in May 2002, groups associated with it came to the fore. In Europe they tried to maintain their websites and their publications as they looked for allies and collected or extorted money for their activities. In Turkey they spawned a host of front organisations and support groups which publicised the cause pursued by Marxist violence. In the meantime, various illegal organisations claim authorship of acts of terror, and these claims are sometimes echoed by the authorities and the media. In some instances subsequent investigations show that different groups are responsible. In fact, although the location of the recruiting base, the family or clan affiliations of members, and personal antagonism between leaders can divide one group from the next, the various organisations of Marxist terrorists are indistinguishable to an outside observer and largely interchangeable.

DHKP/C, which can be treated as the umbrella organisation for all violent Marxist groups and, at least until recently, their representative outside Turkey, traces its history back to the kidnap of British and Canadian radar technicians from their monitoring post near Sinop on the Black Sea coast in 1972. The kidnapped men were taken to a village inland, in an area where Marxist terrorists operate to this day, and, as has already been mentioned, were killed in a fire-fight. The three young students who were subsequently found guilty of leading the terrorist attack, and were condemned to death and hanged, head the list of ‘martyrs’ claimed by the terrorist organisation to this day. At the time it called itself THKP/C (Turkish People’s Liberation Party/Front). Later it mutated into Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left) before assuming its present name.1 DHKP/C and its precursors have specialised in high-profile assassinations. Their victims include the former prime minister Nihat Erim, eight retired military commanders, two public prosecutors, and a British insurance manager.2

The latest spectacular outrage was the murder on January 9, 1996 of the industrialist Özdemir Sabancı, a secretary and another member of his staff, in the closely guarded corporate headquarters of the Sabancı Holding
conglomerate in Istanbul. This crime is reminiscent of the kidnapping and murder of the prominent German businessman Hans Martin Schleyer in 1977 by the German terrorist group known as the Red Army Faction (RAF). Schleyer’s assassins were hunted down and the RAF was eliminated, with the help of French authorities.\textsuperscript{3} But in the case of the murder of Özdemir Sabancı, Turkish authorities did not receive the degree of international co-operation to which they were entitled. One of the suspects, a young woman called Fehriye Erdal, fled to Belgium, where she was arrested for carrying a false passport and an unlicensed handgun. She spent some time in prison, while her claim to political asylum was being processed. The claim was dismissed, but as of mid-2004 – more than six years after Özdemir Sabancı’s murder – the Belgian authorities were still unwilling to extradite her to Turkey pending further proceedings in Belgian courts.

To add insult to injury, until DHKP/C was finally put on the joint EU list of banned organisations in May 2002, it had an office in Brussels, and the fact was cited with pride as an example of the wide range of political opinions to which Belgian democracy allowed free expression.

DHKP/C also had an office in London, which issued a protest when the organisation was banned, and promised that it would not be deflected from its struggle. This points to the main task facing democratic countries. A ban on terrorist organisations, however tardy, is a useful first step and allows the authorities to freeze terrorist funds. But it will not be sufficient unless members of terrorist groups are neutralised. Otherwise, they will come together in new groups to continue their work of violence.

The DHKP/C ‘hero’ and, possibly, its current operational leader, is Dursun Karataş, who fled to Western Europe in 1989, after escaping from a Turkish prison where he was serving a life sentence for terrorist offences going back to the 1970s. Sought by Interpol, he was arrested in France in 1994, but released on bail three months later. He was later reported to be in Holland, where he is said to have married a Dutch woman.\textsuperscript{4} Holland was certainly an important base for DHKP/C where many of its supporters are still to be found. The press agency, Özgürlük (Freedom), which reports the activities of the ‘family’ of Marxist militants, gives an Amsterdam address, and, at least until recently, used to publish its releases in Dutch, Turkish and Arabic. The use of Arabic is a pointer to the close connection between DHKP/C and the violent Palestinian group PFLP. The two organisations have on occasion published joint statements. A link to DHKP/C appears also on the website of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA.\textsuperscript{5} This is another pointer to the status of DHKP/C as a fully fledged member of the terrorist international.

In July 2002, the mass-circulation Greek newspaper To Vima reported that Dursun Karataş was in Athens, where he had spent much of the year. The report added that Greek intelligence believed there were 100 members of DHKP/C in Greece, whereas Turkish intelligence put the figure at 250.
According to the newspaper, DHKP/C had become rich in the 1980s on the proceeds of the narcotics trade. *To Vima* claimed that Alexandros Giotopoulos, who had been arrested a few days earlier and was later found guilty of masterminding the campaign of the Greek terrorist network known as ‘November 17’, had established contact with ‘Turkish and Kurdish’ organisations in Vienna in 1989, and had proposed to them that they should conduct joint operations. But many members of these organisations believed that they were faced with a plot by Greek secret services and rejected the proposal. However that may be, the presence of so many members of DHKP/C in Greece, where they would surely have come to the notice of the authorities, requires an explanation. Foreign correspondents in Athens have suggested that the Greek authorities had decided to crack down on terrorists in their country in order to lay at rest fears about the safety of the Olympic Games. Had the action been taken earlier, many lives could have been saved, including those of the Turkish press attaché Çetin Görgü, murdered in 1991, of the Turkish embassy counsellor Halûk Spipahögülu, murdered in 1994, and of the British defence attaché Brigadier Stephen Saunders, shot dead in the year 2000. It was this last murder which led to the approval of a more stringent anti-terrorist law by the Greek parliament in 2001 and to co-operation between British and Greek security services. In the fight against terrorism, where there is a will, there is usually a way.

In the eight years, 1998 to 2002, DHKP/C killed 53 people in Turkey, of whom 21 were civilians and the others policemen. It murdered two US defence contractors and wounded a US airforce officer during the Gulf War. Terrorist weapons seized by the authorities included 5 rocket launchers and nearly 250 bombs. Many DHKP/C militants have been captured and sentenced over the years. In prison, they tried, and often succeeded, to gain control over common wards, using them as bases for operations outside. A move by the authorities to transfer prisoners from communal dormitories to individual cells in modern prison accommodation was strongly resisted by DHKP/C. Some prisoners set fire to themselves when security forces broke down their barricades; others staged hunger strikes. Hunger strikes continued both inside and outside prisons after the transfer of prisoners had been completed. Journalists were taken to gruesome ‘houses of death’ in poor neighbourhoods, where DHKP/C fanatics and sympathisers were starving to death. The authorities responded by opening ‘houses of life’ to allow hunger strikers a way out.

In June 2004, the website of the Holland-based *Özgürlük* press agency carried the photographs of 105 ‘martyrs of the hunger strikes which started in 2000 and are still continuing.’ The hunger strikes and acts of self-immolation have attracted the attention and, sometimes, the sympathy of liberals in Turkey and abroad. But violence by prisoners is calculated to produce a violent response by the authorities. As a general rule, prisons
can be managed humanely only with the co-operation of prisoners. Where this is denied at the behest of a violent minority intent on confrontation, repression is the most likely outcome. In its turn, repression blackens the public image of the authorities. In using the lives of its members and sympathisers as propaganda fodder, DHKP/C is following the example of the IRA in Northern Ireland and of violent organisations elsewhere.

Here is one example among many which also throws light on the social environment of DHKP/C fanatics. It comes from the DHKP/C statement on the death of a young woman called Meryem Altun. Her family came from Kayseri in central Turkey. She herself was born in Istanbul in 1976 and, after primary school, studied for two years in the high school in the poor neighbourhood of Ümraniye, home to migrants from the provinces. Her elder brother ‘fought’ for Dev-Sol and was killed in İzmir in 1991. In 1991, Meryem went to England to join her family which had gone abroad to work. According to the DHKP/C statement ‘twice she was detained and spent six months in European prisons’. The statement does not specify her offences abroad. She returned to Turkey in 1998 and ‘joined an armed unit to fight this tyrannical system’. Once again, the statement does not specify the manner in which she died, before concluding ‘Now her name is the name of the price we pay and the victory we will win’.9 It would be more correct to say that it is the price paid by a poor semi-educated young woman and by her family to publicise a cause which has brought nothing but misery to the world.

Another tragic personal story emerged from a more recent act of terror. On June 24, 2004, four days before a conference of the leaders of NATO countries met in Istanbul, a bomb exploded in the lap of a young woman terrorist who was travelling on a bus not far from the university of Istanbul. The terrorist and three passengers were killed and another ten passengers injured. The terrorist was identified as Semira Polat. Her life story is instructive. She was born in the mountainous province of Tunceli and grew up in the southern port city of İskenderun where her family had moved when her father found employment in the local steelworks. Semira was a hard-working pupil in high school and was granted a government bursary to read philosophy at the university established a few years earlier in the nearby bustling Mediterranean port of Mersin. In her second year (1996) she began neglecting her studies in favour of radical politics. She forfeited her bursary and left the university without a degree. Falling in with a journalist working for a militant publication, who was later to die in a hunger strike, Semira was imprisoned for attacking a police officer during a demonstration. After her release, she moved to Istanbul, where she took part in three terrorist attacks in 2003–4. She was on the wanted list when she killed herself and three others in the bus on June 23.10 Faced with universal condemnation, DHKP/C apologised for the bus explosion, claiming that
Semira was on her way to exact revenge for the ‘114 victims’ of hunger strikes, when the bomb she was carrying went off accidentally.\textsuperscript{11}

On the same day, June 24, a policeman lost his leg in an explosion when he tried to move a percussion bomb outside the Hilton hotel in Ankara, where President George W. Bush was expected three days later. The attack was claimed by a little-known group which called itself FESK (Armed Forces of the Poor and the Oppressed), affiliated to the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP)\textsuperscript{12} of ‘Turkey and North Kurdistan’.\textsuperscript{13} A few days later, a similarly named organisation, ESPG (Socialist Platform/Group of the Oppressed) protested at the detention in Ankara of eight people suspected of preparing an action during the visit to Ankara by President Bush.\textsuperscript{14}

One can only assume that MLKP is identical with a group which uses the same initials in a reverse order. TKP (ML) (Turkish Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist)) describes itself as a Maoist Party. One of its proclamations associates Mao with somebody called ‘President (or Leader) Gonzalo’ and with the dead Turkish terrorist İbrahim Kaypakkaya. Its book division is called ‘Partizan Publications’.\textsuperscript{15} Partizan was the name of a Maoist group which operated in the mountains of Tunceli in the 1980s. It is not clear whether it still exists under that name. As for İbrahim Kaypakkaya, he is remembered as the student militant who founded TİKKO in 1972. He was wounded and captured in a clash with security forces in Tunceli the following year, and died in prison four months later.\textsuperscript{16} TİKKO, its associates and factions (which give themselves grand names, like New People’s Army/YHO) operate mainly in the countryside. Here are some examples:

- On May 12, 2002, eight terrorists stopped a vehicle and abducted a local representative of the Party of the Democratic Left (DSP), a mayor and a forestry official. They took them to a village where they held a propaganda meeting. The hostages were then freed.\textsuperscript{17}
- On June 11, 2002, a group of TKP (ML)/TİKKO terrorists abducted a villager, Muharrem Hız. He too was later released.\textsuperscript{18}
- On September 30, 2004, it was reported that five DHKP/C terrorists, two of them women, were killed when they were challenged by security forces in the province of Tokat in north-central Anatolia, which, as has already been pointed out, is a recruiting base for Marxist revolutionaries. An NCO died of injuries received during the engagement.\textsuperscript{19}

Attacks on villagers alternate with hit-and-run attacks on security forces. Maoist ideology (one of the TKP (ML) publications was characteristically called The Long March) conceals the reality of rural violence and the settling of local scores.
TKP (ML), TİKKO, and possibly Partizan, overlap with TDP (Turkish Revolutionary Party), which is known to have collaborated with the Kurdish separatist PKK. The purpose of the agreement, which was concluded in 1996, was to extend PKK terrorist operations from the south-east to central and northern Anatolia. However, the two terrorist organisations fell out, and the failure of their collaboration is said to have weakened TDP, some of whose members then fled to Europe. On March 21, 2004, seven TDP militants, including one woman, were arrested in Istanbul, when a small cache of arms was discovered by the police. The arrests threw light on thirteen incidents in the Anatolian countryside. The attacks, which stretched back to 1994, had claimed the lives of nine members of the security forces.

On April 2, 2004 news was published of simultaneous raids on DHKP/C premises and hide-outs in Turkey and in EU countries: 75 suspects were detained in Turkey and another 23 in Germany, Belgium, Italy, Holland and Italy. According to press reports, they included two prospective suicide bombers who had intended to disrupt the local government elections in Turkey on March 28, 2004. The security forces laid their hands on a vast cache of DHKP/C records. On October 25, 2004, a criminal court in Istanbul began to hear the case against 64 alleged members of DHKP/C. The arrests and the trials which have followed them have not succeeded in preventing further bombings by DHKP/C. On May 16, 2004 minor damage was caused when banks in Istanbul and Ankara were bombed during the visit to Turkey of the British prime minister Tony Blair. According to the Turkish police, three suspects (two of them women) linked with DHKP/C were arrested soon afterwards in connection with the bombings. On May 20, a bomb exploded underneath a car parked in front of a MacDonald’s restaurant in Istanbul. On June 18, there was damage but no casualties when two bank offices were bombed in the Kadıköy district of Istanbul. In these last two cases, the attacks could have come either from DHKP/C or from religious fanatics, although DHKP/C is the more likely culprit. On September 28, 2004, four percussion bombs exploded outside branches of the British-based HSBC bank in Ankara, Istanbul, İzmir and Adana, causing damage, but no casualties. HSBC headquarters in Istanbul had been targeted by Islamist terrorists the previous year (in a bloody attack described later in the book). But percussion bombs are used more commonly by DHKP/C, while Islamists prefer deadlier weapons. Whether the bomb explosions on September 28 was the work of DHKP/C or of an affiliated group is not clear. Nor does it really matter.

Of course, not all terrorist attacks are successful. In May 2003, a DHKP/C female suicide bomber prematurely detonated her explosive belt in Istanbul, killing herself and wounding another. Undeterred, DHKP/C struck again the following month, attacking a bus carrying Turkish prosecutors in Istanbul with a remote controlled bomb, and it launched several other bombings against officials in August. On March 17, 2004, a bomb
exploded in the hand of an assailant as he was about to throw it at the police 
headquarters in the Beyoğlu shopping district in Istanbul. The press has 
carried stories of more spectacular narrow escapes. It has been reported 
that in 1996 the assassination of former president Kenan Evren in his home 
in the Aegean resort of Marmaris was prevented at the last moment when 
security authorities located the DHKP/C team of suicide bombers by iden-
tifying the background noise on the tape of their recorded mobile telephone 
messages. Similarly, the justice minister Cemil Çiçek was reported to have 
been saved in 2003 by the timely arrest of the prospective suicide bomber. 
A few days before the opening of the NATO summit in Istanbul in June 
2004, a bomb was found and rendered harmless in a multi-storey car park 
at Istanbul airport. After the summit, on June 29, a cleaner was injured 
when an explosive device hidden in a plastic container was found in an 
abandoned woman’s handbag on board a Turkish Airlines plane which had 
landed in Istanbul, coming from Stockholm and İzmir.

The persistence of hit-and-run attacks on targets such as the police 
and banks, which have long been in the sights of Marxist terrorists, shows 
that DHKP/C continues to lead a shadowy existence. But in mid-2004 its 
name was no longer mentioned by press agencies and publications such as 
Özgürdüğü in Holland and Ekmek ve Adalet (Bread and Justice) in Turkey. 
These concentrated their attention on claims that DHKP/C members were 
tortured in prisons and that people charged with membership of the organ-
isation were wrongly accused and unjustly tried. On the surface, instead of 
DHKP/C one is faced with a bewildering network of organisations all 
claiming to be protest movements within the law. Thus when the Turkish 
prime minister Tayyip Reccep Erdoğan held a meeting for the Turkish com-

munity in Rotterdam in June 2004, he was heckled by members of an 
organisation calling itself the Front of Peoples and Freedoms (Halklar ve 
Özgürlükler Cephesi), who championed the ‘112 victims of hunger strikes’, 

i.e. DHKP/C members who had killed themselves in Turkey. Heckling is, of course, a normal accompaniment of political life. Nor is it illegal to 
demonstrate peacefully against NATO, the US, the European Union (which 
has placed DHKP/C on its list of banned organisations) or whatever. On 
June 20, 2004, the authorities in Istanbul allocated a public square for an 
anti-NATO meeting which had been called by Marxist, as well as religious 
groups. But while all these groups cling to legality, there is often an explicit 
or implicit justification of violence. Thus the radical publication, Ekmek ve 
Adalet, criticised the left-wing union confederation DİSK (Confederation 
of Revolutionary Trade Unions) for condemning ‘the demagogy of terror’. 
‘The refrain “No, to all forms of violence” is a denial of the peoples’ 
centuries-old struggle for independence, freedom and socialism,’ it 
declared. Similarly, SODAP (Socialist Solidarity Platform), one of the 
organisers of the anti-NATO meeting in June 2004, declared it would not 
limit itself to actions that were ‘legal, evoked sympathy and did not produce
[an angry] reaction’, but would ‘express itself in a revolutionary manner’ when it believed that it was right to do so. On June 21, the day after the anti-NATO rally, a policeman was injured when a bomb attached to an anti-NATO poster exploded. Whether words, uttered within the law, are linked with illegal deeds is for the courts to decide.

Any move away from terrorist violence and towards legal protest is welcome, even if protest demonstrations can provide cover for politically motivated thugs. As has already been noted, the EU ban on DHKP/C has forced its members to act within organisations which lay claim to legality. Raids, undertaken simultaneously on premises believed to be used by DHKP/C, and the arrests of suspects have clearly weakened this avowedly terrorist Marxist organisation. Moreover, there are reports of splits within it, and in particular of a move by some members critical of Fehriye Erdal, the young woman accused of involvement in the murder of the industrialist Özdemin Sabancı. However, any success that may have been achieved through the co-operation of the security authorities of several democratic countries does not remove the need for continuous vigilance. Özgürlük complained that the arrests on April 1, 2004 and subsequent trials imply a belief on the part of the authorities that ‘people who leave prison [where they had been detained for terrorist offences or on charges of terrorism] do not have the right to join the struggle for rights and freedoms’. Of course, all citizens, whatever their previous records, should be allowed to exercise their legal rights. But four lives might have been saved if a closer eye had been kept on Semira Polat, the woman terrorist who carried a bomb on board an Istanbul bus. As we shall see, it was the failure of the security authorities to keep track of young people who exercised their legal right to travel abroad – and went to Afghanistan and Pakistan to receive training as terrorists – that opened the way to the murderous bombings in Istanbul in November 2003.

The fact that Marxism has lost its lustre and that Marxist terrorists are diving for cover in a worldwide protest movement does not mean that security forces can relax their vigilance. Terrorism inspired by Marxist utopianism can still make victims, as Italy realised when the Red Brigades reappeared on the scene and murdered an adviser to a left-wing prime minister in 2002 and then another adviser to his right-wing successor in 2004. A policeman’s (and an intelligence officer’s) work is never done.

On October 15, 2004, an anti-terrorist team found considerable quantities of explosive in the homes of five suspected members of DHKP/C in Istanbul. The suspects, who were detained, were said to have been planning ‘spectacular’ bomb attacks in prominent locations. This was one of a string of reports suggesting that security forces were successful in foiling terrorist attacks. The fact remains that it is sufficient for the terrorists to succeed only once, while anti-terrorist forces have to be successful all the time. And, however good their intelligence and effective their organisation, this cannot be guaranteed.
The ideological near civil war between left-wing and right-wing extremists in the 1970s caused some 5,000 deaths; more than 200 people died in subsequent attempts by Marxist terrorists to undermine the state; Islamist terror (which will be described later) added probably another 1,000 dead. Appalling as these figures are, they are dwarfed by the death toll of more than 35,000 people who perished in the terror campaign conducted by the separatist PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers Party) during the 24 years of its existence (1978–2002). Compare this with the 800 or so victims of the Basque separatist terror group ETA, killed over a period of 34 years (1968–2002), and the 1,800 people killed by the IRA (nearly 650 of them civilians) since ‘Bloody Friday’ in July 1972. All three organisations are classed as vehicles of ethnic terrorism. But the term must be refined. ETA and PKK emerged as Marxist-Leninist revolutionary organisations in communities where Marxism-Leninism had little support. They killed in order to intimidate their opponents within their own communities, as well as in the civil and military services of the states from which they wanted to secede. Their Marxism-Leninism concealed an extreme form of nationalism, which it would be more accurate to describe as racist. Public opinion in democratic Western countries has been slow to recognise the sheer nastiness of these ethnic terrorists. For too long, well-meaning liberals, and even the authorities of democratic states, listened to the excuses offered for terrorist crimes. This is true even of the United States, where front organisations were allowed to collect funds from Irish Americans which sustained the terror campaign of the IRA. September 11 was a rude awakening from fancy to reality. But there is this difference: while ETA and the IRA benefited from a degree of toleration by foreign governments, the PKK enjoyed the active support of some of Turkey’s neighbours. This goes some way to explaining the vast scale of the havoc it caused. When the support was withdrawn, the PKK collapsed, at least in its old form and with its old strategy.

For a fuller explanation, we must turn to two sets of factors – the first historical and sociological, the second personal. For all its Marxist...
theorising, the PKK was heir to a tradition of violence in a mountain region where tribal groups had for centuries formed shifting alliances to maintain and enhance their positions against rivals. The tribes were perforce predatory as they sought loot and protection money to supplement the meagre livelihood yielded by their harsh environment. Their leaders had to be ruthless and cunning. In the nineteenth century, reforming Ottoman Sultans gradually suppressed tribal princes. They were replaced by religious leaders, known as sheikhs (şeyh in Turkish). The Turkish Republic endeavoured to deprive the sheikhs of their feudal power. When they resisted, as in the case of Şeyh Sait in 1925 or of Seyyit Rıza in the Dersim (Tunceli) mountains in 1937, their rebellions were crushed.

Rapid social change after World War II did not put an end to the tradition of violence. True, tribal organisation weakened as nomads were settled and towns grew in size, but kinship loyalty, rooted in the old tribes, survived. The growing integration of the south-east with the rest of the country produced new tensions, as the whole of Turkey experienced the pains of growth. The spread of education increased expectations, and spurred the search for short-cuts when these expectations were not met. These conditions favoured the emergence of violent men with simple ideas. The most ruthless among them was Abdullah Öcalan, known as Apo (a diminutive for Abdullah; the word also means ‘uncle’ in Kurdish). His followers were called Apocu (Apo-ites) and his movement Apoculuk (Apo-ism), terms which became synonymous with the PKK, the terrorist organisation he dominated until his capture in 1999.

Abdullah Öcalan was born in 1949 in a village in the valley of the Euphrates, in the province of Urfa. One of seven children in a poor peasant household, run, unusually, by a fierce matriarch, he made full use of the free education provided by the Turkish state. He grew up speaking Turkish, a language in which he has always been more comfortable than in the kitchen Kurdish he picked up at home. After attending primary school in a nearby village, he went on to a junior high school in the small town of Nizip. He felt that his better-off schoolmates looked down on him and this bred in him the determination to succeed by whatever means. At primary school Öcalan was religious and spent time memorising verses of the Koran.

On leaving the junior high school he decided that the best path to advancement lay in a military career and he applied for a place in a military school. But he was too old for entry and his application was rejected. He then successfully sat an examination for a place in the vocational high school in Ankara for land registry officials. As a young student he attended the local mosque, while also developing an interest in Marxist ideas. Öcalan graduated from the vocational school in 1967 and was appointed clerk in the Diyarbakır land registry. He was to admit later that he took bribes, as a preparation for ‘the general rebellion which was to break out one
day’, or, more likely, to finance his ambitions. Transferred to Istanbul in 1970, Öcalan used the opportunity to prepare for the nation-wide university entrance examinations. It was in Istanbul that he first joined a radical Marxist organisation which espoused Kurdish nationalism. This was known as Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (DDKO), an offshoot of the non-ethnic Revolutionary Youth (Dev-Genç) organisation. Later he was to belittle DDKO as an organisation of ‘the children of the feudal petty bourgeoisie’, alien to a ‘social loner’ like himself. In other words, he decided that his prospects of rising to the top were slim within DDKO.

After sitting his examinations, Öcalan registered as a student in the Istanbul University law faculty. But on learning that his results had earned him a scholarship from the finance ministry, he transferred in 1971 to the prestigious faculty of political science of Ankara University, the seedbed of Turkish senior civil servants. The faculty was at that time at the centre of ideological ferment and Marxism, taught by some of the professors, was the dominant ideology. Öcalan fell in with proponents of ‘the people’s armed struggle’, in other words of Marxist guerrilla warfare. He was arrested along with others in April 1972 for distributing an illegal proclamation and spent seven months in a military prison. This was his only spell in prison until he was arrested in 1999. But it was enough to widen his knowledge of the many factions of Marxist revolutionaries and to inspire a determination to become the leader of his own group, while avoiding personal danger as far as possible.

After his release Öcalan returned formally to the faculty of political science, but conspiratorial work took up most of his time and he never graduated. He joined the Ankara Higher Education (Students) Association (AYÖD), which was dominated by the Turkish Socialist Workers Party (TSİP), a more radical successor of the Turkish Workers Party (TİP), banned for infringing the constitution. When DDKO, which had also been banned, was replaced by the similarly named Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Society (DDKD), many young Kurdish nationalists left AYÖD, but Öcalan stayed on. At the same time he made contact with Kurdish nationalist groups, such as a socialist nucleus, led by Kemal Burkay, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (T-KDP), an offshoot of the Barzani movement in northern Iraq. Neither group offered him the opportunities he sought. The T-KDP secretary-general gave this description of Öcalan: ‘This ruthless student of the political science faculty was obstinate, moulded by the conviction that Marxism-Leninism was universally true, and unbelievably ambitious.’

All the while, Öcalan continued to cultivate a personal following. This included a girl student, Kesire Yıldırım, who was engaged to one of Öcalan’s friends. Öcalan won her over and married her, a move which Kesire came to regret. After several preliminary gatherings of less than a dozen conspirators, the group came together formally in 1975 in the
Dikmen neighbourhood of the capital and decided to travel to Turkey’s south-eastern provinces and set up a local organisation. They called themselves ‘Kurdistan Revolutionaries’ but, as their leader’s notoriety spread, they became known as Apo-ites. To make room for themselves, Öcalan’s men had to fight local notables, whom they described as ‘fascists’. Opponents began to be killed.

In November 1978, 19 ‘Kurdistan Revolutionaries’ came together in a village near the small town of Lice, in the province of Diyarbakir, and formally founded the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Three of the revolutionaries did not turn up. Öcalan, who monopolised the meeting, became general secretary and leader of a seven-member party executive. Of the 22 revolutionaries present or invited to the foundation meeting of the PKK seven were later murdered at Öcalan’s orders, five (including Öcalan’s wife Kesire) were denounced as traitors but managed to escape from his clutches, another five were later interrogated and humiliated by the leadership, two committed suicide in prison and one was murdered by the northern Iraqi Kurdish party of Jalal Talabani (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan/PUK). Violence was the hallmark of the PKK from the start, and it stemmed in the first place from Apo himself.

In the two years which followed the founding of PKK, Apo’s bands killed 354 men and injured another 366. These people, described by the PKK as ‘fascist agents and local reactionaries’, were of Kurdish origin just like their assailants. At the same time the PKK collected considerable sums by extortion. Apo’s notoriety spread. On August 20, 1979, Süleyman Demirel, then leader of the opposition in parliament, accused the government of the social-democrat prime minister Bülent Ecevit of losing its grip, saying ‘In the south-east, the Apo-ites have replaced the State.’ But by then security forces had already sprung into action. In May they had uncovered the PKK organisation in the province of Elâziğ, and arrested its members. Fearing that his own arrest was imminent, Öcalan fled to Syria in July 1979. Except for two brief trips to eastern Europe, he was to remain there until the Turkish government forced the Syrians to expel him in October 1998.

Like the earlier story of Turkish Marxist terrorists in the late 1960s and 1970s, the history of PKK terrorism after Öcalan’s flight to Syria can be understood only in the framework of the Cold War and particularly of its extension to the Middle East. The Syrian Baath regime of president Hafez al-Asad was supported and armed by the Soviet Union. In turn, Hafez al-Asad gave facilities to Palestinian militant groups active against Israel, the US ally in the region. In neighbouring Iraq, which was at daggers drawn with Syria, Hafez al-Asad supported the Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani (whose bailiwick was centred on the Sulaymaniyya region, home to Sorani-speaking Kurds) against the Barzani clan, which was dominant further north (where Kurmanji Kurdish is spoken). The leader of the clan, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, had been helped directly by the Shah of Iran and indirectly by the
CIA when he rose against Saddam Hussein. But in 1975 the Shah of Iran and Saddam came to an agreement and Mulla Mustafa Barzani was abandoned to his fate. He died in the USA in 1979 and his territory was devastated by Iraqi forces. In the same year the Shah was overthrown by the Khomeini revolution. A year later Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. The eight-year Iran–Iraq war (1980–8) gave the Barzanis (now led by Molla Mustafa’s son, Masud) the chance to come back. Once again they acted as Iranian auxiliaries, sustained this time by the Khomeini regime. Their rebellion invited appalling reprisals by Saddam Hussein’s forces. Denounced as the Great Satan by the Iranian Islamic Republic, the US was now more favourably disposed towards Baghdad. While Talabani switched sides time and again, Masud Barzani, as an Iranian auxiliary, was open to an accommodation with Iran’s ally, Syria, and with Syria’s retainers. In 1983, Masud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) concluded a co-operation agreement with Öcalan’s PKK.\textsuperscript{12}

As in the case of Turkish Marxist revolutionaries, the Soviets used three proxies in their dealings with the PKK – Bulgaria, Syria and the Palestinians, particularly Marxist groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its offshoots. First Jalal Talabani, then Masud Barzani and later Talabani again, acting on behalf of Syria and Iran, provided additional channels of support. Afterwards other players entered the scene – Greek intelligence and Greek Cypriot authorities. Their motives were national – the pursuit of their quarrels with Turkey – and thus fell outside the framework of the Cold War. To complete the international picture within which the PKK operated, many of the Turkish workers in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, were of Kurdish origin. Their number is difficult to estimate. Not only is Kurdishness a matter of personal choice (which sociologists call self-ascription), but, after 1973 when the European Community stopped recruiting foreign workers, economic migrants sought to gain entry by claiming that they were political refugees. The assumption of a Kurdish identity was thus in many cases an economic necessity rather than a cultural choice by asylum-seekers. But whatever their true number, the existence of a Kurdish community in Western Europe gave the PKK the opportunity to use the West as a rear base.

For the PKK, Western Europe became a refuge and a school for its militants, a source of funds, and a base for a wide-ranging propaganda campaign inciting violence in Turkey and seeking Western support for it. Western liberals fell into the trap set up by the PKK when they accepted it as an expression of Kurdish national aspirations, disregarding the fact that the PKK had started its existence by killing fellow Kurds and went on to kill many more to establish its grip.

The Syrian authorities saw in Öcalan a useful instrument to use against Turkey in the context of the Cold War and also to promote their national aims – territorial claims to the southern Turkish province of Hatay and
claims for the major share of the waters of the Euphrates river, which rises in Turkey. Their dealings with him followed the pattern of their behaviour towards Turkish ideological Marxist terrorists a decade earlier. In other words, they referred Öcalan and his companions to the PLO for training and support. But, as in the earlier case, this tactic was slow to produce results. A few of Öcalan’s followers were infiltrated through the Syrian frontier to Turkey, sometimes with false Palestinian papers. But particularly after the armed forces had taken control in Turkey on September 12, 1980, security measures were tightened and the infiltrators were caught or forced into inactivity. At its first meeting in Syria in June 1981, the PKK decided to withdraw its men from Turkey. Some 300 came to Syrian-controlled Lebanon. After training, some were moved south to the border with Israel. This did not please Öcalan’s Syrian handlers. As he was to admit himself, he was reproached with the words ‘We are paying you and feeding you generously. Why then are you keeping so many men here?’

The policy of sticking close to the PLO, instead of serving Syria (and the Soviet bloc) against Turkey, came to an end when the Israelis invaded Lebanon in 1982. The PLO was forced to move to Tunisia. But some Marxist Palestinian groups and the more numerous Hizbullah Shiite militia stayed behind in Syria and the Syrian-controlled parts of Lebanon. The PKK was also allowed to stay on. To secure continued Syrian support, Öcalan visited Bulgaria which, as usual, mediated covert Soviet policy. Öcalan established himself in a house in Damascus, while his militants were based in a camp in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley in Lebanon. This camp, which became known as the Academy, was used for the ideological and military training of PKK terrorists. In Öcalan’s own words, some ‘15,000 guerrillas were trained’ by 1994 in this and other camps provided by the Syrians.

The Syrians were too canny to allow large-scale incursions into Turkey from their own territory. Moreover, the border between the two countries runs mostly through a plain affording little cover. True, arms smugglers and individual infiltrators got through, but larger groups of PKK terrorists used a circuitous route which the agreement with the Barzani clan in northern Iraq had opened up. As the frontier between Syria and its rival, Iraq, was closely guarded, Öcalan’s men were flown to Iran, Syria’s ally. From there they made their way to Barzani territory.

The decision to launch an eye-catching operation across the Turkish–Iraqi border was taken at the PKK camp in the Bekaa valley in February 1984. Öcalan instructed his men to occupy the chief towns of three districts. In fact only two (Eruh and Şemdinli) were attacked. Weak Turkish border detachments were caught unprepared. In Eruh, one Turkish soldier was killed, and nine soldiers and four civilians wounded, when the terrorists overran a gendarmerie post, capturing arms and ammunition. There and at Şemdinli, the attackers distributed proclamations in which they described
themselves as the Kurdistan Liberation Unit (HRK).\textsuperscript{17} It was the beginning of a bloody terror campaign, which Öcalan had forecast the previous year in a tract entitled ‘The Role of Violence in Kurdistan’.\textsuperscript{18}

It took time to stoke the fires of violence. The proclamations distributed on August 15, 1984, fell on deaf ears. Local people denounced PKK militants to the authorities, which introduced in 1985 a system of lightly armed village guards to defend isolated villages. Öcalan had to think up a new strategy. This was announced at the third convention of the PKK, held in Damascus in October 1986. The main new measure was the forcible recruitment of terrorists in south-eastern Turkey, under a so-called ‘military service law’. Families were to be forced to send their young men to join PKK bands in the mountains or face savage reprisals. In line with the pretence of legitimate conscription, the HRK armed groups were renamed an ‘army’, known under the initials ARGK. A political front organisation (ERNK) was set up to work for the PKK in Europe.

Öcalan had to take account also of changes in the Middle Eastern environment. In the summer of 1986, Barzani denounced his co-operation agreement with the PKK. His role as facilitator of PKK terrorism was taken up by his rival, Jalal Talabani, who had always been close to Syria. The Syrian leader, Hafez al-Asad, who had been warned by the Turkish prime minister Turgut Özal to stop supporting the PKK, sought a counter-weight in Greece. This led to an informal understanding between Athens, Damascus and Teheran. Iran increased its support for the PKK. Instead of being largely a corridor for terrorists travelling to northern Iraq, it began allowing direct incursions from its territory into Turkey.\textsuperscript{19} In 1989, Abdullah Öcalan’s brother Osman opened a liaison office in Iran and the following year he negotiated the establishment of twenty operational bases from which to strike at targets in Turkish provinces bordering Iran. In March that year, Abdullah Öcalan played up the positive aspects of the Islamic revolution in Iran.\textsuperscript{20}

Öcalan’s tactic was to place armed bands of his followers in the arc of high mountains, rising above 10,000 feet, which stretches westwards from Turkey’s frontier with Iran and dominates upper Mesopotamia, where most of the population of south-eastern Turkey is concentrated. The mountain area is dotted with isolated villages and hamlets where tribesmen migrate in the summer months. Throughout history, the authority of the central government was felt only sporadically here. It was ideal country for outlaws, smugglers and now terrorists. Öcalan wanted to use it as a ‘liberated area’, in accordance with manuals of guerrilla warfare, and then descend on the towns, as Castro had come down from the Sierra Maestra to capture Havana in Cuba. But, first, Öcalan had to win over or, at least, cow the villagers in the mountains. This did not prove easy. The villagers were used to bandits. When armed men arrived in the night, many used the traditional strategy of survival and kept their heads down. But others, where armed
guards had been placed, informed the authorities. Öcalan let loose on them the ‘revolutionary violence’ he had preached. He was determined that the villagers should fear his men more than they did the authorities.

The attacks on villages began in January 1987. In June 1987, the country was shocked by the news that terrorists had murdered 29 people, including eight women and five children in the village of Pınarcık. Pınarcık was targeted because some villagers had enrolled as government-paid guards. Four of them were killed in the PKK raid. The wave of terror rolled on relentlessly. Between 1987 and 1991, 33 villages were attacked, and 36 people killed, including 16 children and eight women.21

The wholesale slaughter of tribal enemies had been practised earlier in the area. The Kurdish national epic *Mamê Alan*, ends with a description of the massacre of the innocent population of Jizira Botan (Cizre on the Turkish side of the border with Iraq) by the liegemen of the eponymous hero.22 Öcalan’s men revived the practice, killing ‘wife, children, servants, all’ (to use Shakespeare’s terse description of the massacre of Macduff’s family by Macbeth).

However, Öcalan’s tactic of dominating the local people through terror did not work. In 1989, two years into his terror campaign, he complained: ‘When we look at the experience in other countries, we see that they started with 300 guerrillas. Within two years their number rose to 10,000. We also started with 300, but we are still only 1,500. Why?’23 Yet the terrorists were well armed and equipped and could maintain wireless contact with their leaders outside Turkey. ‘Have you ever seen a revolution so generously supported from outside?’ asked Öcalan as he reproached his militants. As usual, Öcalan put the blame on his lieutenants, in particular on one Halil Kaya (known by the code name of Blind Cemal). His method of terrorising villagers by wiping out whole families was denounced by the PKK as ‘the practices of Blind Cemal’.24

It was clear that Öcalan’s hope to demonstrate to local people that they could not rely on the protection of the Turkish state had been disappointed. The authorities, which had not expected such a wide-ranging terrorist campaign, began to plan their response. At first, the area was put under martial law. But there was still a lack of communication between the military and the civil authorities which controlled the gendarmerie charged with policing rural areas. In July 1987, martial law was replaced by emergency powers exercised by a regional governor, better able to ensure civil–military co-ordination and to respond to the needs of local people. Villages which could not be controlled were evacuated. This measure, which had been used elsewhere (notably by the British in Malaya during the Communist insurgency after World War II) served two aims: to protect the villagers and to deprive the terrorists of food and shelter which they could otherwise force local people to provide. Particularly in Europe, the PKK launched an intensive propaganda campaign accusing the Turkish authorities of
destroying Kurdish villages. The campaign won over many liberals. But rural depopulation had begun earlier for economic reasons in the mountain areas; the emergency speeded it up, as it did in other countries affected by terrorism, such as Colombia and Peru in Latin America. Many of the villages which were destroyed were primitive settlements, often consisting of houses made of mud brick. Some Turkish politicians, notably the social-democrat statesman Bülent Ecevit, had long advocated replacing them with larger settlements, grouping the inhabitants of several villages, who could then be better provided with public services. However, the transfer and the flight of villagers from the mountains to the cities in the plain also offered opportunities to the PKK. It could exploit the resentment of uprooted, unemployed migrants and infiltrate its agents among them.

Like the extremist (not to say demented) Marxist terrorist organisation calling itself Sendero Luminoso (the Radiant Path) in Peru, the PKK tried to destroy the physical infrastructure of the state in a scorched earth policy that was to create a propitious environment for his revolution. In November 1987, the terrorists strangled a teacher with wire. It set a grisly precedent. In fifteen years (1987–2002), mainly in the first phase of the terrorist campaign, 307 public servants were killed and 204 injured. The victims included 96 teachers killed. Also killed were 90 junior officials and manual workers employed by the state, 32 prayer-leaders, four doctors, and three mayors. There were 114 schools totally destroyed and another 127 damaged. Health centres (six destroyed, eight damaged), road-making and mining machinery belonging either to the state or to private concerns (more than 500 pieces of equipment destroyed), railway carriages (45 destroyed and 40 damaged), post offices, electricity lines, bridges were all targeted. The PKK tried to stop the distribution of national newspapers by threatening newsagents with death. The PKK had accused the Turkish Republic of neglecting the areas inhabited by people of Kurdish origin. In fact, the expenditure of the Turkish treasury in the eastern and south-eastern regions of the country has been consistently higher than the revenue derived from them. It was the PKK which tried, and in the last resort failed, to halt the development of the south-east in order to carry out its revolution.

In 1989, after the end of the Iran–Iraq war, weapons became more abundant in northern Iraq. The ability of the PKK to lay its hands on arms and ammunition increased further in 1991 in the aftermath of the Gulf War, triggered by Saddam Hussein’s attempt to seize Kuwait with its rich oilfields. As Turkey rallied to the US-led coalition formed to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, the Iraqi dictator retaliated by helping Turkey’s enemies.

The situation in northern Iraq became chaotic after Saddam Hussein’s defeat in Kuwait. Iraqi Kurds rose, believing that the Americans would help them. No help came, however, when Saddam Hussein’s army swept back into northern Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds pressed against
the borders of Turkey and Iran. Turkey had given refuge to Kurds fleeing from Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war, when Saddam Hussein sought to end once and for all the possibility of ‘his’ Kurds siding with Iran. He did so by the simple expedient of destroying Kurdish townships and villages, expelling their inhabitants and sending thousands of them to the desert of southern Iraq. His campaign reached its climax with the gassing of the small town of Halabja, near the Iranian border, in 1988.

Some of the refugees were still in Turkey when Saddam Hussein’s forces pushed back into northern Iraq in the winter of 1990/1. This time Turkey could not cope with many hundreds of thousands of refugees. It therefore proposed that they should be resettled in safety. The proposal was taken up by the Allies and led to the creation of the Kurdish ‘safe haven’ in northern Iraq in April 1991. Unfortunately for Turkey this became a safe haven not only for Iraqi Kurds (ruled by two rival parties – Masud Barzani’s KDP and Jalal Talabani’s PUK), but also for the PKK. While Saddam Hussein slipped arms to the PKK in order to vent his anger on Turkey, Öcalan retained also the facilities allowed him by Syria, even though that country was officially a member of the Allied coalition.

The world and, with it, the Middle East changed in the years 1989–91. The Soviet Union collapsed. Syria lost its main protector and arms supplier but, along with Iraq and Iran, it retained the use of the weapon of terrorism. The New World Order, promised by President George Bush senior, failed to materialise. Not only was Turkey left alone to fight PKK terror, but it was criticised when, inevitably, civilians suffered in military operations.

The PKK had now a stronger presence in northern Iraq and it was also better armed. Öcalan decided to switch from hit-and-run attacks to a grandly named ‘war of movement’. The PKK fourth convention, held during the Gulf War in 1990, also raised the profile of political warfare, which this time was to be carried out in towns, particularly among the masses of rural refugees. Here a favourite tactic was to force the closure of shops as a sign of protest against the authorities. The spring equinox (March 21), traditionally celebrated as the beginning of the solar new year over a wide area of Eurasia (and particularly in Iran), was appropriated as a ‘Kurdish national holiday’ and clashes were orchestrated between local people and the Turkish authorities. The PKK attempted also to spread terrorism to western Turkey. On December 21, 1991, a group of PKK sympathisers set fire to a department store in Istanbul, owned by the brother of the governor of the emergency region. Eleven people perished and 17 were injured. Agents were infiltrated from Greece to explode bombs in areas frequented by foreign tourists and thus reinforce a propaganda campaign in Europe warning holidaymakers to avoid Turkey. These individual acts of terrorism served only to increase public revulsion against the PKK. Turkish tourism was hardly affected. But in the south-east the political campaign increased the pool of PKK sympathisers.
To widen his appeal, Öcalan now let it be known that he had given up separatism, at least for the moment, declaring ‘My people need Turkey; we can’t secede for at least forty years . . . Unity will bring strength.’ The attempt to present a more moderate image responded to developments in Turkey and the world at large. As Communist ideology became discredited after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PKK toned down its Marxist rhetoric. But its banner still carried the red star. Inside Turkey, some Kurdish nationalists set up the People’s Labour Party (HEP) which fought the 1991 elections on the ticket of the mainstream Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP). It thus managed to secure a few seats in parliament, but its members were later expelled from SHP and regrouped as the Democracy Party (DEP). After parliament had voted to strip them of their immunity, they were put on trial and found guilty of collusion with the PKK. Four of the accused were given long sentences of imprisonment. The best-known among them was a woman MP, Leyla Zana, wife of a Kurdish nationalist who had been mayor of Diyarbakir. Sentenced for collusion with a terrorist organisation, she was seen in Europe as a victim of the denial of free speech in Turkey. Other DEP members of parliament who escaped to Europe did indeed co-operate with the PKK, particularly in the fraudulent Kurdish Parliament in Exile, which the PKK dominated. Gradually, Öcalan came to adopt the IRA tactic of using simultaneously the ballot box and the Armalite (in his case the Kalashnikov). For the ballot box he needed proxies and, to enable proxies to work within the Turkish constitution, he had to sound more accommodating.

The PKK had no choice but to engage in political manoeuvres because its ‘armed struggle’ was failing, in spite of increased supplies of arms and equipment and the accumulation of large funds through extortion and rackets. In Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, who became prime minister after the 1991 elections, and his coalition partner, the deputy prime minister Erdal İnönü, leader of SHP, went to the south-east to reassure local people. Süleyman Demirel declared that he recognised ‘the Kurdish reality’. The PKK responded by intensifying its attacks. The security forces launched a determined offensive, which demonstrated to the terrorists that they could kill, but would never win.

Turgut Özal, who had moved up from the premiership to the presidency of the republic, looked for ways to ease the terrorists out of their blind alley. Unofficial emissaries, including Jalal Talabani, visited Öcalan in Damascus. In March 1993, Öcalan announced a unilateral ceasefire which he accompanied with a number of political demands. The Turkish state refused to negotiate with terrorists who were clearly losing ground. On May 24, 1993, Öcalan’s ceasefire came to an abrupt end when PKK armed men stopped a bus carrying unarmed Turkish conscripts and murdered 31 of them along with four civilians. The government formed by Mrs Tansu Çiller, who replaced Süleyman Demirel after the latter had been elected president
following the death of Turgut Özal in April 1993, saw no alternative but to eradicate the PKK with all the means at its disposal.

The years 1991–3 saw the worst of the PKK campaign. Thereafter, the terrorists were gradually ground down, losing many men in the process. Civilians also suffered. On October 22, 1993, PKK snipers killed the regional gendarmerie commander, Brigadier Bahtiyar Aydın, in the town of Lice. As troops tried to flush out the terrorists, the town suffered heavy damage. The PKK tried time and again to spread its attacks to the whole country. On February 12, 1994, a bomb placed by terrorists in the suburban railway station of Tuzla, near Istanbul, killed five military cadets. But isolated outrages could not disguise the fact that the PKK could not mobilise support among Kurdish migrants in Turkey’s main metropolitan centres. Kurdish nationalism had little appeal for people who were integrating in the wider Turkish society, and the political party (People’s Democracy Party/HADEP), which had replaced DEP and, like its predecessor, espoused ethnic identity politics, obtained only some 4 per cent of the total vote in the 1995 and 1999 elections.

The security forces mastered the task of flushing out the terrorists. It was not easy, particularly in inaccessible mountain terrain, much of it wooded, where snipers could pick off soldiers, ambushes could be laid and rough tracks could be mined. Sometimes the PKK used women and boys in their attacks. The use of boys as killers in blood feuds was commonplace in rural Anatolia, as under-age murderers got off with lighter punishments while their instigators went scot-free. Women were often recruited into terrorist organisations worldwide – the Baader–Meinhof gang in Germany, the Red Brigades in Italy, and both DHKP/C and the PKK in Turkey. Revolutionaries presented it as a sign of feminine self-assertion. The PKK set up a front organisation for women (Union of Free Women of Kurdistan/TAJK), which was particularly active in 1993, mainly in Western Europe, but also in Turkey. In modernising traditional societies women are often frustrated in the circumscribed lives they are forced to lead. This is particularly true in conservative areas, such as south-eastern Turkey. But there are better ways of emancipating women than to turn them into terrorists. Atatürk, who had espoused wholeheartedly the cause of women’s emancipation and gave women the vote before they had won that right in many Western countries, promoted gender equality by enabling women to have careers in civil society. As a result, Turkey already had a high proportion of women in public service and in managerial positions. What the PKK and other terrorist organisations did was to destroy women’s lives rather than free them. The grisly spectacle of women setting themselves alight ‘for the revolutionary cause’ symbolises not emancipation, but subjugation. It is the equivalent of suttee, the former Hindu practice of a widow immolating herself on her husband’s funeral pyre.
The abuse of women and children served only to highlight the fact that the PKK was clearly failing and losing support. Order improved in the south-east, where normal life resumed in the towns. But as long as the PKK kept its bases in neighbouring countries and could infiltrate armed men and weapons, the war on terror could not be won. The Turkish armed forces made repeated incursions into northern Iraq to force the terrorists out. When Barzani’s KDP began to co-operate in operations against the PKK, the latter moved south to Talabani’s PUK territory. But they could still infiltrate through Iran, where the PKK had rear facilities, including a hospital. All the while Öcalan remained in Damascus and directed terror operations, despite repeated assurances from the Syrian government that it would refrain from harming Turkey’s security.

The patient work of the Turkish armed forces in clearing the terrorists from their hide-outs in the south-east led to increased defections from, and splits in, the PKK. The process had started earlier. In 1988, Hüseyin Yıldırım, a Kurdish lawyer living in Sweden who had acted as PKK spokesman in Europe, broke with Öcalan in protest at the latter’s policy of killing civilians. ‘After the party is freed from Apo,’ he declared, ‘the armed struggle will start again. But this time women and children will not be selected as targets.’ Öcalan’s ex-wife Kesire sided with Yıldırım. Four messengers whom Yıldırım sent to Öcalan were killed. ‘They have committed suicide; they had bad intentions,’ Öcalan claimed incredulously. Nevertheless, at the 5th convention of the PKK in 1995, Öcalan admitted that the murder of schoolteachers had been a mistake and that many people had been ‘unjustly punished’, i.e. murdered for no good reason, by his men in Turkey. This time he blamed Şemdin Sakık, at one time his right-hand man in the south-east, who had been responsible for the massacre of unarmed conscripts in 1993. Sakık retaliated by saying ‘Commanders should lead their troops in the field, instead of making speeches from a distance.’ Sakık was not invited to the 5th convention of the PKK. He eventually made his way to northern Iraq where he was detained by Barzani’s KDP and handed over to a Turkish commando team. In November 1997 Öcalan sent a wireless message accusing his men of behaving like bandits and of disobeying his order to stop killing civilians, including ‘those who give you bread and water’. The following year he tried to open a new front in the Black Sea area by concluding an agreement with the Maoist TDP and TİKKO terrorists who were active there. But these were small-scale diversions. He tried to appeal to Islamists, saying at the 5th convention, ‘The PKK represents the application to Kurdistan both of revolutionary socialism and of revolutionary Islam.’ But, as we shall see, ‘revolutionary Islamists’ had their own murderous gangs.

In September 1998 Turkey decided that enough was enough. At a meeting of the National Security Council, chaired by President Süleyman Demirel, the decision was taken to force Syria to expel the PKK bag and baggage.
On September 16, the commander of the Turkish land forces, General Atilla Ateş, speaking near the border with Syria, declared bluntly:

> Neighbours such as Syria misinterpret our good will. By supporting a bandit like Öcalan, they have brought the curse of terror to Turkey. If Turkey’s efforts to maintain good relations do not receive a proper response, Turkey will have the right to take such measures as it will see fit.39

In his speech opening the new session of parliament, President Süleyman Demirel warned that Turkey reserved the right to retaliate if Syria persisted in supporting terrorism. The warning was reinforced by the despatch of Turkish troops to the border with Syria. On October 3, 1998, the Egyptian president Husni Mubarak arrived in Ankara in an attempt to defuse the crisis. The Turkish government asked him to tell the Syrians that if they did not give up Öcalan, they would have to face the consequences. Syria gave way. First it closed the PKK camps south of the Turkish border. Then it ordered Öcalan to go.40

Öcalan’s subsequent peregrinations give a clear picture of his international connections. A Syrian aircraft first took him to Cyprus. From there he went to Greece. The Greek authorities told him to move on within three hours. He flew to Moscow where, he was to say, he had been invited by the ultra-nationalist (and anti-Turkish) politician Vladimir Zhirinovski. The Russian parliament voted that Öcalan should be given political asylum, but the government disregarded the advice and tried to find another country willing to take him. It was finally relieved of its burden when a maverick member of the hard-line Italian Communist Party (Communist Refoundation/RC) arrived in Moscow and escorted Öcalan to Rome. He arrived on November 12, bearing a false passport, and was arrested. Turkey demanded his extradition. Italy refused, while trying to persuade the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder to ask for his extradition to Germany under an arrest warrant issued earlier by a German court. The PKK organised violent demonstrations in Rome and elsewhere in Western Europe, while in Turkey an unofficial boycott started of Italian goods and services. In these conditions the German government chose safety in inactivity and refused to give effect to the arrest warrant of its own court. Meanwhile, in Italy, a court ordered Öcalan’s release and he took up residence in a villa on the outskirts of Rome. As no European country was prepared either to give him asylum or to prosecute him, he was technically an illegal immigrant. But what was Italy to do with him? The problem of the Italian government was resolved by Greeks who did not want their relationship with Öcalan to come out into the open. A faction within the Greek government spirited Öcalan out of Rome in the hope of finding a country outside Europe willing to take him. Africa appeared to offer the
right prospects. On January 31, 1999, Öcalan once again flew to Greece. He was then taken to Nairobi, where he was lodged on Greek diplomatic premises. Öcalan was getting restive and used his mobile phone frequently to call his friends. The calls were traced. On February 15 Öcalan left his Greek safe house and was driven to Nairobi airport. He was carrying a Cyprus passport, issued in a false name, and he thought that he was going to Holland, where he had applied for political asylum. Instead, on arrival at the airport, a commando team which had been flown in from Turkey bundled him into a Turkish private aircraft. Within hours he found himself in a Turkish prison.

The PKK bit the hands of those governments which had allowed it to establish a presence on their territory. In Berlin, guards opened fire when PKK supporters threatened to break into the Israeli consulate in protest at the presumed part played by Israeli intelligence in Öcalan’s capture. In London, the PKK attacked the Greek embassy, claiming that the Greek authorities had tricked Öcalan and delivered him to Turkey. Greece bore the heaviest cost for its covert support of PKK terrorism. The leading proponent of that policy, foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos, and the ministers of the interior and public order, had to resign. PKK supporters who had benefited from official Greek connivance rioted in Athens. Fortunately, the prime minister Kostas Simitis drew the right conclusion from his country’s troubles, and encouraged the new foreign minister, George Papandreou, to open a new page in relations with Turkey. This led eventually to the signature of an agreement providing for co-operation against terrorism.

Öcalan cut a poor figure when he appeared in the dock of the state security court on the prison island of İmralı in the sea of Marmara. He declared that he would henceforth co-operate with the Turkish state and work for reconciliation. He called on his supporters to end their attacks and leave Turkish territory. He laid bare his international connections. Öcalan’s guilt was not in doubt. He was the undisputed leader of a bloody insurrection against the Turkish Republic. He was given the opportunity to defend himself, but his rambling apologia did not affect the verdict. He was sentenced to death on June 29, 1999, and the sentence was confirmed by the court of appeal on October 21. However, the Turkish government heeded the stay of execution granted by the European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, pending its ruling on the conduct of the trial. In August 2002, the Turkish parliament abolished the death penalty when it amended the constitution in line with the practice of member countries of the European Union. As a consequence of the reform, the sentence of death passed on Öcalan was commuted to life imprisonment. In June 2004 – five years after the conclusion of Öcalan’s trial for treason in Turkey – the European Court of Human Rights finally
began its examination of the claim made by his lawyers that the conduct of the trial had breached the European Convention of Human Rights.

The cost in human lives and resources of Turkey’s war on separatist terror has been heavy. Between July 19, 1987, when the state of emergency was proclaimed, and the end of May 2002, security forces (the armed forces, police and village guards) lost 5,500 dead and 11,500 wounded. The total included 250 officers, 230 NCOs and 3,500 other ranks killed. Nearly 15 billion dollars had to be spent from the funds of the armed forces alone to win the war against the PKK.

Civilian losses have also been heavy: 5,335 killed and 10,714 injured. But the heaviest losses were suffered by the terrorists: 23,500 killed, over 600 injured, nearly 3,500 captured and another 2,500 who surrendered. All these figures refer to the area under emergency rule and to the period of the emergency. The grand total is considerably higher, if one takes account of casualties suffered by all sides before the proclamation of the state of emergency and people killed and injured outside the area of emergency rule.

The total of 30,000 terrorists put out of action shows the extent of the problem which faced Turkish security forces. Not all the terrorists were Turkish citizens: they included Syrians, Iraqis and others. Even so, the majority were locals. Many had been press-ganged into PKK bands; some were tricked or won over with promises of money, loot or adventure; some again compromised themselves and felt they had to escape into the mountains. Many were persuaded by PKK propaganda, as they attended courses of ‘ideological training’ in the Middle East or Western Europe. To ease their return to society, the Turkish parliament passed legislation, modelled on the Italian law on pentiti (those who repent), reducing penalties on terrorists who surrendered and co-operated with the authorities. But local factionalism has made it more difficult to restore law and order. The PKK started its life as a group of revolutionaries claiming to stand outside tribal allegiances. However, it soon found its niche in feuds based on old tribal rivalries. It also became a multimillion-dollar business financed by rackets. It will take time to end animosity between local factions and to wind down the international business.

In May 2002, the EU finally added PKK to its list of banned terrorist organisations. The PKK anticipated the ban by dissolving itself in April and re-emerging as KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress). KADEK named as its leader Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned terrorist leader of the PKK. Öcalan’s companions, Cemil Bayik and Murat Karayılan, became prominent members of the KADEK leadership. The PKK mouthpiece, the monthly journal Serxwebun, published in Germany, performed the same service for KADEK. Özgür Politika [Free Politics], the newspaper published in Germany which uses Turkish to promote the cause of radical Kurdish nationalism, highlighted the activities of KADEK,
as it had those of the PKK. Abdullah Öcalan was also named honorary president of KNK, the Kurdish National Congress, which reincarnated the self-styled Parliament in Exile. KNK was founded in Holland. Its second convention in Bilzen, Belgium, was welcomed by the local mayor Johan Sauwens, a member of the Flemish far-right Volksunie party who had earlier had to resign from the Flemish regional government after he had attended a neo-Nazi gathering. By their friends shall you know them.

Serxwebun announced in June 2002 that KADEK had opened a school to train its leading members. It already had a ‘military academy’, a ‘press academy’, etc. The paper did not specify where these establishments were located, but it was reported later that month that KADEK had obtained permission to set up a school in Armenia to provide ‘academic-level education’. The same report added that KADEK representatives in Armenia had been dismissed for a failure to abide by the instructions of the Armenian government.

According to information reaching Turkish authorities, during the six weeks following its establishment on April 16, 2002, KADEK had bought machine-guns and hand grenades in Iran, Armenia and Iraq to a total value of more than 200,000 dollars. In July 2002 the Turkish interior minister, Rüştü Kâzım Yücelen, pointed out to his Iranian opposite number, Abdolvahid Musavi Lari, on a visit to Turkey, the obvious fact that KADEK and the PKK were one and the same. However, Lari refused to note this in the minutes of the meeting, while continuing to claim that Iran paid as much attention to Turkey’s security as it did to its own. Nor did Iran meet the Turkish request that it should extradite Cemil Bayık, one of the leaders of KADEK/PKK, who, according to information reaching Turkey, had moved from northern Iraq to Iran, carrying with him the sum of 1.4 million dollars. The file handed to Iran by Turkish authorities contained information to the effect that 800 PKK/KADEK militants were using seven camps in Iran and that a 250-member PKK operational unit was to be formed following a meeting between an Iranian intelligence official and Öcalan’s brother Osman (who, it will be remembered, had established an office in Iran as far back as 1989).

PKK/KADEK never truly abandoned violence in spite of its protestations after the Öcalan trial that, in accordance with its leader’s wishes, it would observe a ceasefire. The terrorists’ favourite tactic was to plant landmines in south-eastern Turkey. In 2001 seven members of the security forces and civilians were killed in landmine explosions. That year Turkish security forces reported nearly 200 contacts with PKK bands. Operations conducted in the wake of ambushes and bombings by elements of the PKK resulted in the death of more than 100 militants. There were at the time an estimated 500 PKK/KADEK armed men in the mountains of south-eastern Turkey, and another 5,300 in nine bases in northern Iraq and across the border in Iran.
The outbreak of the Iraq War in March 2003 set off a furious debate in the ranks of PKK/KADEK. The more violent elements saw an opportunity in the problems which arose between Turkey and the US administration after the Turkish parliament had refused on March 1, 2003, to allow US troops to transit through Turkish territory in order to open a northern front against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The subsequent decision of the Americans to rely on the militias of Barzani and Talabani in northern Iraq encouraged Kurdish nationalists in their ambition to extend their \textit{de facto} rule to Kirkuk with its rich oilfields and, with luck, to Mosul as well. In July 2003 Turkey reacted strongly against the arrest by the US military of a small group of Turkish military personnel, who had originally been sent to northern Iraq to monitor a truce between the Barzani and Talabani factions. Accused falsely of a plot to assassinate a Kurdish-appointed governor, the Turkish officers and men were released after being flown to Baghdad and returned to their base. They were finally withdrawn and returned to Turkey in July 2004. The long-standing alliance between the United States and Turkey recovered. But this did not stop Kurdish nationalists from trying to play off the leader of the NATO alliance against one of its most faithful members.

Soon after the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, the American military and Kurdish militias conducted a joint operation to destroy a camp set up near the border with Iran by Ansar al-Islam, a group of Kurdish and Arab terrorists which belonged to the loose al-Qaida family. However, in spite of repeated Turkish requests, no action was taken against the PKK/KADEK camp in the same area, although the US administration, which had listed PKK/KADEK as a terrorist organisation, stated repeatedly that there was no room for terrorists of any description in Iraq. In an attempt to reduce the size of the problem, the Turkish parliament passed yet another partial amnesty for terrorists who gave themselves up.

Some members of PKK/KADEK were tempted to give up. They were resisted by a hard core determined not to abandon the business of terrorism. One of the leading members of the PKK in Europe, Engin Sincer, was shot dead during the argument. The PKK announced that he was killed by a stray bullet. It is more likely that he was executed by the leadership for speaking favourably of the amnesty proclaimed in Turkey. The report that the PKK collected in Europe the sum of 200,000 Euros in his memory (and spent some 40,000 Euros on a funeral monument in his home village in Turkey) gives some idea of the resources which the organisation can still mobilise. Writing in the \textit{National Review} in August 2004, Michael Rubin, who had visited PKK camps in northern Iraq, drew attention to a well-known source of terrorist revenue:

\begin{quote}
No matter how poor were Masud Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan at their
\end{quote}
nadir, neither cultivated nor smuggled drugs. The same is not true of the PKK, which facilitates drug smuggling from Iran through Iraq and Turkey and into Europe.55

With adequate funds at their disposal, the PKK/KADEK leadership carried on with the business of terrorism. According to the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy,

In summer 2003, the PKK made a strategic decision to infiltrate back into Turkey. Since then, an estimated 1,500 terrorists have joined their 500 comrades already in Turkey, with some 300 of these operatives crossing the border between April and June 2004. These terrorists are well armed with weapons from the old Iraqi army (e.g. surface-to-air missiles) obtained in northern Iraq in the immediate aftermath of the war in April 2003. On the Iraqi side of the border, the PKK maintains around 5,300 terrorists at nine bases near Haftanin, Harkuk, and the Iranian and Iraqi sides of Mount Qandil. The organisation continues to traverse Iranian territory to infiltrate into Turkey.56

The local Kurdish population of northern Iraq would dearly love to see the last of the PKK who prey on their hosts in the time-honoured tradition of bandits. Michael Rubin reported:

The PKK has denuded villages in the mountains of the ‘triangle border’ where Iran, Iraq, and Turkey come together. The PKK occupies homes and farms, extorts illegal taxes, and metes out summary justice to those who do not comply. On occasion, the PKK mines roads. In a region where adults and children pile into the back of pick-up trucks for transportation, carnage from PKK mines can be immense. The PKK’s terror in northern Iraq stretches more than a decade. In 1994, PKK terrorists rained mortars down on the rooftops of the mountaintop settlement of Amadya. Touring the ancient town in March 2001, residents showed me the damage to their homes. PKK members also sabotaged bridges, cutting off villagers from their fields and disrupting the local economy.57

The decision of PKK/KADEK to reignite terrorism was meant to disrupt the efforts of the Turkish authorities which were trying to ensure the return of normal conditions in the country’s south-eastern area where emergency rule had gradually been narrowed down to a few provinces and then lifted totally in November 2002. For the first time in twenty years, local people could go about their lawful business in peace. The coalition government, led by the veteran social-democratic politician, Bülent Ecevit, which was
in power in Ankara between April 1999 and November 2002, enacted a large number of reforms culminating in the abolition of the death penalty in August 2002. The reforms were pursued energetically by its successor, the government formed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won an absolute majority in the elections held in November 2002. Restrictions on the use of Kurdish (and other languages and dialects spoken by Turkish citizens) in the press, broadcasting and private tuition were removed.

Realising that its true identity as the reincarnation of PKK was about to be recognised in Europe and that it would be banned as a terrorist organisation, KADEK dissolved itself on November 11, 2003, and metamorphosed into yet another body, KONGRA-GEL. Its chairman was Zübeyir Aydar, a former member of the Turkish parliament who had fled the country when he and his colleagues in the Democracy Party (DEP) were stripped of their parliamentary immunity. The change of name made no difference. On April 2, 2004, the European Union specified that its ban on PKK applied equally to both KADEK and KONGRA-GEL. The United States had earlier come to the same conclusion, although, as we have noted, it took no action to remove the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL terrorists from Iraqi territory.

The amnesty, the return of normal conditions in the south-east, and finally the failure of KONGRA-GEL to hoodwink world opinion into believing that it was a new and legitimate organisation, intensified the split between moderates (realists might be a better term) and extremists in PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. At the same time friction developed between the extremists and the Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP), which had succeeded HEP, DEP and then HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) as the vehicle for Kurdish nationalism on the Turkish political scene. The split came out into the open in the run-up to the Turkish local government elections on March 28, 2004. DEHAP allied itself with the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP, which had split off from the Republican People’s Party/CHP) and produced a common list of candidates under the ad hoc name of Union of Democratic Forces. They selected a new candidate, Osman Baydemir, for the post of mayor of Diyarbakır, the main city in the south-east. PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL militants, on the other hand, backed the old mayor, Feridun Çelik, who challenged his party by standing as an independent with the blessing, it was claimed, of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. However, Öcalan’s brother, Osman, disagreed with the KONGRA-GEL leadership, which then deprived him and his companions of all their positions in the party on February 25. Baydemir defeated Çelik. However, in the country-wide poll the combined vote of DEHAP/SHP (4.8 per cent) fell short of the result achieved by DEHAP alone in the 2002 general elections (6.3 per cent).
On May 17, 2004, a Kurdish nationalist news agency operating out of the United Kingdom reported that the imprisoned rebel leader Abdullah Öcalan had denounced two senior PKK figures in Europe, Rıza Altun and Mizgin Sen (the latter was described as vice-president of KONGRA-GEL), as well as prominent PKK men in northern Iraq. These included a militant leader called Nizamettin Taş, who had married a woman militant some time earlier. Abdullah Öcalan’s style is illustrated by his call to Nizamettin Taş: ‘Take this broad and run away.’62 Not to be outdone, some of Abdullah Öcalan’s opponents accused him of advocating a policy of reconciliation indistinguishable from that of the Turkish authorities.63 However, most members of KONGRA-GEL preferred to appeal to Abdullah Öcalan’s authority in their faction fighting.

The position of brother Osman and his companions (including Nizamettin Taş) was not at first clear. At the beginning of June 2004 it was reported that they had taken refuge with the forces of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of the Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani.64 But when Talabani visited Ankara the following month, he claimed that they were in Mosul, in the area under the control of the Iraqi government. In August 2004, Osman Öcalan and a group of followers, including Kani Yılmaz, formally left KONGRA-GEL in order to set up their own Patriotic Democracy Party (PWD). In an interview with a Kurdish nationalist news agency, Kani Yılmaz declared that he and his companions were left with no option but to leave KONGRA-GEL in order to resolve the Kurdish issue ‘without savagery and war’. He went on:

We demanded an end to torture inside the organisation [KONGRA-GEL] and to the culture of fear and reprisals, saying that individuals should have the right to leave or join the organisation without fear of persecution . . . In a single word, it was savagery [within KONGRA-GEL].

Kani Yılmaz claimed that:

at his meeting with lawyers [in İmralı prison] on August 25, 2004, [Abdullah] Öcalan demonised us as traitors and destroyers. This is the standard way in which the organisation provides the foundations for individuals to be eliminated. During a broadcast by Roj TV the same Wednesday evening, a statement was made in which we were called traitors and our execution order [was] effectively given. Roj TV and the Özgür Politika newspaper must remember that media organisations broadcasting from and publishing in democratic countries (including Denmark and Germany) cannot incite bloodshed and violence.65
The warning given by Kani Yılmaz was justified. On October 6, Siphan Rojhilat (Shapur), an Iranian Kurd, responsible for co-ordinating the political activities of KONGRA-GEL in Iranian Kurdistan, was kidnapped near the Mahmur refugee camp, which KONGRA-GEL is believed to control, on the outskirts of Mosul. His body was found the following day. Siphan was on the hit list containing the names of 25 dissenting members of KONGRA-GEL.66

All the while KONGRA-GEL militants did their best to disturb the peace in south-eastern Turkey. Between April 9 and May 25, 2004, ten members of the security forces and 19 terrorists were killed.67 On May 31, the KONGRA-GEL leader Zübeyir Aydar announced at a press conference in northern Iraq that he was ending the non-existent ceasefire the following day. Taking a leaf out of the book of insurgents in Iraq, he added ominously that thenceforth no foreigner – neither tourist nor businessman – would be secure in Turkey.68 The blackmail was spelled out in an article in Özgür Politika, the radical Kurdish nationalist newspaper published legally in Germany. ‘Tourism is the jugular vein of the Turkish economy’, claimed the writer (Mehmet Özgül), adding ‘Will not your reservations collapse if a few bombs exploded without harming any tourists?’69 In fact in previous years the terrorists had been unable to discourage tourists even when their attacks caused casualties. Similarly, 2004 witnessed an increase in the number in tourist arrivals in spite of blood-curdling terrorist threats.

While there had been no pause in terrorist attacks and anti-terrorist operations before June 1, 2004, there was certainly an increase in incidents after that date, and the security forces intensified their efforts to flush out the terrorists and prevent outrages. The diary for June 2004 makes grim reading:

June 1: Six members of PKK/KONGRA-GEL arrested in Adana.
June 9: Three terrorists killed in Adıyaman province.
June 11: One policeman and one watchman killed in Batman province.
June 12: Two soldiers injured when their vehicle struck a mine in Tunceli. In the same province, one gendarme was killed and two injured in a terrorist attack.
June 15: One soldier and one terrorist killed, and two soldiers injured in Şırnak province.
June 16: One soldier killed in a terrorist attack on a police station in Hatay province near the border with Syria. On the same day two terrorists were killed in the province of Hakkârri; one soldier killed in Şırnak, and two village guards injured in Muş province.
June 19: One soldier killed and one injured when their vehicle struck a mine in Bingöl province.
June 21: Five terrorists killed in Tunceli.
June 23: One terrorist killed in Bingöl.
June 26: Two bombs exploded in Adana without causing casualties. On the same day, the police detained 15 suspects in an operation against PKK/KONGRA-GEL in Istanbul.

June 28: Three soldiers killed and three injured by remotely controlled mines in Van province.70

There was no let-up in subsequent months. On one day alone, July 13, 2004, there were three attacks, in which two members of the security forces were killed and ten injured and five terrorists killed.71 On July 18, a gendarmerie post was attacked in the province of Tunceli and a soldier injured; on July 24, a terrorist was killed in an attack on a police station in the province of Hakkâri, bordering on Iraq, and a civilian killed by terrorists in Tunceli; on July 27, two members of the security forces were killed and six injured when their patrol was ambushed in the province of Bingöl; on July 29, a watchman was killed and two policemen and one civilian were injured in an attack on a police station in the city of Diyarbakır; on August 3, a policeman was killed and another injured when their car came under fire in the province of Ağrı; on August 6, a child was killed and another injured by a land-mine detonated in Dargeçit, in the province of Mardin – the scene, as it happens, of a popular demonstration against the resumption of terrorist activity by PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL a few weeks earlier; on August 7 reports were received of attacks in the provinces of Van, Bingöl and Mardin, in which nine members of the police and security forces were injured and one terrorist was killed.72 On August 10, two people were killed and eleven injured when a PKK/KONGRA-GEL cell bombed two small hotels and facilities for filling gas cylinders in Istanbul.73 PKK continued its efforts to disrupt Turkish tourism by bombing the marina in the Mediterranean resort of Antalya on August 23, killing a young boy.74 On September 20, PKK terrorists bombed a pop concert in the Mediterranean seaport of Mersin, wounding 19 fans.75 In September and October 2004, there were several reports of police arresting suspected PKK terrorists in Istanbul,76 suggesting that the split in terrorist ranks had increased the flow of intelligence.

In the meantime attacks continued in south-eastern Turkey, where the terrorists reverted to their old tactic of striking at economic targets: a railway track on September 13 and an oil well on September 20;77 then an oil pipeline on October 23.78 There were also frequent hit-and-run attacks on the security forces. On September 9, PKK terrorists killed two policemen in the city of Diyarbakır on the eve of the visit by the EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Gunter Verheugen. On October 23, two members of the security forces were killed in the province of Tunceli;79 the following day, two soldiers were killed and four wounded in the province of Diyarbakır.80 Then on October 26, one soldier was killed and two wounded when a military detachment was ambushed in the countryside.
near Bingöl. Two days later, on the eve of the celebration of the national holiday, the people of Bingöl came out into the streets to protest at the resurgence of terrorist activity.\textsuperscript{81} October 29, 2004, the 81st anniversary of the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, provides a convenient point to pause in this recital of terrorist attacks in Turkey. There had been 36 terrorist incidents the previous week and 51 suspects had been arrested.\textsuperscript{82} The world media paid little attention to Turkey’s continuing struggle with terror.

On October 21, the commander of Turkish land forces, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, noted during an inspection visit to Diyarbakır that security forces had suffered casualties since the previous June, when KONGRA-GEL had announced that it was resuming its armed struggle. He explained that the terrorists avoided clashes with the security forces, resorting in most cases to land-mines and other explosives and to long-distance weapons. ‘Our determination to conduct an effective campaign against terror has not been shaken,’ General Büyükanıt added.\textsuperscript{83} A survey by the German Marshall Fund showed that he had overwhelming public support: 74 per cent of Turks were convinced that military action was the most appropriate way to fight terrorism (compared with 63 per cent of Americans, and 49 per cent of respondents in nine selected EU countries).\textsuperscript{84}

As has already been noted, the order for the attacks had come from PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL in northern Iraq. It is a safe assumption that the weapons used by the terrorists had come from the same direction. The tactics used by terrorists in south-eastern Turkey, as described by General Büyükanıt, mirror those of the insurgents in Iraq. But public resistance to terrorism is much stronger in Turkey. As we have seen, prominent Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin and even some Kurdish nationalists outside Turkey are beginning to protest at, or at least to question the wisdom of, this resurgence of terrorist activity.

On June 12, 2004, the DEHAP leader, Tuncer Bakırhan, appealed to PKK/KONGRA-GEL to reinstate the ceasefire.\textsuperscript{85} His statement came two days after the Turkish court of appeal had freed the four DEP ex-MPs pending a second retrial. (When the European Court of Human Rights found fault with the first trial, the accused were tried again, but the Turkish state security court confirmed the original verdicts. The case will now be heard by an ordinary criminal court, as state security courts have been abolished.) On June 14, Murat Karayılan, one of the leaders of PKK/KONGRA-GEL, responded by saying that ‘a total reversal of the decision [to end the ceasefire] was not contemplated at the moment’.\textsuperscript{86} Statements by the freed former MPs that they were ‘equidistant’ between the government and PKK/KONGRA-GEL drew a sharp rebuke from the prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. ‘To confuse legality with illegality is not a democratic move,’ he said, ‘No one has the right to weigh the government and an illegal organisation in the same scale.’\textsuperscript{87} ‘The peoples in the
east and south-east [of the country] do not support terrorism. . . . There can be no question of our making concessions to terror,’ the prime minister declared a few days later.88

‘Is it really in the interest of the Kurdish nation to resume the armed struggle at this very moment?’ asked the Kurdish Media nationalist news agency on June 7, 2004. In a statement to the news channel CNN TÜRK, the Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani claimed that it was the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan who had himself given the order to end the ceasefire, adding that this had placed him and everyone else in a difficult position as the Kurds no longer wanted to fight. ‘The PKK’, Talabani added, ‘is like a fish out of water.’ It had, he said, 70 leaders, of whom 17 were in favour of peace and dialogue. The 4–5,000 PKK/KONGRA-GEL militants in northern Iraq were split in three factions. The faction led by Osman Öcalan was in favour of peace and of taking the struggle into the realm of politics. Talabani suggested that Turkey could strengthen their hand by declaring a general amnesty. This drew from the Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül the rejoinder ‘It is up to us and not for them to take the decision.’89

By the summer of 2004 it was clear that the PKK/KONGRA-GEL hardliners were trying hard to hold on to the armed militants they had infiltrated inside Turkey. If peaceful conditions continued to prevail, these bands, numbering some 1,500 men, would gradually melt away. Some would be put out of action by Turkish security forces, others would abandon the terrorist campaign. Abdullah Öcalan was said to have advised the militants (who call themselves ‘People’s Self-Defence Forces’/HPG) to pursue a defensive strategy. However, a commentary carried by the Kurdish Media agency, which reported Öcalan’s advice, added: ‘Öcalan is not satisfied just with a war in Northern Kurdistan [south-eastern Turkey], but wants the war to be extended to East [Iranian] and South-Western [Syrian] Kurdistan.’90

The PKK still has a presence in all three countries, as witness the fact that of three terrorists killed in the province of Tunceli in June 2004, one was an Iranian citizen known as a professional bomber and another a Syrian.91 However, in the summer of 2004 both Iran and Syria appeared to be taking steps to restrain PKK activity. In July two PKK militants were reported killed in a clash between Iranian security forces and a PKK-affiliated group (known by the acronym PEJAK).92 At a meeting of the Turkish–Iranian security committee in Ankara a few days later, Iran responded to Turkish complaints of a lack of effective joint anti-terrorist measures by saying that the matter was under consideration.93 Although Iranian co-operation can never be taken for granted, the outlook appeared to be more promising. On July 13, after meeting his Syrian opposite number in Ankara, prime minister Erdoğan said that since the two countries had reached agreement on security measures Syria had handed over 59 PKK terrorists to Turkey.94 Then, at the end of July when Erdoğan visited
Teheran, the Iranian government entered PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL on the list of banned terrorist organisations and promised to take all necessary measures to stop it from operating on Iranian territory. The implementation of this promise will be watched closely.

In the summer of 2004 the external threat to Turkey’s security was centred in Iraq where stability had yet to be established. Iraq was awash with weapons on which terrorists of all persuasions could easily lay their hands. On June 23, on the eve of the NATO summit in Istanbul, Turkish authorities discovered a load of weapons and explosives in a lorry which had been stopped at the border crossing with Iraq. The need to secure the Iraqi frontier against terrorists was as urgent as ever.

As the militants thrash around like fish out of water in their search for survival, they accuse each other of making off with the funds amassed by PKK, or of wasting them in unsuccessful attempts to promote their supporters within DEHAP. The hard-core leaders of PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL know that, if they lost their force of armed men, they would not only be deprived of any clout inside Turkey but, more importantly, they would be of no use to any foreign backers. It cannot be stressed too often that to survive a terrorist organisation needs at least foreign connivance. To obtain that connivance, it must have a force, however small, at its disposal which foreign backers could use in order to extract advantages for themselves.

The attitude of the international community to the threat posed by terrorism to Turkey will be discussed in the last chapter, but the story of PKK terrorism also holds lessons for the Kurds themselves. Kurdish nationalists tend to accuse foreign powers of using them and then abandoning them to their fate. But it is more accurate to say that it is the Kurdish nationalist leaders themselves, like the tribal leaders before them, who try to enlist foreign support in order to promote their ambitions. They would be well advised to resist this old temptation. Zübeyir Aydar, the KONGRA-GEL leader, admitted that the resurgence of terrorism would be exploited by opponents of Turkey’s accession to the European Union. If this does not worry him, it clearly worries the mass of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, who are enthusiastic supporters of EU membership as a guarantee of the democratic freedoms of which they are the beneficiaries. But rational arguments do not stop terrorism. The menace can be contained only by the unremitting, meticulous efforts of security forces acting in co-operation with foreign colleagues.

Extremists within PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL are unlikely to renounce terrorism, even if the organisation as such dissolved itself in fact and not only in theory. When the original IRA stopped its campaign of violence after World War II, its ‘armed struggle’ was taken up by the Provisional IRA. When the latter promised to disarm under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, the ‘Real IRA’ and the ‘Continuity IRA’ emerged and went on
murdering for ‘the old cause’. Similarly, ETA split into a more moderate political wing, known as ‘Poli’, and the more violent ‘Mili’ or military wing. Then the ‘Mili’ split again, but individual acts of terrorism continued. Both in Northern Ireland and in Spain a slow and patiently pursued political process helped to isolate the men of violence. The same is likely to happen in Turkey where the political process has still a long way to go. At the end of October 2004, Leyla Zana and her companions were preparing to establish a new political party which, she said, would set its face against violence. This would be in line with the advice she was given by EU officials and parliamentarians when she visited Strasbourg earlier that month. If the party does indeed enter the political fray, it will be judged on its record. The example of Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland suggests that the road to genuine democratic behaviour is long and tortuous.

As in any democracy, it will be up to the Turkish parliament to decide how Kurdish nationalism can be accommodated without imperilling the country’s hard-won unity and integrity and the cohesion of its society. But as the political debate goes on, men who are intent on imposing their political ideas through violence must be resisted. The difficult mountainous terrain of south-eastern Turkey, the endemic nature of violence in local society, the proximity of badly governed neighbours, the relative under-development of the area and a host of other factors complicate the task of first circumscribing and then eliminating Kurdish separatist terrorism. But the successes already achieved by successive Turkish governments, often in the face of foreign incomprehension and, not infrequently, of foreign obstruction, suggest that the task can be completed, especially now that the civilised world was been awakened to the menace of terrorism and is less inclined to make excuses for it.
THE ABUSE OF RELIGION

The authors of the outrages of September 11 claimed to draw their inspiration from the Muslim religion. This claim gave currency to the term ‘Islamic terrorism’, even though President George W. Bush and other leaders of democratic states stressed time and again that terrorism and not Islam was the threat they faced. The record shows that terrorists can come from any religious tradition or from none. Where a terrorist claims religious motives for his crime, he is abusing religion for a political purpose. It is therefore more accurate to speak of Islamist terrorists to denote those Islamists, i.e. militants in the cause of political Islam, who resort to violence.

Turkey has long fought against the abuse of Islam for political purposes. It knows the danger posed by fanatics who want to stop the spread of modern knowledge and the consequent evolution of society, and to drag the country back to the Middle Ages. Long before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the Ottoman state tried hard to contain religious fanaticism. When the Ottomans were in control of the Arab lands in the Middle East, they fought sects such as the Wahhabis in what is now Saudi Arabia and the Zeydis in Yemen. The Wahhabis who arose among the Bedouins of central Arabia in the middle of the eighteenth century, at a time of Ottoman weakness, were considered particularly pernicious because they branded as infidels all Muslims who did not follow their puritanical teaching. They were ejected from Mecca in 1812–13 by Muhhamad Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt. When the Ottoman reforming statesman Midhat Pasha was governor of Baghdad in 1870, he described the Wahhabis as ‘evil men’ and pushed them out of the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf. It is instructive to remember that before Napoleon invaded Ottoman Egypt at the beginning of the nineteenth century, one of his generals tried to open relations with the Wahhabis. Similarly, the Italians sustained the Zeydi Imam Yahya in his revolt against the Ottomans in Yemen in order to facilitate their invasion of Libya in 1911. During World War I, when the British financed the revolt of Husayn, the Hashimite ruler of Mecca, they also negotiated both with the Wahhabi chieftain Ibn Saud in central Arabia and with Imam
Yahya in Yemen. The rise to power of the Wahhabi dynasty of Ibn Saud in Arabia was the direct result of the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, as the British protégé, the Hashimite Emir (later King) Husayn, proved unable to retain control of the Muslim Holy Places. As the Saudi dynasty gradually moved away from Wahhabi extremists, the latter joined forces with another group of fanatics known as Salafis. Their doctrine of return to primitive Islam was developed in Egypt in the middle of the nineteenth century and then spread to North Africa and Syria. Today Islamist terrorists justify their recourse to violence in terms of Wahhabi-Salafi teaching, which arose as an expression of opposition to the Ottoman order. These extremist doctrines have always been alien to Turkish Islam.

Ottoman statesmen were preoccupied with the danger to public order posed by fanatical students of religious colleges, known as medrese (madrasa in Arabic). In the early days of Ottoman expansion, the medreses trained able and often open-minded civil administrators for the empire. But they lost their main function when secular establishments were set up to train officers and civil servants in the nineteenth century, and became foci of opposition to reform. Their students, nicknamed sofia (from the Persian sukhte, meaning ‘burning [with religious zeal]’), often rioted in protest at what they called ‘sinful innovations’ (bid’at). When the Young Turks came to power after the revolution of 1908, they tried to reform the medreses, and in 1916 they placed them under the authority of the secular ministry of education. Atatürk dispensed with them altogether when he instituted a unified system of secular education in 1924. Elsewhere in the Muslim world where medreses survived, they have continued to produce fanatics to this day, in spite of government efforts to control their teaching.

The principle of secularism laid down by Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, was born out of bitter experience. As a young officer, Atatürk took part in quelling a mutiny inspired by the dervish Vahdeti against the modernising regime of the Young Turks in 1909. When he led the Turkish War of Independence he had to face accusations that he was an infidel. His reforms were opposed by conservative vested interests which used the cloak of religion to gain legitimacy. It was in order to stop this abuse once and for all that the principle of secularism was written into the Turkish constitution in 1937. At the same time, not only does the constitution safeguard freedom of belief, but the state pays the salaries of mosque personnel as it recognises that 99 per cent of the population profess Islam or come from the Muslim tradition. Nonetheless, constant vigilance is needed to safeguard the secularity of the republic. Ever since the introduction of multiparty politics after World War II, politicians have been tempted to play the religious card in order to gain votes. At the same time, bands of fanatics have tried to change the fundamental secular character of the state. But the long struggle waged by the Turkish state to stop the abuse of religion for political purposes has gained wide social acceptance and
public opinion surveys show that at most 10 per cent of the people would like to see the introduction of the canon law of Islam (sharia, in Turkish şeriat). Of course, there is still a minority of religious fundamentalists in Turkey, as there is in many countries of Christian tradition. The number of actual or potential terrorists is smaller still.

There are few Turkish citizens in the ranks of the loose network of terrorist groups, known under the name of al-Qaida, and no Turks, it seems, in the higher echelons of that transnational organisation. According to official data, over four years only 17 young Turkish citizens travelled from Turkey to Afghanistan and another 150 or so to various Arab countries in order ‘to fight for Islam’. If one considers the very large number of Turkish citizens of Bosnian and Chechen (and other Caucasian) origin, the number who went to fight in these countries shown in official data is tiny, 214 going to Bosnia and 58 to Chechnya over four years. However, official figures are bound to underestimate the total since clandestine departures and travel via other countries are difficult to monitor. Moreover, one knows of Turkish citizens resident in Western Europe who have joined militant Islamist groups. It is worth noting that some of the Turkish citizens apprehended in Afghanistan were converted to the terrorist cause by fanatical preachers in Germany. Nevertheless, there are Islamic terrorists inside Turkey and it is their existence which has prompted the Turkish National Security Council (which brings together the government and military commanders) to stress time and again that reactionaries, who claim religious justification, continue to pose a major threat.

Outmoded Marxist extremism, separatist nationalism and religious terrorism flourish in the same social environment, in the least developed parts of the country or among migrants from these areas. As has already been noted, it is these people who are targeted by merchants of snake oil, coloured red for Marxist revolutionaries or green for political Islamists. The two extremes fight each other; they also fight among themselves. But on occasion they come together, for they understand each other, as it is often a matter of chance whether a violent man chooses the cause of a Marxist or of an Islamist revolution. Thus Abdullah Öcalan might well have become an ‘Islamic’ terrorist if he had not exchanged his original primitive religious beliefs for an equally uncritical belief in Marxism.

Just as the left-wing student federation Dev-Genç was the matrix of Marxist revolutionaries, so too its political rival, the National Turkish Union of Students (MTTB) gave birth to right-wing extremists – racist, Islamist or both. In the 1970s Islamist members of MTTB gravitated towards the youth organisation of the National Salvation Party (MSP), which was at that time the main vehicle of political Islam in Turkey. The party’s youth organisation was called Akıncılar (the Raiders). The Raiders were not a major menace in the troubled 1970s when most of the right-wing perpetrators of violence belonged to the nationalist, not
to say racist, organisation of Idealists (Ülkücüler). But they bred a number of fundamentalists who entered the terror scene in the 1980s.

On the eve of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, some of these Turkish fundamentalists joined the campaign against the Shah. This was the beginning of the Iranian connection which was to feed Islamic terror in Turkey in its initial stage. A key figure at the Turkish end of this connection was an extremist called Hüseyin Velioğlu, who recruited supporters in bookshops he opened in south-eastern Turkey for the sale of Islamic tracts. It is worth noting that as schools and colleges in Turkey are controlled by the ministry of education, while the salaried staff of mosques are overseen by the department of religious affairs, preachers of fanatical doctrines have to use small-circulation magazines and tracts to propagate their views and tend to congregate where this material is sold. In recent years, the printed word has been supplemented, and at times replaced, by the internet, which is much more difficult to police. According to the indictment drawn up in the year 2000 for what became known as the Hizbulah trial, Velioğlu and a number of associates decided, in 1980, to overthrow the secular regime by force of arms and to replace it by an Islamic regime. The indictment went on to say that Velioğlu and his associates had made several trips to Iran, where they received military and political training from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.

The term ‘Hizbulah’, meaning the Party of God, first gained currency in Iran, where it was appropriated by supporters of Khomeini’s Islamic revolution. As it tried to export the revolution, the Khomeini regime sponsored militants among the Shiite community in southern Lebanon, who also called themselves Hizbulah. The Iranian Islamic regime is based on the Shiite faction of Islam and discriminates against the Sunni minority in the country. Hafez al-Asad, the Syrian Baathist leader, was also a Shiite, but of a different persuasion (known as Nusairi or Alawi/Alaouite). He was, however, a secularist who had cracked down on the organisation of Muslim Brethren in his country and destroyed the old city of Hama in the process. This did not prevent him from collaborating with Iran against their common enemy, the Baathist regime of Iraq, and also against Israel. This common interest, as well as the Shiite link, however tenuous, explains the facilities afforded by Syria to the Iranian-backed Lebanese Hizbullah in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa valley and elsewhere in Lebanon.

Most Kurds are Sunni. But in order to gain influence within the Kurdish area of northern Iraq, Teheran supported a group called the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK). Its leader, Mulla Uthman Abd el Aziz (known in Turkey as Şeyh Osman), received only 4 per cent of the vote in the elections in the Kurdish region of Iraq in 1992. Small as the party was, the IMK was a useful link between Teheran and Turkish Islamic terrorists of Kurdish origin, such as Velioğlu. Later, some Islamist fanatics among Iraqi Kurds joined Arab and other militants (known as jihadis, meaning
people engaged in a universal holy war) in a terrorist organisation which called itself Ansar al-Islam.12 As already noted, the camp which the Ansar set up near the Iran–Iraq border, was targeted by the Americans in 2003, and the Ansar then dispersed to perpetrate acts of terror throughout Iraq.

The term Hizbullah was first heard in a Turkish context in 1983/4, when the police uncovered a terrorist group in Kasımpaşa, a poor neighbourhood in Istanbul with a tough reputation. The band became known later as ‘the Islamic Movement’ (İslami Hareket). The terrorists, who had robbed foreign-exchange offices and jewellers, were caught and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.13 However their leader, İrfan Çağırıcı, remained at large. He was arrested only in 1996. Four years later he was sentenced to death for his part in the murder in 1990 of the prominent journalist Çetin Emeç.14 In line with the moratorium on executions since the mid-1980s, the sentence was not carried out.

Ever since this first outbreak, the term Hizbullah has been applied loosely to terrorist groups in Turkey which claim religious justification for their crimes. The Turkish Hizbullah is not a single identifiable organisation, nor do the various Islamic terrorist groups use the name. The murders and other crimes committed by these groups have occurred in four different contexts: internecine fighting, the conflict with the Marxist PKK, contract killings, and the campaign against prominent secularists, especially in the media and the universities. Whether the murder of Turkish intellectual defenders of secularism should also be considered as contract killings ordered by shadowy organisations in Iran is a moot point. What is certain is that many of the murderers and their accomplices went to Iran, some repeatedly, and received training there. A committee of the Turkish parliament which investigated ‘murders by a person or persons unknown’, stated in the report it issued in 1995, that the Iranian consul general in Istanbul and members of his staff had helped set up the Turkish Hizbullah, which then enjoyed the support of Iran in all respects.15 The Iranian government has, of course, routinely denied this, just as it has denied its well-documented support for the PKK. But then the Islamic Republic of Iran is a country where one hand makes a point of not knowing what the other hand does.

Velioğlu quickly fell out with some of his original companions who had come together in the 1980s in a bookshop in Diyarbakır, called inappropriately Vahdet (Unity). Two factions arose from the split – the İlim (Knowledge) group, named after another bookshop Velioğlu opened in the south-eastern provincial centre of Batman, and the Menzil (Staging Post) group, also named after a bookshop.16 Although the latter was more successful in attracting Iranian support,17 it was weaker on the ground and many of its members fell victim to Velioğlu’s murderers. More than 300 people are believed to have been killed in the feud between the İlim and Menzil fanatics.18 Velioğlu then fell on another group of former associates. Known as Med-Zehra, they had espoused Kurdish nationalism more openly
but appear to have been less violent. Their leader was İzzettin Yıldırım, a preacher of Kurdish origin who belonged to the Nurcu brotherhood (set up by the Kurdish sheikh Said-i Nursi). Originally close to Velioğlu, İzzettin was kidnapped at his orders, questioned personally by him and eventually suffocated. Velioğlu’s terrorists attacked also the staff of mosques who resisted their campaign of intimidation. A number of prayer-leaders thus fell victim to terrorists who posed as defenders of Islam.

Turkish Islamist terrorists, trained in Iran, were paid to neutralise opponents of the Teheran regime within the large Iranian community in Turkey. The most notorious contract killing had for its victim a prominent Iranian dissident, Aliakbar Ghorbani. He was murdered on June 4, 1992. Another dissident, Abbas Gholizade, was kidnapped and handed over to Iranian agents against a payment of 500 million Turkish Liras.

One of the members of the gang which killed Ghorbani was also involved in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a prominent Turkish Jewish businessman, Jak Kamhi. Other targets of the Turkish Hizbullah were less lucky. The year 1990, when the journalist Çetin Emeç was killed, also witnessed the murders of Muammer Aksoy, the chairman of the Society of Kemalist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği), and of the modernist woman theologian, Professor Bahriye Üçok. On January 24, 1993, the country was shocked when the well-known academic and investigative journalist Ürur Mumcu was killed by a bomb placed under his car. Mumcu’s funeral turned into a demonstration of protest by a huge crowd which denounced Iranian-supported terror. This did not prevent two more high-profile murders. On December 30, 1994, the film critic Onat Kutlular was gravely injured by a bomb in Istanbul. He died of his injuries a few days later. Then, another well-known academic and writer, Professor Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, was killed in a bomb explosion in Ankara on October 21, 1999.

The most notorious atrocity by fanatics who gave religion a bad name took place in the central Anatolian city of Sivas on July 2, 1993. A celebration had been organised to honour the memory of a popular bard, Pir Sultan Abdal, who came from the minority Alevi community. It was attended by prominent Alevi intellectuals as well as by the secularist author, Aziz Nesin, famous for his satirical short stories, who had angered fundamentalists by publishing an unauthorised translation of extracts from Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses. A mob of fanatics gathered to protest against the celebration. After first destroying the bard’s statue, they set fire to the hotel where the guests were staying. Aziz Nesin escaped, but 36 people, including leading Alevi intellectuals, perished in the flames. After a long trial, the perpetrators of the outrage were sentenced to death. These sentences were later commuted to imprisonment.

The conflict between the Turkish (or rather Kurdish) Hizbullah and the PKK assumed at times the character of a civil war in which the Turkish
state was involved. It was a struggle for supremacy in the south-east, a turf war between rival gangs of extortionists. The İlim group of Islamic terrorists planned to destroy the PKK first, and then rise against the secular republic and set up an Islamic Kurdish state. The strategy of the Turkish state, on the other hand, was to destroy the PKK first, and Hizbullah second. This meant that during the first stage – in the early 1990s, when PKK terrorism was most intense – Turkish security forces and Hizbullah terrorists had a common enemy. These years witnessed also the highest incidence of murders ‘by a person or persons unknown’, murders which left-wing Kurdish nationalists, and many liberals also, attributed to death squads in which Islamist terrorists did the state’s dirty work. There is certainly evidence of Hizbullah infiltration in the local police and of contacts between Islamist terrorists and special anti-terrorist teams of gendarmes. But did the state support Hizbullah? The governor of Diyarbakır province, who dealt the heaviest blow against Islamist terrorists, gave this answer: ‘Support is the wrong word. But it [the state] may have looked at Hizbullah sympathetically.’ In any case, the security forces were fully engaged in fighting PKK and could not devote major resources against Hizbullah. One Hizbullah apologist, resident, it seems, in Germany, has claimed that his organisation was approached by the intelligence section of the Turkish gendarmerie (JİTEM) and encouraged to set up camp across the border in Iraq. ‘But we realised that JİTEM was trying to destroy us’, the apologist went on, ‘and we did not fall into the trap.’

As we have already noted, not only Islamist terrorists but racist (or ultra-nationalist) Turkish terrorists also appear to have been used as covert auxiliaries in the fight against PKK terrorism. There are parallels here with the behaviour of security forces fighting terrorism in other countries, including Western democracies, as witness the lead story in the London Guardian on June 14, 2002 (based on a BBC investigation): ‘Exposed security force links with [Protestant] killer gangs [in Northern Ireland]’. But democracies pay a price even when government ministers do not authorise their officers to use one group of terrorists to fight other terrorists. Where ministers are involved, the price is higher. In the 1980s, the Spanish government, frustrated by French lack of co-operation, set up a terrorist group known as GAL (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Group), which carried out assassinations of known ETA members – and innocent victims of mistaken identity – in France and the Basque country. The Spanish interior minister, José Barrionuevo, was jailed for ten years for his part in the operation which tainted the Socialist administration of Felipe González.

It is difficult to give an exact estimate of the number of deaths caused by the conflict between Islamist and PKK terrorists in Turkey. The People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) – now succeeded by the roughly similar Democratic People’s Party (DEHAP) – which was sympathetic to left-wing
Kurdish nationalism, gave on its website\textsuperscript{32} the names of some 150 of its members (and of members of its precursors – the People’s Labour Party/HEP and the Democracy Party/DEP) killed by ‘a person or persons unknown’. The most famous victim was the Kurdish nationalist writer, Musa Anter, murdered, certainly by local people, on September 20, 1992. Anter was one of 18 journalists working for Kurdish nationalist publications who were killed in 1992–3.\textsuperscript{33} Later, captured Hizbullah terrorists were to confess to some, although not all, of these murders. As for the PKK, which murdered people on a much vaster scale than did the Hizbullah groups, it did not differentiate between officials of the state, village guards, ordinary villagers and other civilians, and Islamist terrorists among its victims.

However, even in the early 1990s when some state officials were accused of using or, at least, winking at the activities of Islamist terrorists, security forces were engaged in operations against them. The danger that the Islamists posed had to be taken seriously, particularly since it was reported that in March 1993 the Turkish Hizbullah and PKK had signed a cooperation protocol and promised to cease attacking each other’s members in order to join forces against the Turkish state. According to a report in the Turkish press, on November 13, 1998, Velioğlu and a leading PKK militant, Nizamettin Taş, had concluded a peace accord under the auspices of the Iranian intelligence organisation SAVAMA, a few weeks after the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan had been expelled from Syria.\textsuperscript{34}

By the end of 1999, the south-east had become too hot both for Islamist and for PKK terrorists. Hüseyin Velioğlu thought it wiser to move to Istanbul. It was in the Istanbul suburb of Beykoz, on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus, that the police surrounded his safe house on January 17, 2000. Velioğlu was shot dead after he had refused to surrender. Documents and computer disks found in his lair led the security forces to other safe houses used by Islamist terrorists throughout the country, particularly in the south-east. Here and there the terrorists offered resistance. In the eastern town of Van, five policemen were killed as they forced their way into two safe houses.\textsuperscript{35} The terrorists had good reason to resist. Their safe houses served also as torture chambers, execution and burial grounds for rivals within the Islamist movement or for businessmen who resisted their exactions. The police found the remains of 67 murder victims and a mass of incriminating evidence, including a gruesome video shot as a Hizbullah victim was being tortured to death. In all, more than 2,500 operations were mounted against Islamic terrorists over ten years, to the end of 2002, and nearly 4,000 suspects were arrested and sent for trial.\textsuperscript{36}

One of the most active investigators of Hizbullah crimes was the Diyarbakır police chief Gaffar Okan, who had compiled a data bank on the terrorists. On September 24, 2001, Okan and five bodyguards and companions were shot dead in an ambush in the city.\textsuperscript{37} The crowds which
assembled to mourn this popular professional investigator rivalled the angry
demonstration which had marked the funeral in Ankara of Uğur Mumcu, the
highly effective amateur investigator. Gaffar Okan’s murderers have
been arrested. Several have been sentenced to death, but escaped execution
when the death penalty was abolished. The success of the Turkish security
in dismantling Veliöğlu’s network was the result of prompt action taken
in a co-ordinated fashion by the police, the gendarmerie and the National
Intelligence Organisation (MİT). It was a model effective anti-terrorist
operation. It will take a long time to complete the trials of all the terrorists. But the
ranks of Turkish Hizbullah have been decimated. At the beginning of 2001
it was reported that as a result of continuing operations, this terrorist move-
ment was on the point of dissolution. However, the job was not finished.
On July 5, 2002, two policemen were killed when they raided a Hizbullah
safe house in the south-eastern town of Elâziğ. A member of Hizbullah,
involved in the murder of the police chief Gaffar Okan, was shot dead
in the raid. On February 11, 2004, three members of the İlim group,
suspected of responsibility for three murders committed in eastern Turkey
in 1993–4, were arrested in Istanbul. On July 11, 2004, the police arrested
a suspect when he arrived at Istanbul airport, coming from Germany. His
interrogation revealed that he was a member of the military wing of
Hizbullah and had been responsible for eight murders and other crimes in
south-eastern Turkey between 1992 and 1994. One of his victims was said
to be Mehmet Sincar, a member of the Kurdish nationalist Democracy Party
(DEP), killed in Batman in 1993. According to the report compiled by
the command of the Turkish gendarmerie, Hizbullah groups financed their
terror activities by extortion, by taxing their own members and supporters
and by robbery. The report listed also revenue from foreign sources.
Although it does not specify them, Iranian sources are clearly meant.
However, as subsequent events were to prove tragically, the groups known
collectively as Hizbullah were not alone in the field of Islamist terrorism
in Turkey. The security forces had done an excellent job mopping up the
terrorist groups which had drawn their inspiration and/or their support
from Iran. But they had taken their eyes off other terrorists who had been
indoctrinated and trained in camps situated in Afghanistan and Pakistan
and became members of the al-Qaida network. When these terrorists struck
at Istanbul in November 2003, they used the name of an existing local
terrorist organisation, whose leader was in prison, and which was believed
to have been rendered incapable of mounting serious attacks. That organ-
isation called itself the Islamic Grand Orient Raiders-Front (İBDA-C). Its
leader is, or was, Salih İzzet Erdiş (who uses the nom de guerre of Salih
Mirzabeyoğlu). He has been in prison since 1998 with many of his
followers. They have staged several prison mutinies and routinely refuse
to attend trials where they have to be taken by force.
Salih Erdi/Mirzabeyoğlu was born in 1950 into the family of hereditary leaders of the Mutki Kurdish tribe, which was centred in the south-eastern province of Muş. The family, which was close both to the Nakşibendi and the Nurcu brotherhoods, was involved in the Kurdish rebellion of Şeyh Saït in 1925, and was exiled to Konya in central Turkey. As a combative adolescent (and amateur boxer) Salih joined Erbakan’s youth organisation, the Raiders, but found it too moderate. A keen but unappreciated poet since his youth, he fell under the spell of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905–83), a well-known pessimistic poet and confused thinker who published a magazine called Büyük Doğu [The Grand Orient]. Curiously, this was the name of a famous lodge of freemasons, whose influence Kısakürek probably sought to emulate. Originally catholic in its choice of contributors, who included some prominent mainstream writers, Büyük Doğu became with time an Islamist review preaching a utopian Sunnî Islamic commonwealth. Kısakürek is said to have been converted to radical Islam by a Kurdish sheik, Abdülhakim Arvasî, who is now held up by İBDA-C as one of its ‘three lights’ of inspiration. Salih Erdi/Mirzabeyoğlu combined the names of the Islamic youth organisation which he had left and of the literary-political review which inspired him, when he chose a name for his own violent Islamic group. Following the convention of other militant groups, he added the initial C (for Cephe, meaning ‘Front’) to the name Islamic Grand Orient Raiders, in order to suggest that it was a fighting force with diverse followers. First imprisoned for evading military service, Mirzabeyoğlu was arrested in 1998 and convicted for trying to overthrow the constitutional order by force. The character of İBDA-C can be gauged from its accusation that Mirzabeyoğlu was tormented in prison by ‘remote mind control’. Quite properly, İBDA-C can be found listed on websites along with the Weathermen and similar rebels against rational thought.

Mirzabeyoğlu’s delusions led to the murder on May 3, 2004, of a retired lieutenant-colonel and his wife, who were supposed to have founded a brotherhood called Dost (Friend). The cell responsible was quickly uncovered and three of the thirteen men detained admitted to the murder. They told the investigators that they had been inspired to commit it by references to the Dost brotherhood in a book written by Mirzabeyoğlu under the title ‘Mind Control by Telegram’. In October 2004, the trial of five men accused of direct involvement in the murders and of two accomplices began before a criminal court in Istanbul. Under Mirzabeyoğlu’s command, İBDA-C mounted hit-and-run attacks with Molotov cocktails and similar homemade devices on churches, establishments serving alcohol, TV stations, etc. As a terrorist organisation it did not amount to much and, after the imprisonment of Mirzabeyoğlu and his band of fanatics, it seemed to have been rendered ineffective. However, one of its principles helped perpetuate its baneful influence. This was the concept of ‘leaderless resistance’ which can also be observed in some
American right-wing groups. Groups subscribing to the ideology of İBDA-C do not take orders from a central command but act independently and choose their own targets. In other words, any small group of Islamist terrorists can claim to be acting on behalf of İBDA-C. This is what happened when terrorists struck first at two Jewish synagogues in Istanbul on November 15, 2003, and then at the British consulate and a London-based bank five days later. The İBDA-C label which they claimed was irrelevant. True, many of them shared Mirzabeyoğlu’s origin in the unruly Kurdish area. But they came to terrorism by a different route.

The bombings in Istanbul cost the lives of 65 people, including the four suicide bombers. One of the victims was the British consul general Roger Short, who died instantly, on November 20, when a truck loaded with fertiliser explosive was detonated by a suicide bomber outside the gates of the consulate in the centre of the Beyoğlu district of downtown Istanbul. The identity of the terrorists was quickly established. The two synagogue bombers were natives of the south-eastern province of Bingöl, which had been at the centre of the Şeyh Sait rebellion in 1925. They had been trained in al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On their return, one of them ran an internet café in Bingöl. They had made a trip to the Middle East before mounting the attack. The brains behind the gang which attacked British targets is said to have been Habip Aktaş. He was born in the province of Mardin, in south-eastern Turkey, and had joined the terrorists in Pakistan. One of the presumed planners of the attack, Azad Ekinci, had been trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan and had fought in Chechnya. According to the indictment drawn up by the Turkish authorities, the decision to bomb targets in Turkey had been taken in Afghanistan. Subsequently, Aktaş received US$ 50,000 from a Syrian in Europe, and Ekinci was paid US$ 100,000 in Iran to mount the attack. Aktaş, Ekinci and another leading associate left Turkey on the eve of the bombings. They were not among the suspects whom Syria extradited to Turkey. Aktaş was later reported in Iraq where he is said to have been killed in a US bombing raid, as we shall see in the next chapter. One suspect in the Istanbul bombings was arrested as he tried to cross into Iran. On May 31, the state security court in Istanbul began hearing the case against 69 persons accused of involvement in the bombings, of whom 50 had been arrested. Following the abolition of state security courts, the trial was transferred to an ordinary criminal court which began its hearings in September 2004.

The investigations have shed a light on the social environment and the modus operandi of the terrorists. It was a small group linked by kinship, friendship and geographical origin. Like their predecessors in the Turkish Hizbullah, with which they overlapped, they came under the influence of Salafi-Wahhabi agitators in south-eastern Turkey and then fanned out to the rest of the country. Young men recruited by these fanatics made their way to Pakistan and Afghanistan where they received ideological and military
training. Some fought in Chechnya and elsewhere in the ranks of Islamist militants before returning to Turkey, which they considered an ‘infidel’ state. They established themselves in conservative neighbourhoods, often in suburbs peopled by rural migrants. Some wore distinctive clothes (such as baggy trousers), grew beards, kept to themselves and prayed at home rather than in mosques, which they considered lax or even guilty of apostasy. They received their ‘franchise’, as a Turkish commentator put it, from al-Qaida and financial and other support from affiliated groups, such as the ‘Martyr Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade’ (named after an Egyptian terrorist killed in Afghanistan) and the group headed by the notorious Jordanian terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi is said to have spent some time organising Kurdish Ansar-al Islam terrorists in northern Iraq. If so, he would have been well placed to act as the godfather of terrorists of Kurdish origin hailing from south-eastern Turkey.

According to the statement made by one of the accused, the terrorist cell responsible for the bombings in Istanbul developed out of the Muslim Youth Group which had come together to agitate for the lifting of the ban on headscarves in Turkish universities. Members of the cell, he claimed, discussed their targets with Abu Hafs al-Masri in Afghanistan. If true, the meeting must have taken place before November 2001 when Abu Hafs was killed in a US air raid. The terrorists who had come from Turkey had suggested raiding a meeting of the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSİAD), ‘which included many Jewish bosses’, and demanding a billion dollars for the release of hostages. But this, he said, was turned down in favour of an attack on an Israeli tourist ship at the Mediterranean resort of Alanya or on the NATO air base at İncirlik, near Adana. The attacks were planned for summer 2002, but there were delays in obtaining explosives. When the terrorists were finally ready to strike, they discovered that the Israeli boat would not be calling at Alanya. They then switched the attack to the two synagogues in Istanbul. At the trial in Istanbul in September 2004, one of the accused, Harun İlhan, admitted all the offences with which he had been charged, declaring proudly that he had chosen the jihad (holy war) as a way of life and that he was an ‘al-Qaida warrior’. He said nevertheless that al-Qaida did not have a structure in Turkey, and that, at most, one could speak of an ‘action group’. This was confirmed by another one of the accused, Adnan Ersöz, who declared that no one in the group was formally a member of al-Qaida, with which Habip Aktaş had entered into a co-operative relationship. ‘At most,’ he said, ‘one can speak of a cell or a platform linked to al-Qaida.’

Within a month of the two attacks in Istanbul, security authorities had uncovered the ramifications of the terrorist cell and on December 27, 2003, the governor of Istanbul declared that the terrorists’ organisation in Istanbul had been dismantled. However, other Islamist terrorists were still at large. On January 8, 2004, in the province of Kocaeli on the eastern approaches
to Istanbul, anti-terrorist teams arrested three young men who had received weapons and bomb-making training in Afghanistan. On March 9, 2004 two terrorists attacked a lodge of freemasons in the Istanbul suburb of Kartal, again on the city’s eastern approaches where Islamist terrorists are known to have safe houses. One terrorist and a waiter were killed, while the second terrorist was injured in the explosion and caught. The injured terrorist told interrogators that he had been responsible for the murder of a Jewish dentist in Istanbul the previous August. His confessions led to eighteen arrests. Ten suspects were sent for trial. According to the indictment, the leader of the gang, Adem Çetinkaya, had received training in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, a base for terrorists who infiltrate the Indian-controlled major part of the province. Five of the accused had intended to fight in Chechnya after their training in Pakistan. But the terrorist who was killed in the explosion objected, saying ‘Rather than go and fight in Chechnya, it will be easier to strike at the Jews in Turkey’, whereupon the group decided to bomb the freemasons’ lodge (which, in view of its location, is unlikely to have had many, if any, Jewish members). Again according to the indictment, the group intended to stage a suicide bomb attack on the popular television channel ATV and was gathering information on journalists working for the newspapers Hürriyet and Star. They were in touch with Habip Aktaş, the alleged organiser of the bombings in Istanbul on November 15 and 20, 2003, and knew several members of his cell. However, Engin Vural, the terrorist who lost an arm in the attack on the freemasons, denied that an organisation (meaning al-Qaida) was responsible for the crime. His reasoning was simple: ‘Ours was an amateur attack, because all we could afford to spend on materials was 300 to 500 dollars. Had it been the work of an organisation and had we received 5,000 dollars in foreign support, the outcome would have been different.’

Security authorities are faced with a multiplicity of often overlapping groups and cells of Islamist terrorists. Following the bombings in Istanbul, research by police authorities identified twelve militant Islamist groups. Most, if not all, had foreign links. The names of some of these groups suggested that they were local branches of militant organisations in various Islamic countries. Thus the name of the Movement for Islamic Revolution in Kurdistan suggests an Iranian inspiration. The Army of Allah (Jayshullah) has been described as an ‘indigenous terrorist group’ in Azerbaijan and appears on the US terrorist exclusion list. According to press reports, a man trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards was the leader of the Turkish branch of the ‘Jerusalem Fighters’ (said to be the military wing of the Peace and Unity/Selâm-Tevhid group), who have been linked with the murder of the strongly secularist Turkish historian Necip Hablemitoglu in Ankara in December 2002. In May 2003, Turkish authorities arrested 67 men suspected of membership of Hizb-al Tahrir (The Party of Liberation), a militant organisation, active in Central Asia and elsewhere, which has
described Turkey as an infidel country and incites citizens to boycott secular national holidays.\textsuperscript{63}

Not all the sponsors of Islamist terrorism in Turkey are to be found in Muslim countries. On December 12, 2001, the Federal German government finally banned the ‘Federation of Islamic Associations and Communities’ (ICCB/AFID). This extremist group, known in Germany as \textit{Kalifatsstaat} (Caliphate State), was founded in 1984 by a Turkish fanatic called Cemalettin Kaplan. ICCB has proclaimed a non-existent Anatolian Federal Islamic State (AFID). In May 1998, it declared a \textit{jihad} (holy war) against the Turkish Republic. A few months later, the Turkish authorities announced that they had foiled an attempt by followers of Kaplan to crash an aircraft on the mausoleum of Kemal Atatürk in Ankara on Republic Day, October 29. Cemalettin Kaplan’s son and successor, Metin, has served a prison sentence in Germany for incitement to murder a rival ‘Caliph’. Later, he could not be found when Turkish authorities applied for his extradition. Attempts to locate him were abandoned on May 27, 2004, when a court in Cologne accepted his petition that the detention warrant issued against him should be lifted.\textsuperscript{64} He was finally found and extradited to Turkey in October 2004.\textsuperscript{65}

ICCB/AFID is said to have some 5,000 supporters in Western Europe, where it maintains 27 regional offices, three foundations and 73 mosques.\textsuperscript{66} They belonged originally to a much larger grouping, \textit{Milli Görüş} (National Vision, known in Germany by the acronym IGMG). IGMG is said to have about 30,000 members and control over 400 mosques, as well as more than 1,000 subordinate organisations.\textsuperscript{67} \textit{Milli Görüş}/IGMG has been closely associated with political parties which have represented political Islam in Turkey and which have been dissolved, one after the other, by the constitutional court for activities contrary to the secular character of the Turkish Republic. Neither \textit{Milli Görüş} nor the Turkish political parties linked with it have ever been accused of terrorist offences. But it is on the fringes of political Islam that terrorism originates.

Following the German ban, it was reported that followers of Kaplan were contemplating a move to Holland where sister organisations were active.\textsuperscript{68} The tolerant attitude of Dutch authorities towards extremists produced a popular reaction which targeted all Muslims established in the country, as witness the electoral success of the party of Pim Fortuyn, the politician who campaigned against the entry of further Muslim immigrants and who was murdered on May 6, 2002.

In Belgium, a report by the parliament’s intelligence committee claimed that Islamic terrorists had turned the country into a recruiting base and the launch pad for future attacks across Europe. The security services said that Belgium itself was not a target of terrorist groups. According to the Brussels correspondent of the London \textit{Daily Telegraph}, this finding was likely to revive allegations that the authorities had in the past turned a blind eye
to conspiracies hatched on Belgian soil in exchange for immunity from attack. Turkish authorities have long pleaded against such an attitude and warned that a policy of tolerating terrorists would end by rebounding against the host country. Before September 11 these pleas fell on deaf ears. It remains to be seen whether the measures announced in the wake of that terrorist outrage will be followed through to their logical conclusion. That conclusion is that all democratic countries must co-operate against terrorists and realise that a terrorist threat against any one democracy is a threat to all democracies.
Two events dominate recent history. The first was the destruction of the Berlin Wall on November 10, 1989; the second the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001. The destruction of the Berlin Wall symbolised the end of the Cold War between the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union, and NATO, led by the United States. It raised hopes of a peace dividend, of the diversion of resources from military expenditure to human development. These hopes were, if not destroyed, at least substantially diminished by the terrorist attacks on the United States. The interval between the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the war on terror, proclaimed by President George W. Bush in response to the first major foreign onslaught on US soil in recent history, lasted for only twelve years.

During the Cold War and its aftermath, terrorism was a minor nuisance for the United States and its West European allies. True, Americans were targeted by terrorists in Lebanon, Somalia, East Africa and elsewhere. The United Kingdom had to contend with IRA terrorists, Spain with the Basque ETA; France had a problem with North African and Corsican terrorists, Germany with the Baader–Meinhof gang and the Red Army Faction; Italy with the Red Brigades. But in the West, terror was not seen as a universal, pressing problem. Conventions were drawn up, but there was little effective co-operation among the various anti-terrorist agencies of NATO countries, and little understanding of the difficulties faced by individual members of the Western alliance. Often the difficulties were blamed on policies pursued by this or that Western country – by the United States towards the Arabs and Iran, by Britain in the matter of the grievances of the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, by Spain towards Basque nationalists, France towards Algeria and in dealing with the demands of Corsican nationalists.

Just as war has been defined as diplomacy by other means, so too terrorism is politics by other means – means that are repugnant to civilised people. It has been aptly described as the weapon of the weak in a political struggle, from which it cannot be divorced. But two essential points
must not be overlooked. First, while a democratic state is seeking solutions to political and social grievances, it cannot neglect its primary duty of ensuring law and order and protecting the lives and property of its citizens. Law and order cannot wait on the eradication of poverty, the achievement of a universally high standard of living or the satisfaction of all political grievances, however justified. In any case, many terrorists are not personally under-privileged, but are typically young people from the lower middle class who have succumbed to the influence of fanatics as they try to find their own way in life. Second, the terrorists’ political demands are, as a rule, unacceptable to the majority of their fellow-citizens. In these circumstances, a minority of terrorists can be conciliated only at the cost of alienating the majority of law-abiding citizens. Where the ballot-box decides policies, recourse to the gun cannot be justified.

These basic considerations have been routinely ignored by critics of measures taken by the Turkish authorities to fight the terrorist threat. The end of the Cold War did not bring a peace dividend to Turkey. True, the Soviet Union was no longer there to threaten Turkey directly by its armed might and indirectly by fostering terrorism through proxies. But, the demise of Soviet power created a vast area of instability in which terrorism could flourish. The PKK terrorist insurgency peaked after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Marxist-Leninist terrorists were undeterred by the failure of Communism in Russia and its discreet demotion in China. The PKK and Islamist terrorists profited from the failure to establish the new world order promised by President George Bush, sr. after the expulsion of Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait in 1991. PKK terrorism was finally defeated, although not eliminated, by military means and the military pressure Turkey brought to bear on Syria to deny facilities to the PKK. It was only then that the Turkish state could safely put in hand reforms and deal with the grievances on which the PKK had fed as it pursued its extremist objectives.

The terrorist onslaught on the United States on September 11, 2001, changed Western perceptions of the terrorist menace. The United Nations Security Council adopted two wide-ranging anti-terrorism resolutions. The first, No.1368 of September 12, 2001, condemned the attacks which had taken place the previous day. The second, No.1373 of September 28, 2001, reaffirmed the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence against terrorism, demanded international co-operation, and outlined the duties of member states. ‘All states’, the resolution declared (in article 2), shall:

(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, including by suppressing recruitment of members of terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to terrorists;
(b) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts, including by provision of early warning to other states by exchange of information;
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens;
(d) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts from using their respective territories for those purposes against other states or their citizens.

If ‘all states’ had faithfully carried out these duties, Turkey would have been spared the human and material losses incurred over 30 years in its struggle with terror. As we have seen, Armenian terrorists who assassinated Turkish diplomats, Marxist extremists engaged in the ‘propaganda of the deed’ inside Turkey, and PKK terrorists who caused tens of thousands of deaths in south-eastern Turkey, all used Western Europe as one of their bases. Islamist extremists also had, and still have, a presence in Europe, while relying primarily on facilities in various Muslim countries.

In June 2002, the Turkish armed forces published their analysis of the origin of weapons they had captured in anti-terrorist operations. It was an impressive armoury: more than 11,000 Kalashnikovs, nearly 6,000 other rifles, 1,600 rocket launchers, nearly 3,000 machine-guns, some 11,000 land-mines and nearly 3,500 hand-grenades. In many cases serial numbers and manufacturers’ marks had been erased. Where they could be traced, an analysis of the countries of origin produced instructive results. Weapons of Russian manufacture predominated, except in the case of land-mines, 61 per cent of which were of Italian origin, and of machine-guns, where (the former) Czechoslovakia came first with 22 per cent, and was followed closely by Spain and Italy (20 per cent); 13 per cent of rifles and other guns were of British make, and 9 per cent American. The USA was also the country of origin of 20 per cent of hand-grenades (Russia and other CIS countries accounted for 72 per cent). These figures do not, of course, prove complicity by the countries of origin. The PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, said during his trial that the procurement of weapons was largely a commercial affair. But some countries winked at this deadly trade. Greece was almost certainly one of them since, to quote Öcalan again, ‘after 1990 thorough training [of our militants] in all subjects began in Greece’. All subjects’ must have included weapons training.

After September 11, attention became focused on spectacular weapons – aircraft used as missiles, the threat of weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons. But throughout history terrorists have relied largely on light weapons, such as rifles, handguns, hand-grenades and unsophisticated explosives for their deadly work. Conventions limiting the sale of these weapons and country regulations insisting on certificates of final destination for all sales cannot, of course, prevent the existence of
an illicit market in arms. Fears have often been expressed that in countries of the former Soviet Union, in particular, controls are poorly enforced and arms smuggling is prevalent. Moreover, areas like the Middle East are awash with arms originally provided on easy terms by protagonists in the Cold War. None of this absolves country authorities of the duty to make sure that arms do not fall into the hands of terrorists. It is scandalous that some 5,000 land-mines bearing Italian markings should have been used by terrorists in Turkey.

The United States could afford to be less patient than its Turkish ally. On October 7, some ten days after the UN Security Council resolution no.1373 was passed, American and British forces commenced military operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had hosted the leaders of the terrorist attacks of September 11. Kabul fell the following month as the Taliban collapsed. The campaign against al-Qaida and its host, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, enjoyed the support of NATO, acting in accordance with article 5 of the alliance which specifies that an attack on any one member would be considered as an attack on all members. Turkey, as a loyal NATO ally, contributed troops to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) set up to stabilise the situation in Afghanistan and took its turn in assuming its command. In 2004, the former Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Çetin (as it happens, a native of south-eastern Turkey) was appointed chief civilian representative of NATO in Kabul. Afghanistan was the first country with which the Turkish Grand National Assembly had concluded a solidarity pact, and to which it promised educational aid. The pact was signed in 1921, in the middle of the Turkish War of Independence, before the Turkish Republic was proclaimed. At that time, Afghanistan had newly shaken off British tutelage, while Turkey was threatened by the Allies who had emerged victorious from World War I. Several other treaties followed, the most notable being the Saadabad Pact of 1937, which established an alliance comprising Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. With its long record of support for Afghan independence, Turkey is well placed to help the Afghans re-establish their state after a tragic period of Soviet occupation, foreign intervention and civil war.

When the Taliban regime fell apart, al-Qaida lost its headquarters and its training camps in Afghanistan, although its leader Usama bin Ladin and many of his followers remained at large. As the United States secured the support of President Parvez Musharraf of Pakistan, the facilities terrorists enjoyed in that country were also reduced. But the president had to contend with strong resistance by religious fanatics, supported by some tribal leaders. As a result, terrorists survived in Pakistan and caused considerable bloodshed. Nevertheless, foreign Islamist terrorists could no longer flood into Afghanistan and Pakistan for instruction and training, as had been the case earlier. This has eliminated one source of supply of Islamist terrorist recruits targeting Turkey. Unfortunately another source opened up.
Before Afghanistan could be stabilised, and terrorism there and in Pakistan could be mastered, President George W. Bush took the controversial decision of starting a war against the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq on the grounds of its non-compliance with UN resolutions on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein was no friend of Turkey. The blatant misuse of Iraq’s rich natural resources by his brutal dictatorship was in stark contrast with the determination of the Turkish government ever since the establishment of the republic to husband national resources for the country’s development. But the danger of opening a new front in the Middle East was all too evident to Turkey. First Armenian, then Marxist, and later Islamist and, above all, Kurdish separatist terrorists had come together in the Middle East and targeted Turkey from that region, profiting from the instability caused by dictatorial, adventurous, incompetent or simply short-sighted local regimes. Turkey needed an area of peace and security on its borders and was by no means certain that the US decision to go to war with Saddam Hussein, without thought for the consequences, would serve this objective.

On March 1, 2003, with public opinion overwhelmingly opposed to the war, the government, formed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after its victory in the elections of November 2002, failed by a narrow margin to muster the parliamentary majority needed to allow US troops to transit through Turkey on their way to northern Iraq. As has already been noted, the crisis which this caused in Turkey’s relations with the United States was quickly resolved, as Turkey opened its air space to coalition war planes and offered to send peacekeepers to Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein – an offer which the provisional Iraqi authorities rejected, much to the relief of most Turks. But, as Turkey had feared, terrorists were not slow to profit from the dissolution of Saddam Hussein’s repressive regime.

The primary target of the terrorists were the Americans, their coalition partners, and the new Iraqi regime to which sovereignty was formally transferred on June 28, 2004. Islamist terrorists from far and wide were infiltrated through Iraq’s porous borders with Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Americans accused Syria and Iran of failure to prevent the movement of terrorists through their territory, if not of complicity with the traffic. They tried also to bolster the ability of Saudi Arabian authorities to control terrorists within their country. But the security situation inside Iraq remained precarious.

The terrorist menace caused difficulties for Turkey’s revived trade with Iraq and for Turkish firms taking part in that country’s reconstruction. Lorries coming from Turkey were attacked; Turkish drivers were killed, injured or abducted. On August 2, Turkish public opinion was outraged when a Turkish hostage was killed in cold blood in Iraq. The kidnappers had made no demands: the murder was an expression of their hatred for...
the policies of Turkey’s democratically elected government. Recordings of their conversation suggested that some of them were Turkish citizens who had fled the country after committing terrorist offences in their homeland. According to press reports, one of them was Habip Aktaş, who, as noted in the previous chapter, was regarded as the brains behind the bombings in Istanbul in November 2003. It seems that after making their way to Iraq via Syria, Aktaş and two of his companions had joined the terrorist gang led by the Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In September 2004 it was reported that Habip Aktaş had been killed when US aircraft bombed a terrorist base in the province of al-Anbar in western Iraq.

On September 15, 2004, the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan disclosed that more than 30 Turks had been murdered by terrorists in Iraq. The tally of victims increased subsequently. After the murder of Turkish hostages and the kidnapping of Turkish drivers, some Turkish enterprises decided to withdraw from Iraq. Turkey had hoped that Iraq would become a good neighbour and a profitable trading partner. Instead, in the summer of 2004 Iraq had become a source of danger to Turkey: a refuge for terrorists, a source of weapons for them and an obstacle to peaceful trade. In August 2004, Turkish police authorities reported that in 2003, the year of the US intervention, the number of weapons intercepted as they were being smuggled from Iraq into Turkey had equalled the tally for the two previous years taken together. On July 31, 2004, news came that the Turkish police in the province of Hatay, bordering on Syria, had discovered 23 tons of TNT explosive in a consignment of scrap iron which had come from Iraq. Such were the first consequences of the forcible destruction of the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.

The inability of either the provisional Iraqi authorities (including the de facto Kurdish authorities) or the coalition forces to exercise effective control allowed the militants of PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL to perpetuate their presence in northern Iraq and use that country as their forward base for operations inside Turkey. While the crimes of Islamist militants made the headlines, as far as the number of victims was concerned, it was PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL that posed the greatest threat to Turkey’s security. When President George W. Bush came to Ankara on June 26, 2004, on the eve of the NATO summit in Istanbul, the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan complained that promises to put an end to the PKK presence in Iraq had not been kept and said that this had a negative impact on the struggle with terrorism. President Bush replied that the provisional Iraqi government was responsible for security in the country and that the US would do its best to co-operate with it suppressing terrorism. But the Iraqi provisional government was manifestly too weak to deal with terrorists in and around the capital, Baghdad, let alone in the north of the country. At the end of the summit, on June 28, the NATO heads of state and government issued a statement on Iraq which declared: ‘We deplore and call for
an immediate end to all terrorist attacks in Iraq. Terrorist attacks in and from Iraq also threaten the security of its neighbours and the region as a whole.\textsuperscript{12} But deploring and calling was not enough. As we have seen, PKK attacks, which had picked up in June, continued unabated after the NATO summit.

Turkey and the United States share a common interest in the establishment of civilised law and order in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, but their tactics have differed. The Americans have sought to secure the co-operation of Middle Eastern states by putting pressure on them. Turkey, which had earlier put pressure on Syria to put an end to the PKK presence in its territory, preferred whenever possible to enlist the voluntary co-operation of its Middle Eastern neighbours and to persuade them that they shared with Turkey an interest in security. This policy has produced some results. As has already been noted, Syria extradited some of the suspects sought by the Turkish authorities after the Istanbul bombings in November 2003. Others, however, have been able to cross Syria after making good their escape from Turkey. In September 2004 it was reported that seven members of the PKK, who had been arrested on the Syrian side of the border as they tried to cross into Turkey, were handed over to the Turkish authorities.\textsuperscript{13} The more co-operative stance by Syrian authorities in the matter of Kurdish ethnic terrorism may owe something to Syria’s own difficulties with its Kurdish minority, difficulties which erupted in riots in 2004.

Iran has also finally taken some action against the PKK.\textsuperscript{14} When the Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Teheran at the end of July 2004, he thanked the Iranian authorities for their action. As a result of the visit, Iran has officially named PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL as a terrorist organisation. In exchange, the Turkish government has promised to make sure that Mojahedin-e Khalq (People’s Fighters), an opposition group which employed terrorist tactics against the Teheran government, did not operate from Turkish soil. The agreement was written into the 10th memorandum of understanding drawn up by the two countries’ joint security committee.\textsuperscript{15} Clearly, progress in security co-operation with Iran does not come quickly or easily.

Turkey’s aim to construct a regional agreement to fight terrorism has been promoted by frequent high-level exchanges of visits. Turkey has been in close contact with the Iraqi provisional government and also with local leaders, including the Iraqi Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani who visited Ankara in June 2004 and Masud Barzani who followed him in October. Since the outbreak of the war in 2003, Iraq has been at the centre of Turkey’s concerns. As the Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül said on July 22, 2004, on his return from Egypt where he attended a meeting of the foreign ministers of countries bordering on Iraq, ‘certain terrorist groups on Iraqi soil constitute a threat to that country’s neighbours’.\textsuperscript{16} The least these
countries can do is to refrain from exacerbating the domestic conflict in Iraq. But they could do much more.

As it persists with its regional initiatives, the Turkish government is, of course, continuing to co-operate closely with the United States and its other NATO allies. Turkish authorities announced on July 22, 2004, that the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was to help set up in Turkey an international academy of anti-terrorist studies, on the lines of the existing Turkish international academy for the study of drug-trafficking and organised crime (TADOC).

After September 11, 2001, the European Union had finally to take note of the fact that the Islamist terrorists who had attacked the United States had come together in Hamburg, Germany, and that they had links with similarly minded militants in Britain, Belgium, Holland, France, Italy and elsewhere. While the headquarters of al-Qaida were in Afghanistan, its forward base was in Western Europe. On December 27, 2001, the Council of the EU adopted a common position which gave a comprehensive definition of terrorism and promised action to freeze the funds of terrorist groups and to act jointly in order to prevent and combat terrorist acts. However, none of the terrorist organisations which had targeted Turkey was listed in the common position. Following repeated requests by the Turkish government, the PKK and DHKP/C were added to the EU list of banned terrorist organisations on May 2, 2002. On December 12, 2003, after the terrorists had attacked British targets as well as two synagogues in Istanbul the previous month, the statement issued at the end of the Brussels summit declared:

The European Council unequivocally condemns all recent terrorist attacks, including in Istanbul, which killed and injured many people of different nationalities and faiths. The Union reiterates its solidarity with Turkey and reaffirms its determination to defeat terrorism together with others in the international community and to provide a common response to this global threat.

On December 22, in keeping with this declaration, the EU added İBDA-C to its list of terrorist organisations, and on April 2, 2004, it specified that the ban on the PKK applied equally to its successors, KADEK and KONGRA-GEL. However, in October 2004 it was reported that PKK and DHKP/C still maintained ‘representative offices’ or ‘communications offices’ in Belgium, which were allowed to hold press conferences and organise demonstrations.

Nevertheless, there are instances of action by EU member states against individual members of organisations which have now been described as terrorist. Thus on July 10, 2002, the PKK leader in the Ruhr was sentenced to three years in prison for membership of a ‘criminal’ organisation.
It will be remembered that the status of the PKK in Germany was changed in 1996 from ‘terrorist’ to criminal. After the EU decision of May 2, 2002, it should logically revert to ‘terrorist’. On December 12, 2003, the German police carried out a nationwide sweep against Islamist militants. As has already been mentioned, in April 2004 police in Turkey and in several EU member countries carried out co-ordinated raids in order to flush out DHKP/C terrorists. However, when arrests are made, Turkey experiences difficulties in securing the extradition of persons accused of terrorist and other offences on Turkish soil. Due process must, of course, be observed in all extradition cases. But it is hard to avoid the impression that, when extradition cases come up in European courts, there is a presumption that Turkish justice would not deal fairly with the accused. One can only hope that this presumption will fade away as Turkey’s long-drawn out process of accession to the European Union gathers speed. After all, a country which has met the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, to which all candidates for membership are subject, must be presumed to have achieved a fair system of administering justice. German authorities recognised this in October 2004, when, as has already been noted, they finally extradited to Turkey the Islamist fanatic Metin Kaplan. But other cases remained unresolved in 2004. In Belgium, apart from the cause célèbre of Fahriye Erdal, who, as we have seen, was still fighting her extradition to Turkey on charges of involvement in the murder of a businessman, the case against 17 suspected members of PKK/KADEK, apprehended as long ago as 1996, was still dragging on. In October 2004, radical Kurdish nationalists in Europe were waging a campaign to prevent the extradition to Turkey, ordered the previous month by the Dutch justice ministry, of Nuriye Kesbir, a woman member of the PKK terrorist organisation. She had been arrested in Holland as early as September 2001 and was subsequently refused political asylum.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s convergence with the EU is extending to the field of security. A memorandum of understanding on security was signed when the British prime minister Tony Blair visited Ankara in the spring of 2004. A similar memorandum records the agreement reached by Greece and Turkey on security measures. But agreements are not enough. Security agencies must learn to work together to ensure implementation.

It must be admitted that identifying terrorists, and particularly foreign terrorists, is not an easy task for any police force or judiciary. As we have already seen, banned terrorist organisations have a habit of reappearing under different names. In addition, terrorists are adept at establishing subsidiary bodies and front organisations. The PKK had set up in Europe front organisations for women, young people, workers, intellectuals and even religious people (with separate groups for Sunnis, Alevi and the small syncretistic sect known as Yezidis, or, to their critics, as devil-worshippers). There are also media organisations, which deny organic links with the PKK but which propagate its views and those of its...
successors. We have already mentioned the monthly journal Serwhebun and the newspaper Özgür Politika, both published in Germany. There is also a news agency (Mezopotamya Haber Ajansı/MHA), several radio stations and, most important of all, satellite television stations broadcasting from Europe.

Between 1995 and 1999 the main channel for the dissemination of PKK news and views was the TV station MED-TV (the name derives from the ancient Medes, whom Kurdish nationalists claim for their ancestors). It has been described as ‘the jewel in the party’s crown’, although the station director ‘firmly denied’ that the PKK exercised a strong influence over its broadcasts.28 The programmes of MED-TV appear to have been put together in Brussels and transmitted to satellite from Britain. On September 18, 1996, Belgian police raided the studios of MED-TV near Brussels, the office of the so-called Kurdish Parliament in Exile and the offices of the PKK terrorist organisation. The operation was code-named ‘Sputnik’. Many documents and film footage were seized and five persons were arrested. They were released after thirty days pending trial. The Brussels prosecutor’s office also investigated reports that the PKK had been guilty of laundering black money, smuggling people, falsifying documents, smuggling drugs and blackmailing.29 Eight years later, the judicial process was still not complete.

The transmissions of MED-TV ceased in April 1999 when Britain’s Independent Television Commission ruled that MED-TV broadcasts were ‘likely to encourage or incite to crime or lead to disorder’. But by July of the same year, a new pro-PKK Kurdish station, called Medya-TV, had begun broadcasting twelve hours each day.30 Medya-TV published on its website the address of its head office and its advertising department in Paris, and the telephone numbers of its editorial offices and newsroom in Brussels.31 On February 13, 2004, the French authorities cancelled the station’s licence, and it ceased broadcasting, to be replaced as from March 1, 2004, by Roj-TV (Roj means ‘day’ or ‘the sun’ in Kurdish).32 The new station is operated by the Mesopotamia Broadcasting Company, a sister organisation of the Mesopotamian news agency (MHA), which reports the activities of PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. This broadcasting company was established in 1998 and the following year it obtained a licence from the Danish ministry of culture. Following the launch of Mezopotamya TV, MHA applied for a licence for Roj-TV. Some of its programmes are supplied by production companies registered in Germany and in Sweden. On the day Roj-TV began broadcasting, its director said that it wanted to ‘profit from the experience’ of staff formerly employed by Medya-TV.33 In June 2002, the Spanish authorities refused accreditation to correspondents of MED-TV, of the MHA news agency and of Özgür Politika who wanted to follow the Seville summit of the EU Council of Ministers.34 So it seems that the Spaniards, with their experience of ETA, are more particular than
their colleagues in Denmark, Sweden and Germany about the credentials of these media.

Admittedly, it is not easy to stop the dissemination of propaganda by terrorist organisations. When she was prime minister in Britain, Margaret Thatcher said famously that she wanted to ‘deprive the terrorists of the oxygen of publicity’, and banned broadcasts of interviews given by terrorists in their own voices. The ban was opposed by broadcasters and journalists and was circumvented by the simple expedient of getting actors to mouth the words of IRA members or sympathisers interviewed on TV. The prohibition on interviews with advocates of violence was later lifted in response to protests by journalists’ organisations. The Americans are facing the same difficulty with the Arabic-language Al-Jazira television station, broadcasting from Qatar, which insists that when it broadcasts statements by, or videos emanating from, terrorist sources it is simply performing its journalistic duty, as it does when it reports stories from American sources. But though it is difficult to define, there is a line separating reporting from the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. The broadcaster must have his heart in the right place. He must consciously avoid encouraging terrorists. It is up to the licensing authorities to make sure that this rule is respected.

The internet is not subject to licensing and this is often hailed as its democratic virtue. But at the same time, this freedom has been widely abused by pornographers, terrorists, people spreading libellous gossip and other malicious groups. Where the origin of the internet message can be traced, the authorities can take legal action. But this is not easy since the source can be a mobile telephone. Anti-terrorist authorities keep the internet and mobile telephony under constant surveillance but are unable to stop abuse. Many software programmes now incorporate a feature called ‘parental control’ to stop children from accessing noxious material. Perhaps the practice could be extended to noxious terrorist material without subjecting the internet to overall censorship, which has been attempted unsuccessfully in countries ruled by authoritarian regimes.

Outside the immediate ring of PKK front organisations and of media sympathetic to PKK and its successors, there are foundations which were set up to promote Kurdish culture and which, as an inevitable result, encourage Kurdish nationalism. As a writer in The Times Literary Supplement has pointed out, ‘Today, a significant portion of linguistic research is done in two of the capitals of the Kurdish diaspora, Paris and Stockholm.’ In Paris this work takes place in the Kurdish Institute (Institut Kurde de Paris), founded in 1993, and recognised as a charity (fondation d’utilité publique) by the French authorities. It receives subsidies from French public funds on a project basis. In addition to academic work, the institute is also politically active, as witness the fact that it shares offices with the International Committee for the Liberation of Kurdish Parliamentarians.
Imprisoned in Turkey (CILDEKT). It will be recalled that these parliamentarians have now been freed pending a retrial. In Spain, which like France is a member of the EU, a support group for prisoners of the ETA terrorist organisation has been declared illegal, while a newspaper (*Egin*) sympathetic to ETA and the latter’s youth wing have been closed down.\(^{38}\)

In Sweden, interest in Kurdish culture and Kurdish affairs generally is promoted by the Kurdish Library, which advertises on its website the fact that it is supported by the Swedish government and the city of Stockholm. The website of the library encourages parents to give their children pure Kurdish names and says that it is considering sending birthday presents to children so named. Among its links there is one to KONGRAGEL, which has been banned in the European Union as a terrorist organisation.\(^{39}\)

It may be unfair to mention cultural organisations in a study of terrorism. But as Rohan Gunaratna, research fellow in the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence in the university of St Andrews in Scotland, has pointed out, host countries, ‘especially liberal democracies, provide a healthy environment for terrorist front groups where – under the guise of conducting cultural, economic, political and religious activities – terrorist organisations accumulate political-economic influence’. Gunaratna examines how these ‘mobilise human rights and humanitarian organisations on their behalf, infiltrate NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and manipulate their co-ethnic and co-religious diasporic communities’.\(^{40}\)

To point out the danger of infiltration and manipulation is not to cast aspersions on the motives and work of bona-fide scholars.

The latitude allowed on occasion by liberal democracies to advocates, not to say perpetrators, of terrorist violence has given rise to suspicions that the West (especially Western Europe) wishes to weaken Turkey.\(^{41}\) However, as any realistic assessment of international relations would make clear, the West needs, on the contrary, a strong, stable and prosperous Turkey as its partner in a troubled region. It remains true nevertheless that Turkey tends to be judged more harshly than other members of the Western community. Why, for example, did Germany which has given its support to American operations against terrorists in Afghanistan, impose embargoes on the export of weapons which might have been used against terrorists in Turkey? If anti-terrorist operations in Turkey could conceivably harm innocent civilians, does not the same objection apply to the ‘collateral damage’ admittedly caused to civilians in US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq? One answer to these questions would be that an influential section of Western public opinion has difficulty in recognising terrorists in Turkey for what they are, and that, in any case, it finds excuses for them. Sometimes these excuses are provided by front organisations set up by terrorist networks. But more often than not they arise from misconceptions both about history and about Turkey today.
To take history first, Western views of Turkey are still influenced by a distorted picture of the Ottoman Empire. True, a rehabilitation of the Ottoman past is under way. The Ottoman Empire is now seen by many scholars and reputable observers of the international scene as having been much more tolerant of ethnic diversity and much better at keeping law and order than its successor states have proved to be. However, this wisdom from hindsight, deriving from a realisation of the current sorry state of many of the territories once ruled by the Ottomans, has not put out of mind the idea that the Turkish Republic today perpetuates the oppressive traits of the Ottoman legacy. Terrorists can make good use of this presumption of oppression by Turkey’s rulers.

Second, Westerners who find excuses for terrorists in Turkey ignore or disregard basic facts. These are that Turkey is ruled by a government chosen by and responsible to a freely elected parliament; that all citizens have the vote; that all elections have been free since 1950; that the country enjoys press freedom within the law; that the media are robust in their criticism of the authorities and that self-criticism is a national pastime; that Turkey is an open country, its openness exposing abuses and shortcomings that are hidden elsewhere; and that the judiciary is independent in upholding the law.

None of this means, of course, that the administration and the practice of democracy are unblemished in Turkey. The process of convergence with the West that began under the reforming Sultans in the nineteenth century, gained impetus with Atatürk’s reforms after the proclamation of the republic in 1923, and moved forward when Turkey became a military ally of Western democracies against Soviet expansionism after World War II, is now continuing as Turkey is preparing for full membership of the European Union. But although no date can be set for the realisation of this latest objective, one can say here and now that Turkey is a secular democracy under the rule of law and should be treated like other democracies, none of which is perfect. True, it has particular problems because it is young as a nation state (although it has a long state tradition), because it is much poorer than Western Europe, largely as a result of a recent population explosion, and because it has not as yet caught up with the West in the acquisition and dissemination of modern skills, in spite of recent rapid advances. We have pointed out how relative poverty, income disparity and the as yet incomplete integration of some traditional communities in the national society have facilitated the emergence of terrorists. But none of these factors is sufficient to explain, let alone justify, terrorism. The terrorists who have been active in Turkey, like their counterparts in the West, are not interested either in reform or in democracy. They are intent on imposing their will on the country. Terrorism delays the extension of freedom and other reforms, because a society’s first instinct is to defend itself.
In any case, in the words of the former Turkish foreign minister İsmail Cem, spoken before September 11, ‘social or political demand[s] or the presumed lack of certain freedoms cannot justify the demand and the massacre of thousands. Terror cannot be justified under any circumstances.’

Turkey has defeated the four onslaughts of terrorism which have assailed it since the 1960s. The state of emergency which had been proclaimed in the south-east of the country was gradually narrowed down and then lifted totally in 2002. Turkish society then turned its attention to new concerns. According to a public opinion survey, the proportion of people who believed that terrorism and security were the country’s most important problem fell from 45 per cent in 1994 to 1.7 per cent in April 2002. But a few months later, Turkey began to feel the repercussions of the terrorist outrage of September 11 and of its sequel, the war in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. In the West, security concerns were centred on the menace of Islamist terrorism of which al-Qaeda was seen as the chief representative and the symbol. This is natural since almost all recent terrorist attacks on Western targets were launched by Islamist terrorists. In October 2002, barely a month after 9/11, Islamists caused the death of some 200 persons, mainly Western tourists, when they firebombed a nightclub on the Indonesian island of Bali. On March 12, 2004 another 200 people were killed when Islamist terrorists of North African origin exploded bombs on Madrid suburban trains. The carnage in Afghanistan and in Iraq, after the end of military operations in the two countries, was the work of terrorists who proclaimed themselves warriors for Islam, even as they killed other Muslims. On September 1, 2004, the civilised world was shocked by the massacre of the innocent – schoolchildren and their teachers – in the town of Beslan in Northern Ossetiya (in the Russian Federation). In Beslan, Chechen ethnic separatist terrorism and religious fanaticism came together in the commission of a crime against humanity. Similarly, Islamist militants are responsible for the acts of terror which mark the resistance to the Israeli occupation of territories inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. In Palestine, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and similar secularist organisations, which hijacked aircraft in the 1970s, have been back-staged by the Islamic Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

It was natural, therefore, for the West to sympathise with Turkey when Islamist terrorists bombed Istanbul in November 2003, particularly since the second wave of attacks on November 20 was directed at British targets. But Turkey has suffered much more from the terrorism of the Kurdish nationalist PKK than from Islamist or ideological (extreme rightist and leftist) terrorists. ‘I am the prime minister of a country which has lost 40,000 victims to terror,’ declared prime minister Erdoğan in July 2004, when he underlined his country’s backing for the international war on terror. As has already been explained, some 35,000 of the 40,000 victims in Turkey died as a result of the PKK terror campaign. After 9/11, Turkey
can count on greater Western help in fighting Islamist terrorists. But although PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL has been listed as a terrorist organisation both in the EU and the USA, Turkish concerns about the threat of ethnic terrorism are less widely shared. In a book published in 2001 when he was Turkish foreign minister, İsmail Cem wrote:

I believe that West Europeans have a share in the responsibility for the ethnic and separatist terrorism that Turkey faced in the 1980’s and in 1990’s. This does not relieve Turkey’s political leadership of its own responsibility, due to mismanagement. Nevertheless, the Western political elite and media by their misunderstandings and prejudices, sometimes by their animosity, contributed fully to the tragedies that Turkey went through.45

In May 2003, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, who was then Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff (later Commander of the 1st Army in Istanbul, and then Commander of Land Forces) put this question to a symposium on security: ‘Do powerful countries harm the national interests of weaker countries by imposing on them their own threat perceptions, which they have defined with reference to their own national interests?’46 The decision of the US administration to go to war in Iraq derived from its national threat perception and evaluation. So too the tendency to equate terrorism with Islamist militancy reflects the threat perception of most Western countries. But it is dangerous to compartmentalise terrorism.

Particularly after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, terrorists of various hues and conflicting inspirations are joining forces under the banner of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. It is often difficult now to determine which particular brand of terrorist is responsible for an attack. The terrorists who exploded bombs when the British prime minister Tony Blair visited Turkey in May 2004, and then on the eve of the NATO summit in Istanbul the following month, were probably Marxist extremists. But they might equally well have been Islamist fanatics. When the governor of the province of Van in eastern Turkey escaped an assassination attempt in July 2004, it was generally assumed that the perpetrators were members of PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. But some analysts thought the evidence pointed to Hizbullah,47 while others wondered whether the drug mafia had a hand in it. As has already been noted, there have been temporary alliances between separatist, Marxist and Islamist terrorists in Turkey. All of them have also had a hand in drug trafficking.

Inevitably the priorities of the anti-terror campaign will change with circumstances. As early as 1997 the Turkish National Security Council switched its priorities and decided that Islamist militancy presented the greatest threat to the country. If security is not re-established in Iraq, and particularly if inter-communal conflict in that country develops into a fully
fledged civil war and gives rise to large-scale population movements, ethnic terrorism may again become the greater threat, or it may combine with Islamist terrorism in a single menace.

The global campaign against terrorism has destroyed the headquarters of al-Qaeda and has made it difficult for its leadership to keep the organisation together. Among Turkish Marxist extremists, the banned DHKP/C has been succeeded by a constellation of small violent groups and front organisations. The success of the Turkish armed forces and the clearly expressed desire of the people of south-eastern Turkey to live in peace have led to splits within PKK. What we are witnessing can be described as the atomisation of terrorism – the proliferation of small violent groups some franchised by larger networks, others claiming unilaterally to act in the name of this or that organisation. None can be overlooked. Terrorism is a universal danger and it must be fought worldwide. But if the anti-terrorist struggle is a war, then it is a long-term war of attrition. As Professor Walter Laqueur has pointed out, the key role in this war should be played by intelligence and security services, which may need a military arm. Patience and inter-service co-operation and co-ordination on both a national and an international scale, particularly among allies, are needed at all times, for, to quote Professor Laqueur again, ‘Terrorism . . . will continue – not perhaps with the same intensity at all times – and some parts of the globe may be spared altogether. But there can be no victory, only an uphill struggle, at times successful, at others not.’

The persistence of terrorism should not make us forget the successes achieved in anti-terrorist operations – by the British in defeating the Communist terrorist insurgency in Malaya after World War II, by the Peruvian government against Sendero Luminoso, and by the Turkish security forces which defeated the PKK in a struggle which lasted for fifteen years between 1984 and 1999. If they are to be successful, anti-terrorist forces must match the terrorists in persistency.

The fact that we shall never live in a perfect world must not deflect us from efforts to make it as safe as we can. September 11 has already led to greater co-operation among agencies fighting against terrorism. Intelligence is more widely shared; terrorist organisations which had been tolerated have been banned and their funds frozen. Now their list must be kept under constant review and revised as necessary. The activities of people with a terrorist record must also be watched carefully. Where there are good legal grounds for extradition, this should not be denied. As criminologists often point out, it is not the severity but the certainty of punishment that has the greater deterrent effect.

Prosperous democratic countries can also contribute to the fight against terrorism by reviewing their immigration and asylum policies. Attention has recently been focused on the activity of traffickers in human misery who are paid for smuggling illegal immigrants. Some of these traffickers
are politically motivated. Like other terrorist organisations, the PKK has exploited illegal immigrants by smuggling them in or by sponsoring claims to political asylum by economic migrants. It is instructive to note that the number of Turks seeking asylum in Western Europe decreased gradually between 1990 and 1993, as terrorism was being mastered, but then rose again steeply in 1994 in the wake of an economic crisis.49 A sensible immigration policy would welcome economic migrants where there are employment opportunities for them, instead of pushing them into the arms of traffickers and terrorists.

There is another area in which liberal democracies can help – by going back or at least revising policies launched with the best intentions, which have nevertheless produced harmful unintended consequences. In an admirable effort to grant greater respect to old-established or immigrant ethnic or religious minorities, Western liberals have promoted the adoption of the ideal of multiculturalism. This sometimes involved positive discrimination, and often the expenditure of public funds. Officially promoted multiculturalism has strengthened the natural initial tendency of immigrants to lead separate lives in ghettos, whose existence increases friction between the immigrants and the host community. Friction is further increased by the employment of religious preachers and secular teachers, who are sometimes paid out of public funds, in order to cater for the immigrants in their own mother tongue. Inevitably, some of the teachers are nationalists, sometimes extreme nationalists, and some of the preachers are fanatics. It is bad enough when such agitators are chosen and paid by the immigrants themselves; it is scandalous when they are financed by the taxpayers of the host country, under whose laws it is a crime to stir up hatred on racial grounds.

Several European countries – Britain, Germany, France, Holland, Denmark – have recently begun to realise that, apart from being a potential menace to their international relations, multiculturalism can be an obstacle to the integration of immigrants and to the establishment of good relations between the majority and minorities. As a result, there is a new emphasis on the culture of the host country, as expressed in its official language. Many liberals who used to promote multiculturalism are now trying to work out a new modern definition of a unifying national culture which embraces all minorities. There is a new emphasis on the proper teaching of the country’s common language of communication, which can be none other than the principal official language.

The concept of a shared, unifying national culture, expressed in the official language, has always been dominant in the French Republic, which served as a model for the republic established by Atatürk in Turkey. A unifying national culture was the prerequisite of nation-building. It was sensible to delay the advent of multiculturalism until society, which formed the nation, was strong enough to absorb it. It is fortunate that
multiculturalism is making an appearance on the Turkish scene at a time when the limitations and dangers of the concept are better understood. It is always difficult to make proper provision for linguistic or religious minorities without creating division in society. The difficulty persists in Turkey. But it has been lessened by the defeat of the PKK terrorist insurgency and the upsurge of popular opposition to its resumption.

On January 6, 1941, as tyrants were extending their dominion in a deadly world war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formulated the Four Freedoms as his social and political objective. They were the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom of every person to worship God in his own way, the freedom from want and the freedom from fear. September 11 is a reminder that Roosevelt’s vision must be pursued as a whole. Political, social and religious freedom must be complemented by the elimination of poverty. And none of these freedoms can be enjoyed without freedom from fear. Terrorism is by definition the instigation and exploitation of fear for political ends. Turkey has paid a high price to defeat it. All those who sincerely want Turkey to enjoy the first three freedoms must help it retain its hard-earned freedom from the fear of terrorism.
In the winter of 2004/5 and the following spring, the PKK maintained its presence in northern Iraq and continued to target Turkey, despite dissensions in its ranks and increasing hostility from Islamist militants. In December 2004, there were reports that five leading PKK members had been shot dead near Mosul in an area where Islamist terrorists were active. In February 2005, it was the PKK which was accused of attacking Syrian Kurds who had joined the rival PWD group. At the beginning of May, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg found fault with the procedure followed in the trial of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Turkey in 1999. Procedural errors will now have to be rectified, a prospect that the Turkish government has taken calmly. In April 2005, Abdullah Öcalan issued a declaration proposing ‘democratic confederalism’ as a solution to the Kurdish problem in the Middle East. It was presumably on this or a similar basis that the US Country Reports on Terrorism 2004, released on April 27, stated that ‘the PKK’s aim has been to establish an independent, democratic Kurdish state in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq and parts of Iran and Syria’. In reply to Turkish press criticism, the US embassy in Ankara made it clear that this passage did not imply any change in the American position that PKK/KONGRA-GEL was a banned foreign terrorist organisation. But there was still no action against the PKK encamped in northern Iraq.

On March 10, 2005, the commander of the Turkish land forces, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, warned that as a result of the infiltration of terrorists from northern Iraq, there were now as many PKK militants inside Turkey as there had been at the time Abdullah Öcalan’s arrest in 1998. His words were borne out by reports of clashes in southeast Turkey: two terrorists killed in the province of Mardin in November; another two in Tunceli in December; two soldiers and five terrorists killed in the same province on January 15; five terrorists killed in the province of Şırnak a few days later; two terrorists and a village guard shot dead in Tunceli in April; a village guard killed, and three soldiers and one civilian wounded in the province of Bingöl at the beginning of April; nine PKK militants and one NCO were killed.
a few days later in Şırnak. This was followed by a major operation in the same province, which resulted in the death of 21 PKK militants and cost the lives of three soldiers and one village guard. By the end of May, the number of deaths caused by terrorists since the previous June had climbed to 107. Nearly half of the victims were killed by land mines smuggled in from northern Iraq.

Most Turks believe that the attitude of the West – of the US in Iraq and of the Europeans in their own countries – is an important factor in the persistence of PKK terrorism. Speaking in Norway on April 12, Prime Minister Erdoğan complained that the West identified the PKK with the Kurdish people as a whole. However, some measures were being taken against the PKK in Europe. On November 12, 2004, Dutch authorities raided a camp where they suspected PKK militants were being trained for terrorist attacks in Turkey and arrested 38 people, 18 of whom were subsequently released. Cooperation by the Dutch in the struggle against terrorism was long overdue. In December 2004, a defector from a PKK camp in northern Iraq claimed that the terrorists had procured their wireless equipment from Holland and obtained their rockets via Armenia. The terrorists, he added, had stored 3,000 tons of explosives and 2,500 mines in one of their bases in Iraq. Turkish authorities had good reason to demand action against them. On November 20, it was reported that a serviceman’s wife was killed and 14 people were injured when a bus carrying service families struck a mine in the province of Şırnak.

Instability in Iraq continued to claim Turkish lives. Five Turkish security guards were gunned down in Mosul in December 2004 as they were travelling to take up their duties at the Turkish embassy in Baghdad. This brought the number of Turkish nationals killed in Iraq to nearly 80.

Turkish tourism was again targeted. On February 23, a bomb was exploded in the yard of a maritime transport company in Istanbul. On April 27, 2005, the Istanbul police carried out controlled explosions of a bomb which had been placed beneath the bridge across the Golden Horn, and another left next to the municipal bus garage. Two days later a policeman was killed and four others were injured when they tried to remove a bomb in the tourist resort of Kuşadası on the Aegean. On May 1, the police found five kilos of explosives in the luggage of a recently released female terrorist who was travelling from the southeast of the country to the Aegean port of İzmir.

In contrast, Islamist terrorists, against whom the West presented a united front, were unable to mount any more attacks in Turkey. Similarly, the Western ban on the Marxist DHKP/C forced the latter to confine its activities to demonstrations in favour of its imprisoned members. These achieved some success on March 8, when the Istanbul police used excessive force in dispersing a women’s demonstration, and was widely criticised for its
action. However, on another occasion the police saved the lives of DHKP/C sympathisers who were attacked by a mob in the Black Sea port of Trabzon.

On May 16, 2005, a new convention on the prevention of terrorism was opened for signature by the Council of Europe in Warsaw. It tightened up the definitions of terrorism and the duties of the signatories in combating the terrorist threat. However, loopholes still remain. Thus when signatory states ratify the convention, they can still reserve the right to refuse extradition on the grounds that an alleged terrorist act was a political offence.\textsuperscript{25} Even when terrorist activity peters out, its social repercussions require long-term treatment. But for the moment the main task is still to end terrorism.

May 2005
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9 Ibid., 246.
11 David McDowall, 386.
Ansar, meaning ‘helpers’, was the name given to the inhabitants of Medina who took up arms in support of the Prophet Muhammad.

Mehmet Faraç, 16–17.

www.sucdosyasi.gen.tr.

Ercan Çitlioğlu, 288.

Mehmet Faraç, 45–6.

Ercan Çitlioğlu, 265.

Mehmet Faraç, 61.

Ibid., 112. Med-Zehra took its name from Medresetül-Zehra [The Radiant Medrese], the Islamic college which Said-i Nursi wanted to set up. The Med-Zehra group arose out of a split in the Nurcu community, and brought together Kurdish followers of Said-i Nursi who treat him as a Kurdish nationalist, whereas the Turks stress his pan-Islamism (Hakan Yavuz ‘Islam in the Public Sphere’ in Hakan Yavuz and John Esposito (eds), Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, Syracuse University Press, 2003, 17).

İzzettin Yıldırım rose to the top after a split in the Med-Zehra faction. His group formed the Zehra Kültürü ve Eğitim Vakfı [Zehra Foundation for Culture and Education] which focused on education rather than on Kurdish nationalism (Hakan, 17).

Ruşen Çakır, ‘Hizbullah Nihayet Sessizliğini Bozdu’ [Hizbullah Has Finally Broken its Silence], an article carried by NTVMSNBC on June 23, 2004.

Ibid., 50–1.


Mehmet Faraç, 51.

www.islamiyetgerecekleri.org/cumhuriyetyazar.html.

Mehmet Faraç, 128.

The Annual Register 1993, 104.

Ibid., 55.

Ibid., 238.

Ruşen Çakır quoting a book written by a certain ‘İ. Bagasi’ (Bagasi, the name of a village in the south-eastern province of Batman is said to be the birthplace of İsa Altsoy, a close companion of the Hizbullah leader Velioglu).


www.hadep.org.tr/sehilter.

Mehmet Faraç, 224–7.


Ibid., 136.

Ibid., 240.

Ibid., 149.

Ibid., passim.


NTVMSNBC, July 5, 2002.


Ercan Çitlioğlu, 325–6.


See Ümit Furkan, Kendi Kaleminden İBDA Mimari Salih Mirzabeyoğlu [Salih Mirzabeyoğlu, Architect of İBDA Pens His Own Story] on http://members.lycos.fr/gazete/kendi_kaleminden-ibda-mimari.htm. Mirzabeyoğlu has called his autobiography Tilki Günlüğü [The Diary of a Fox].

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50 NTVMSNBC on May 31, 2004. See also Hürriyet, December 1, 2003.
51 NTVMSNBC, September 13, 2004.
60 Ibid., December 18, 2004.
66 Briefing letter by Turkish General Staff to members of US Congress.
68 www.turkses.com/countryreport/kaplanists_may_move_their_activities.htm.

5 FREEDOM FROM FEAR

3 Pirim and Örtülü, 113.
6 NTVMSNBC September 10, 2004. On September 14, NTVMSNBC reported that Aktaş’s uncle had identified him from a photograph of his dead body.
7 NTVMSNBC, September 15, 2004.
8 NTVMSNBC reported on September 29, 2004, that another Turkish driver had been killed near Mosul.
9 NTVMSNBC, August 16, 2004.
12 www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-o98e.htm.
14 Statement by the Iranian Deputy President, Mohammad Aref, to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, during the latter’s visit to Teheran on July 28, 2004, reported by NTVMSNBC.
17 Ibid.
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19 Eur-Lex, 32002D0334.
20 EU Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, December 12, 2003, paragraph 54.
23 AFP despatch from Düsseldorf, July 10, 2002.
26 www.kurdistan.no (a website operating out of Norway), updated October 22, 2004; extradition decision reported by Reuters on September 8, 2004.
27 Özcan, 308–10.
28 Paul White, 175–6.
30 Ibid., 177.
33 Interview in Özgür Politika, March 1, 2004.
34 Özgür Politika, June 22, 2002.
37 www.institutkurde.org.
38 Guardian, June 6, 2002.
41 As a typical example of this attitude see Atila Şehirli, Türkiye’de Bölücü Terör Hareketleri, Burak, Istanbul 2000, 425–40.
43 TÜSES survey quoted in Radikal, July 18, 2002.
45 İsmail Cem, 103.
49 ANKA agency report published in Hürriyet on May 20, 2002.

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25 Article 20.2. See www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/Fight_against_terrorism.
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